

## Artículo de investigación

**Political regime of the modern Russia: transformation factors and institutional traps**ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ РЕЖИМ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РОССИИ: ФАКТОРЫ  
ТРАНСФОРМАЦИИ И ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ ЛОВУШКИ

Régimen político de la Rusia moderna: factores de transformación y trampas institucionales

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[https://elibrary.ru/author\\_items.asp?authorid=781981](https://elibrary.ru/author_items.asp?authorid=781981)**Abstract**

The possibility of applying a neoinstitutional theory in the study of hybrid political regimes has been studied in the article. The authors use the "institutional traps" theory of Academician V. Polterovich to analyze the state of the post-Soviet political regime. The authors have identified six institutional traps that penetrate the hybrid political regime at the present stage (the "separation of powers" trap, the "freedom of gathering" trap, the "freedom of speech" trap, the "legislature" trap, the "electoral region" trap, the "federalism" trap) and have given a characteristic of each of them.

In conclusion, the authors have defined the general framework and concepts of methodology and have come to the conclusion about the advantage of using the methodology of neoinstitutionalism to study hybrid political regimes.

**Keywords:** Neoinstitutionalism, political regime, political institutions, institutional traps, interim institutions, institutional environment, hybrid political regimes.

**Аннотация**

В статье исследована возможность применения неинституциональной теории при изучении гибридных политических режимов. Авторы используют теорию «институциональных ловушек» академика В. Полтеровича для анализа состояния постсоветского политического режима. Авторы определили шесть институциональных ловушек, которые проникают в гибридный политический режим на современном этапе (ловушка "разделения властей", ловушка "свободы собраний", ловушка "свободы слова", ловушка "законодательного органа", "избирательный округ" ловушка, "федерализм", ловушка) и дали характеристику каждому из них.

В заключение авторы определили общие рамки и концепции методологии и пришли к выводу о преимуществе использования методологии неинституционализма для изучения гибридных политических режимов.

**Ключевые слова:** неинституционализм, политический режим, политические институты, институциональные ловушки, временные институты, институциональная среда, гибридные политические режимы.

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## Resumen

La posibilidad de aplicar una teoría neoinstitucional en el estudio de regímenes políticos híbridos ha sido estudiada en el artículo. Los autores utilizan la teoría de las "trampas institucionales" del académico V. Polterovich para analizar el estado del régimen político postsoviético. Los autores han identificado seis trampas institucionales que penetran en el régimen político híbrido en la etapa actual (la trampa de "separación de poderes", la trampa de "libertad de reunión", la trampa de "libertad de expresión", la trampa de "legislatura", el "trampa de la región electoral, la trampa del" federalismo ") y han dado una característica de cada uno de ellos. En conclusión, los autores han definido el marco general y los conceptos de metodología y han llegado a la conclusión sobre la ventaja de utilizar la metodología del neoinstitucionalismo para estudiar regímenes políticos híbridos.

**Palabras clave:** Neoinstitucionalismo, régimen político, instituciones políticas, trampas institucionales, instituciones provisionales, ambiente institucional, regímenes políticos híbridos.

## Introduction

The problems of the political life of the state have particular relevance. Attention to them arises both in scientific polemics and in the laymen environment. The issues of choosing the means, methods and techniques for exercising power that underlie it, of the mechanisms resulting from their combination, and of their general impact on the state life have been dominant among the key issues studied in the sciences, the subject of which includes concepts of the idea of the state, since the inception of the state. The states themselves, from democratic to despotic, largely differ in the set of their methods and techniques of exercising power, which determines some other differences.

The political regime, which contains a set of techniques and methods for exercising power, determines the nature of the relationship between the state and the individual, represents the order of interaction between the structure of administrators and the administrated. A particularly subtle connection between the state and the individual, which can be traced in this volume, is expressed in the political regime of the state and establishes a circle of relations resulting from this administration system. According to the authors, the political regime of the state is one of the fundamental principles that form the structure of the state. The specifics of social relations arise on this basis – in particular, relations between power and subordination, as well as nonpolitical relations. Moreover, the specific nature is defined by a direct dependence on the qualitative correlation of the methods used in organizing the administration system in the state. As such, the relevance of studying the concept of "political regime" is based on its basic nature for the theory of the state and is primarily due to epistemological reasons: the existing level

of cognitive practice and the type of political culture. Such poorly studied objective phenomena as "endogenous" and "exogenous" factors of transformation of the post-Soviet political regime require a systematic analysis with the identification of correlation relationships.

