data collection and analysis from open sources,
which is used in the interests of criminal justice
by law enforcement officers.
OSINT is positioned as an exploration among
available sources covering any information. The
data about person, business entity can be
obtained on legal grounds from free public
sources. Generally, it is information from the
Internet, but can also include data contained in
open libraries, newspaper articles, press releases,
and stored on various types of media. Based on
the form of fixation, the search objects can be
texts, film, photo, video recordings, materials
located on websites about webinars, public
events, conferences (Softlist, 2022).
The main sources of information, which help to
create a profile of the object, are social networks,
blogs, video hosting, forums, magazines,
newspapers, television, radio, public materials of
state structures, publicly available observations,
reports, articles, reports, conferences, and
information with limited access (regarding
banking transactions, telephone connections,
travel routes, real estate owned or used by a
person, or people of his (her) circle and
connections).
On the basis of the profile, pre-trial investigation
bodies can establish the whereabouts, hidden
assets, possible accomplices who facilitated or
directly participated in the commission of corrupt
acts, as well as receive other information that is
not directly related to the subject matter of pre-
trial investigation, but is related to private life
and is sensitive for the person.
At the same time, according to the legislation of
Ukraine, just the access to information on
telephone connections and removal of
information from electronic information systems
and their parts, the access to which is restricted
by logical protection system without the
knowledge of the owner or user, requires the
permission of the investigating judge; the
implementation of other means does not need
such authorization. The rest of the information
from the databases can be obtained either at the
request of the investigator, the prosecutor,
directly through an electronic office, or by
examining mobile devices, including using
portable hardware and software complexes for
forensic research, which allows to extract,
decode and analyse evidence.
Therefore, acquisition and recording significant
amount of electronic information for the benefit
of criminal justice in Ukraine is outside the scope
of judicial control, and the development of
technologies for collecting electronic evidence is
substantially ahead of the regulation of such
activities by criminal procedural legislation.
It should be noted that the ECHR has repeatedly
emphasized the need for a balanced approach to
the interference in private life and defining its
limits.
In the case of Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary
(2016), which concerned Hungarian legislation
regulating secret anti-terrorist surveillance for
national security purposes (in particular, “section
7 / E (3) Surveillance”), the applicants
complained that they could be subjected to
unreasonable and to offensive measures; the
introduced regulations do not rule out abuse in
the absence of judicial control.
The court, recognizing the violation of Article 8
of the Convention, stated that under current
conditions, the fight against terrorism requires
the government to resort to advanced
technologies, including those enabling mass
surveillance of citizens’ telecommunications to
prevent crimes. Such wiretapping, given new
technologies that allow the government to easily
intercept masses of data, even on individuals
outside the primary range of operations, could be
applied to any Hungarian citizen. Besides, the
Court drew attention to the fact that the
permission to carry out the mentioned measures
took place within the scope of the executive
power, without assessing whether the
interception of communications is strictly
necessary in the absence of a judicial.
Accordingly, in the opinion of the Court,
Hungarian legislation did not provide safeguards
to prevent abuse.
Notably, the Court also stated that there had been
no violation of Article 13 (right of an effective
remedy) of the Convention along with Article 8,
reiterating that Article 13 could not be interpreted
as requiring a remedy against the state of
domestic law.
In terms of determining the procedure for access
to biological samples, in addition to the generally
recognized objects (blood, saliva, nails, hair,
sperm, suturing agent, bucal epithelium etc.), it
also refers to fingerprints, handwriting, speech
and voice of a person, traces of a person’s scent
and others.
This view is primarily due to the fact that the
purposeful search and collection of information
about a person and his (her) life as an