Interpretive activity in the judge’s professional occupation

Auteurs

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2020.29.05.47

Mots-clés :

decision of the ECHR, interpretation of law, legal argumentation, legal communication, legal consciousness.

Résumé

The purpose of the article is a comprehensive analysis of the issue of the judge’s interpretive activity from the standpoint of the judge’s cognition in such a process of unchangeable dualism of the factual circumstances of the case and the norm of the law. To achieve this goal, such methods as dialectic, comparative, formal-logical, communicative and phenomenological was used. The article deals with the approach according to which the judge's interpretive activity during professional occupation is a necessary method of specifying the content of abstract, relatively defined legal norms; and these norms become applicable in solving certain debatable questions. It is concluded that the judge creates the search for the best solution of a particular legal position. Reconciling the uniqueness of the law case and the formality of the legislative provisions resolving case is impossible without interpretive activity. One of the peculiarities of the dynamics of the interpretive activity of the European Court of Human Rights is its intellectual and creative nature; mechanical transformation of the norms of law into individual acts and "stereotype" application of previous court decisions are not admissible. The judge's interpretive activity combines rational-technical and existential-semantic levels, which necessitates a high level of personal and professional maturity of the judge. The problem of interpretation is not only technical skills in legislative provisions; it covers an important "standpoint" of the reality based on the professional experience and legal consciousness.

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Bibliographies de l'auteur

Nataliia Huralenko, Chernivtsi National University, Ukraine.

Associate Professor, Doctor of Laws, Associate Professor, Department of Human Rights, Faculty of Law, Chernivtsi National University, Ukraine.

Oksana Voloshchuk, Chernivtsi Institute of Law of National University "Odessa Law Academy", Ukraine.

PhD in Law, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of International and Customs Law, Chernivtsi Institute of Law of National University "Odessa Law Academy", Ukraine.

Stepan Slyvka, Lviv Polytechnic National University, Ukraine.

Professor, Doctor of Laws, Professor, Department of Theory, History and Philosophy of Law, Faculty of Law, Lviv Polytechnic National University, Ukraine.

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Publiée

2020-05-18

Comment citer

Huralenko, N., Voloshchuk, O., & Slyvka, S. (2020). Interpretive activity in the judge’s professional occupation. Amazonia Investiga, 9(29), 427–435. https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2020.29.05.47

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