Lack of research into the endogenous and exogenous factors of the post-Soviet political regime transformation has direct impact on the quality of forecasts related to the direction of the political regime development.

In particular, the critical problem of the variability of political modernization arose, and the accents of a liberal and civil patriotic principle were revealed. The immediate results of a comprehensive research into the problem of transforming the political regime of post-Soviet Russia today are in demand both by regional political practice and by the choice of the country's development path and the role of Russia in the world political process. Consequently, the problem of rational understanding and systematization of the factors of the political regime transformation in the modern Russia will allow to specify the vector of its political modernization and transformations.

The writings of H. Arendt (1996), R. Dahl (2000), A. Leiphart (1997), S. Huntington (2003), P. Schmitter (1996), G. O'Donnell (1994), and others made a significant contribution to the study of political regimes. The focus of the local political science is also made on the types and forms of the political system development, and the emphasis was made on the problem of the political regime in the modern Russia. The specifics of the political regime in

Russia in various historical periods in the context of the problem of establishing democratic regime in modern Russia were revealed in the writings of A. Galkin (1998), M. Krasin (2003), I. Klyamkin (1995), V. Sogrin (2001), and L. Shevtsova (2004).

When studying the features of the political regime of Russia, special attention is paid to the analysis of the social foundations of the political regime (L. Belyaeva (2011), T. Zaslavskaya (2002; 2004), M. Rutkevich (2001), Yu. Levada (1995; 2000; 2006), Butko, 2019, and others). Hypothesis of research. The political regime of Russia at the main stages of evolution in 1993 – 2017 represented a hybrid form, combining the elements of the formation and operation of politically focused institutions for democratic development with authoritarian methods of political governance. However, democratic institutions can be "decorative", and the regime can present reversionary political means amid the economic crisis. At the same time, the transformation of the post-Soviet political regime into a new quality with overcoming the rudiments of authoritarianism in the modern Russia is objectified into an irreversible process only under the influence of endogenous and exogenous factors.

The goal of the article is to study and systematize endogenous and exogenous factors of the post-Soviet political regime transformation into a new quality.

The objectives of the article are the following:

Identification and description based on the analysis of the main political concepts of the idea of the post-Soviet political regime;  
 research into the evolutionary specifics and identification of the stages of the post-Soviet political regime;  
 analysis and systematization of endogenous and exogenous factors of the political regime transformation, their relationship in the post-Soviet political regime;  
 analysis of the ideological foundations of the post-Soviet political regime and changes in its potential in the conditions of transformation;  
 revealing the uniqueness of the subjective potential of the post-Soviet political regime, its differences in the conditions of presidencies of B.N. Yeltsin and V.V. Putin; and ranking criteria for the dynamics of the political regime in Russia (from 1993 to 2017) in order to determine the prospects of transition to a new quality and a new political form.

## Materials and methods

The authors were guided by the principle of the combined application of general scientific and private methods of cognition in the research. The following general scientific methods should be noted: the dialectical method, the method of systemic structural analysis, the formal logical method, the comparative method, deduction, induction, and analogy. The particular methods of research used in the article include formal legal, comparative legal, historical, sociological, and institutional. An important place in the work belongs to neoinstitutionalism as the methodological base for the study of the post-Soviet political regime, which lies in the very heart of the political regime. According to the authors, the political regime is a combination of formal and informal institutions and practices. Unlike classical institutionalism, neoinstitutionalism allows shifting the focus of research from formal institutions and legal norms to the study of informal practices and the sociocultural environment, and thus provides more comprehensive understanding of institutions. Institutions are understood not only as a set of rules prescribed in laws, but as real "rules of the game" to reduce costs from the interaction between the actors of the political process.

The theory of institutional traps helps review the current state of the hybrid political regime, which is in a number of institutional traps – stable but inefficient norms.

However, a certain operationalization of concepts is required. The institutional trap is understood as a sustainable, inefficient institution. The inefficiency of an institution is understood as the deviation from its perfect form, the dysfunctional state of the institution, the internal conflict between formally declared functions and the existing ones. Sustainability is described by the disadvantage of deviating from a given state of an institution or a norm; it is beneficial for the political actors to maintain such a state of the institution, and the deviation accordingly incurs transaction costs. According to the authors, the institution is in a trap not due to the influence of objective factors, not as a result of a political or economic crisis, but it rather falls into it as a result of a deliberate choice of political actors who had the opportunity to influence the "rules of the game" at the time. As such, the hybrid political regime is actually permeated by a system of institutional traps that ensure the stability of its existence.

## Results

The study has resulted in the determination of the trinity of the post-Soviet political regime: firstly, it is a combination of means objectifying the form and methods of exercising political power in the modern Russian state; secondly, it is the relations of "domination – submission" and "political control – political freedom", as the development and the embeddedness of democratic values depend on their relationship; and thirdly, it is the historical form of the post-Soviet political regime at a particular stage, objectified by the economic basis and the specifics of the political and legal culture of society.

The following stages of the post-Soviet political regime evolution to a new quality have been revealed in its development:

– "Liberal" – the stage coincides with the period of B. Yeltsin's presidency in 1991 – 1999. The unbalanced concentration of power prerogatives in the hands of the Institution of the President of the Russian Federation with the formal preservation of the principles and institutions inherent in the constitutional system; liberal economic policy; centrifugal processes in the national republics of the Russian Federation; diversity in the parties, and a high level of competition in parliamentary elections;

– "Recentralization" is the stage of strengthening the vertical federal power in the context of V. Putin's political leadership from 2000 to 2018, including the stage of modernization attempts under the interim presidency of D. Medvedev. There was a characteristic strengthening of authoritarian trends with parts of point liberalization under D. Medvedev, the elimination of centrifugal processes in the regions of the Russian Federation, active use of patriotic ideology, and strengthening of the role of special services and the army; and – a new stage in the presidency of V. Putin since 2018, which synthesizes the two previous ones and suggests two possible scenarios of development:

- a) Positive (increase in political freedom and decentralization); and
- b) Negative (increased political control, mobilization of society, and centralization and concentration of power with elements of the economy militarization).

The subsystem of endogenous factors in the political regime transformation has been defined:

- Economic factor: type of economy (mainly according to the World Bank classification, including the type of external debt/status of the country as a borrower); gross domestic product in USD at purchasing power parity per capita; export of goods and services in USD; and import of goods and services as a percentage of the gross domestic product;
- Institutional political factor: the cooperation of parties, sociopolitical movements and interest groups with political institutions, the consent of these political agents with democratic procedures, their choice of strategies and tactics; separation and competition among the state agencies or their interaction and cooperation; the specifics of the party legislation with a focus on budget funding opportunities, number of members to register, etc.; the presence of a leading party or a stable coalition (more than 2/3 of the parliamentary seats in the last three elections), the percentage of parliamentary seats that belong to the leading party or a stable coalition, the percentage of parliamentary seats that belong to other parties; and the number of parties with representation in the parliament in the last two or three electoral cycles;
- Ideological factor: the prevailing cultural and political values and orientations in society; the presence of a sense of national identity in society as a condition and prerequisite for the transition to democracy; and the nature of the expressed ideological splits and conflicts (if any) and features of the ideological spectrum;
- Social factor: a category of demarcation and development of social structure, the relationship between classes and the "supporting" social structures of society; and the inequality in income or consumption is measured by the Gini index, major socioeconomic, regional and other splits and conflicts; and
- Subjective factor: real actions and volitional intentions of the key political actors, their charisma.

The subsystem of exogenous factors of the post-Soviet political regime transformation has been defined:

- Economic pressure and sanctions of the countries of the West aimed at undermining the welfare of society;
- Financial support for opposition;
- Information war, creation of a negative image of the current government for the population, the propaganda and inoculation of the desired value systems, either Western or Russian;
- Impact on world public opinion. It includes statements by presidents, authoritative politicians and officials from various countries regarding the immorality of the political regime that needs to be influenced;
- Diplomatic influence through undermining influence or worsening conditions in international organizations;
- Attractiveness of "neighbors". For example, economically successful and stable neighboring regimes can serve as a guidemark for democratic transformations; and
- International context, the ratio of the number of democratic transitions or throwbacks towards authoritarianism for the current time period.

The dominance of the "instrumental" role of the media was measured. Such a role can predetermine stagnation in the transformation of the political regime towards democracy, which reduces the quality of governance due to weakened feedback, reduces confidence in government institutions, leads to political absenteeism, and contributes to corruption and preservation of problems and contradictions in society.

A set of institutions has formed in post-Soviet Russia that can be classified as necessary for sustainable democratic development and political stability. However, these institutions do not exist sufficiently long against the background of a long-lasting tradition of preserving the rudiments of an authoritarian regime. Negative development criteria were also revealed: the young age of the minimum electoral tradition (since 1993) and attempts of an unconstitutional change of power (in 1991 and in 1993). The low degree of competition: the losing candidates received about 29 % of the vote in total in the 2012 presidential election. The vast majority of seats in the parliament were assigned to one party – 54.20 %. The ruling party, which has a majority in the parliament since 2003, has not changed. New factions have not appeared in the parliament in the past three electoral cycles. The positive

criteria for ensuring sustainability include lowering the electoral threshold in 2016 from 7 to 5 %; elections to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation were held according to a mixed electoral system. Most of the population is included in the election institution, the voting turnout is not inferior to a number of European countries – for example, France, – but it does not reach the level of Germany or Great Britain, minority suffrage in Russia is not discriminated. There were no cases of competition undermining in the country as a result of referenda on the extension of the powers of the head of state; the incumbent president has not been in office for more than two consecutive terms, according to the letter of the Constitution. As such, from the standpoint of the institutional foundations of democracy, the post-Soviet political regime occupies an intermediate position, clearly not leaning toward an authoritarian trend, but also not belonging to liberal democracies.

## Discussion

The main current institutional traps of the post-Soviet political regime are listed and analyzed below:

### 1. The "separation of powers" trap

The authors believe that the institution of separation of powers is in the institutional trap, because the executive branch dominates the legislative and judicial branches. Possessing strong constitutional formal powers, the executive branch uses informal tools to control other branches of the state, which should be independent in their ideal institutional form. The peak of confrontation between the executive branch in the person of President B. Yeltsin and the legislative branch was resolved in 1993 in favor of the president. As a result, the president obtained wider powers enshrined in the Constitution. Opposition parties have been co-opted, and the parliament has supported the vast majority of presidential bills since 2000 and has not confronted the president. Subsequent consolidation of the status quo resulted in an increase in the barrier to the entry of parties to the State Duma to 7 % and more complicated registration of new political parties, as well as in the introduction of a ban on the creation of election blocks. The abolition of the election of the heads of executive power in the regions also fits into the general concept of maintaining the status quo; the executive power in the person of the president de facto appoints regional heads.

Despite the restitution of direct elections of regional heads in 2012, the executive federal government was already in a system with a dominant party, where the party in power fully supported the president's decisions and had leverage over the appointment of regional heads through the introduced municipal filter. As of 2018, the "municipal filter" deprived almost all political parties in Russia (except for United Russia and also the Communist Party in some regions) of the opportunity to independently nominate their candidates for posts of heads of the regions of the Russian Federation. Another important factor for maintaining the status quo was the change in the presidential term from four to six years, and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation from four to five years.

## 2. The "freedom of gathering" trap

Freedom of gathering is one of the universally recognized means of direct participation of the people in the exercise of power, but oppositional meetings pose risks to the stability of the political regime. On the one hand, the suppression of such demonstrations involved both internal and foreign political risks, from the confrontation of society to international isolation. On the other hand, the regime cannot allow democratically-minded oppositional meetings get out of control, otherwise such movements can go far beyond declaring slogans. In the context of the research into the political regime, attention should be paid to the main amendments regarding freedom of gathering that were adopted after the protests in Moscow in 2011. Amendments were made in 2012, both to the federal law "On gatherings, meetings, demonstrations, marches, and pickets," and to the related articles of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation – in particular, regarding the preliminary campaigning only after approval of the place and (or) time of the public event by the executive authority of the region of the Russian Federation or the local government body, rather than from the moment of submission of the notification of its holding (Article 10, Part 1) (2004), as was previously established by law; the introduction of the right of the regions of the Russian Federation to ban the holding of meetings, gatherings, etc. where they can "result in disruption of the functioning of life support facilities, transport or social infrastructure, communications, interfere with the movement of pedestrians and (or) vehicles or citizens' access to residential premises or objects of transport or social infrastructure" (2004); imposing the obligation to take measures to prevent exceeding

the number of participants in the event declared in the notification and establishing the administrative responsibility of the organizer for failure to fulfill this obligation on the organizer of a public event; and empowerment of executive bodies of the regions of the Russian Federation with the power to determine specially designated places for public events. As such, the executive branch acts flexibly and does not pose itself with the dangerous dilemma of "to break up or not to break up", but rather only with the dilemma of "to permit or not to permit." A dysfunction of freedom of gathering is obviously created in such a situation – an institution that should serve as one of the elements of communication between the state and society. However, there is no legislative prohibition on holding meetings, force suppression is not used, and any detentions are rare.

## 3. The "freedom of speech" trap

Freedom of speech is institutionalized in the independence of the press. The independence of the media is a pillar of the democratic development of the regime. The press should help civil society control the state by performing a supervisory function, raise important public topics for discussion, investigate the abuse of power by officials and politicians, and provide participants in the political process with the opportunity to compete with the current government in the media space. In the classical understanding of authoritarian regimes, either the institution of the media is completely under state control, or there is a strict censorship policy established in the regime. The hybrid mode follows a different path, creating a pool of the most influential media outlets. They are used to form an alternative media agenda. Any opposition-minded media are presented as marginal, sponsored from abroad and not requiring the attention of the people; the regime is trying to "cut off" the income of such media from advertising revenues. The formation of an alternative reality with a "convenient" system of values for the regime becomes the main function of the media in the institutional trap. In the context of the Russian regime, the following specifics can be mentioned:

- 1) Formation of a television oligopoly on the basis of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, the National Media Group and Gazprom-Media Holding;
- 2) Almost the entire television market belongs to the segment of federal channels, while regional television is

weakly developed, and there is insufficient support for local media companies;

- 3) "digital expansion" of the state (the law on the "right to be forgotten", Telegram ban, the law on the "sovereign Russian Internet"); and
- 4) Strengthening administrative control over the Internet.

#### 4. The "legislature" trap

Firstly, when in the institutional trap, the parliament almost ceases to fulfill its representative function, the specifics of its state lie in the fact that only parties co-opted with power are allowed into it and become part of the system. At the same time, there is a certain struggle of ideas within the parliament, though de facto it is not representative of public ideas, but rather represents a struggle of development courses within the ruling elite. Secondly, when in the institutional trap, the parliament loses the status of a leader in the legislative process, usually giving way to the government. The parliament does not enter into confrontation with the executive branch, fully supports its decisions, and thus loses its exclusive role in the system of checks and balances.

The following characteristics of the parliamentary institutional trap can be noted in the context of the Russian political regime:

1. The maximum degree of parliamentary control by a pro-presidential party (the United Russia fraction is 76.12 % of the total number of deputies) (List of deputy associations of the State Duma of Russia, 2019);
2. The presence of parties loyal to the government in the parliament, which declare their opposition only as a formality. Such parties make the system flexible and accumulate part of the protest vote, thereby actually strengthening the current dominance of the party in power;
3. The parliament does not oppose the executive branch in the legislative process, the strategy of approving the proposals of executive bodies prevails; and
4. Miscommunication between the parliament and society. The parliament loses touch with the real needs and problems of society due to the absence of real interparty competition, during which the political agenda and the need

for legislative changes are born, and therefore resonant bills arise that divide society and provoke conflicts in it. There is a danger of the formation of two parallel self-sufficient realities.

#### 5. The "electoral region" trap

Electoral competition is one of the main areas of political competition. Tough authoritarian regimes try to avoid elections. However, elections exist in a hybrid political regime – they are regular, but the institution itself is in the institutional trap. Firstly, this contradiction between the perfect state of the election institution and the real state of affairs and compliance with electoral procedures does not lead to the redistribution of power in the context of the modern political regime, but only reinforces the existing order. Secondly, elections hardly solve the problem of presenting new, changing demands of society in the political programs of candidates or parties. However, why do not autocrats cancel elections in hybrid regimes? The election institution ensures legitimization of the regime; the level of falsification usually may not be too high. The authorities prefer the strategy of not allowing potentially dangerous competitors to the elections: such candidates fall into a situation of "information outcast" in the media space and are usually forced to boycott elections. Ensuring a high turnout in such a situation is extremely necessary, otherwise any absentee can be defined as a supporter of unsystematic opposition and a boycott strategy for elections. High turnout is also the main criteria for the authorities' legitimacy from its point of view. As a result, the opposition forces do not constitute a serious electoral threat to the authorities, and the elections turn out to be uncompetitive in all respects. The possibility of large-scale fraud is limited in many cases, due to the presence of international observers or parallel vote counts.

#### 6. The "federalism" trap

In the opinion of the authors, federalism in the Russian Federation as an institution is in the institutional trap. They state a contradiction between the formal and informal state of the institution, between its form and content. The federal structure implies the actual existence of economic and political independence of the region, the equal rights of the regions in relations both among them and with the federal center, and the absence of complete hierarchical subordination to the federal center. However, in the context of Russian federalism, the following

features of federalism can be noted in the hybrid political regime that describe its state as an institutional trap:

1. The prevalence of the political expediency principle over the principle of equality of regions in the field of budget transfers. Five regions of the Russian Federation receive 30 % of all subsidies (Mogilevskaya, 2017). The economic dependence of the region on federal subsidies is transformed into political dependence. The regional government is controlled through the allocation of federal funding to the region; "objectionable" governors are deprived of financial aid from the center.
2. Creation of the "center – region" vertical of power through the creation of federal districts and the institution of plenipotentiaries of the president. As such, the concentration of power of the federal center is increasing, since the representatives in the districts have the task of controlling the implementation of the orders adopted by the federal government bodies and ensuring the implementation of the president's personnel policy.
3. The President of the Russian Federation has the power to appoint 10 % of the Federation Council members. As such, the federal government can act as a decisive factor in the voting on the bills that are disputable for some regions of the federation.
4. The presence of a municipal filter in the elections of regional heads restricts popular but nonparty regional politicians. As such, the federal government can co-opt such politicians by presenting the required number of signatures of municipal deputies.

The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 193 dated April 25, 2019 "On assessing the efficiency of the activities of senior officials (heads of the highest executive bodies of the state authorities) in the regions of the Russian Federation and the activities of executive bodies in the regions of the Russian Federation" must also be noted, along with a list of indicators for assessing the performance of senior officials in the regions of the Russian Federation and the activities of executive authorities in the regions of the Russian Federation. If the performance indicators are reached, the region may obtain incentive grants for which the government

annually allocates 20 bln rubles. However, not all indicators are socioeconomic, as there are also political ones in the list of criteria: "Level of trust in the government (in the President of the Russian Federation, in senior officials (heads of the highest executive bodies of the state authorities) in the regions of the Russian Federation)" (2019). Thus, the federal government endowed itself with yet another tool of influence on government representatives in the regions: if opposition is emerging in the region, it may just lose financial support, which will be allocated to the regions with loyal governors.

The concept of intermediate institutions is also described in the writings of Dani Rodrik under the name Second-Best Institutions (Rodrik, 2008). The concept of interim institutions, such as Second-Best Institutions, explains the process of creating desirable institutions in developing countries, when the "transplantation" of an institution is impossible due to the unavoidable barriers of the institutional environment. At the same time, any attempts to completely exclude the cultural component of the institutional environment should be critically addressed. The authors believe that D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson did this in their famous book "Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty" (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2017). In their opinion, the nature and direction of institutional development depend on a combination of institutions with cultural specifics. The institutions determine the choice of a trajectory, while culture makes it a stable track. However, their contribution to the methodology must be noted. In particular, the authors will rely on the concept of inclusive and extractive institutions. Another advantage of the neoinstitutional approach is that it removes contradictions between the formal legal and sociocultural context in the factors of the political regime transformation.

General framework and concepts of the methodology:

1. The institutions should be understood as the rules that organize and streamline human interaction, thus setting a set of alternatives for the actor, reducing uncertainty, and minimizing transaction costs.
2. The institutions can be both formal and informal and are in complex interaction. They can be extractive and inclusive. Inclusive institutions encourage the participation of large groups of the population in economic activity, where



alienation of property is not allowed. Extractive institutions allow the elite to extract rent from the population for its own benefit, and allow or establish the alienation of property or income in favor of narrow groups.

3. Both endogenous and exogenous factors can be sources of changes in institutions.
4. Interim institutions are specific institutions that combine old and new norms, operate under the cultural constraints of the institutional environment and develop new attitudes in society.
5. Institutional trap is an inefficient but steady norm.

As such, the methodological tools of neoinstitutionalism allow the following:

- To analyze not just formally prescribed interactions, but also informal ones; take the cultural characteristics of the institutional environment into account; and
- To identify the direction of the regime transformation as a result of exposure to endogenous and exogenous factors, based on this analysis.

### Conclusion

The political regime of the modern Russia from the early 90s of the 20th century to 2016 has been explored in the article, along with its essential characteristics, transformation factors, and the dynamic dependence of political power on endogenous and exogenous factors. The systemic, structural, functional, and institutional analysis used in the study has led to the following conclusions.

As a result of the theoretical analysis of the "political regime" category, the authors defined it as a dialectical unity of political control and political choice, harmonized to the degree of political freedom. Consequently, the use of this term primarily provides for the analysis of internal power mechanisms endogenously inherent in political power. Besides, the interaction between the regime and the environment, as well as their mutual influence and exogenous factors cannot remain outside the scientific analysis.

The nature of the political regime is defined in the modern science mainly by the degree of separation of powers in the state and the specifics

of their relationships, the basic principles and methods of establishing political bodies of state power and local self-government, methods of managing political processes in society, level of authority of the political elite, state legality in the country, prevailing type of legitimacy of the government in society, the degree of political power and freedom in society, as well as a number of other characteristics.

Endogenous transformation factors have been identified and reviewed in the article.

The political regime in the modern Russia is being transformed under the influence of endogenous and exogenous factors. In the opinion of the authors, the endogenous and exogenous transformation factors should be considered from the point of view of their synthesis. This is due to the fact that these factors can exert a separate effect only in theoretical concepts of their study. De facto, they have simultaneous impact on the political regime, and exogenous factors can serve as a catalyst for the manifestation of endogenous factors.

The authors have noted the establishment of a hybrid political regime in the modern Russia. The political regime in the modern Russia combines elements of a democratic political system and democratic institutions together with authoritarian methods of governance. Democratic institutions can be "decorative," but this imitation also occurs in another direction – the regime may appear to be more repressive than it actually is. The scientific consensus is that a multiparty system and regular elections are already the necessary criteria for recognizing a regime as hybrid. Therefore, the political regime in the modern Russia cannot be defined as a classic autocracy or dictatorship.

It must be noted that at the same time, the party system still admits the desire for a single, so-called "party of power", the political opposition is weak and plays actually no role (except for the decorative) in the political life of the country. Political power seeks to create conditions in which the media space is controlled exclusively by pro-government media.

As a result of the analysis of the political regime in the modern Russia, the authors have concluded that a hybrid political regime is able to make a transformation in a democratic direction almost painlessly for society due to its inherent adaptability, in contrast to tough authoritarian regimes. The main goal of the hybrid regime is self-preservation, which is why Russia still exists

in an ideological vacuum, and there is no national idea.

In the opinion of the authors, an active bureaucracy is a social base of the political regime in Russia, and the majority of the politically and socially inactive population has no mechanisms to influence political power. The authors have analyzed a combination of positive and negative aspects in the nature and functioning of the political regime in the modern Russia. The positive thing is that the authorities manage to maintain sociopolitical stability in the country, but at the same time it is not yet clear what resources the authorities are going to use for the ongoing progressive social development. There is reason to suppose that the national populist model of solving Russian problems may prevail if the effects of the economic crisis worsen. The existing considerable systemic shortcomings of the current political regime will undoubtedly impact its place and role in the international division of labor and the socioeconomic situation of citizens in the further development of Russia. Political democracy is the only prerequisite for the efficient development of the economy in the context of globalization.

According to the authors, the red tape reduction in the economic life is of priority in Russia, in order to allow business to depend only on the law, rather than on its loyalty to the government. The authors have noted the need for a real, strong political opposition, the importance of creating conditions for the media independent of the state, ensuring the openness of political decision-making for society, and the succession of political elites. The authors hope that such conditions will be created in Russia in the next six to ten years. Nurturing a political culture of a fundamentally new type, aimed at creating a civil type of culture in Russia, is one of the ways to create these conditions. Political education and the study of the characteristics of political power and the specifics of the political regime transformation in Russia by citizens are promising directions in the political activities of state authorities.

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