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DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2024.76.04.9
How to Cite:
Naidon, Y., Naumiuk, S., Rybynskyi, Y., Shemayeva, L., & Peliukh, O. (2024). Sanctions as a policy tool of Ukraine in countering
threats to national security. Amazonia Investiga, 13(76), 103-112. https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2024.76.04.9
Sanctions as a policy tool of Ukraine in countering threats to national
security
Політика санкцій України у протидії загрозам державній безпеці
Received: February 5, 2024 Accepted: April 10, 2024
Written by:
Yuliana Naidon1
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1076-0471
Serhii Naumiuk2
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7039-0946
Yevhenii Rybynskyi3
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6014-0142
Lyudmila Shemayeva4
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2989-0823
Oleh Peliukh5
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1399-1643
Abstract
The article analyzes the effectiveness of
sanctions as a tool of Ukrainian policy against
Russian aggression. It examines the role of the
Security Service of Ukraine in identifying
individuals and entities subject to sanctions and
presenting them to the National Security and
Defense Council of Ukraine. The study employs
a polymethodological approach, combining
philosophical, general scientific, and legal
methods. The findings reveal that sanctions are
key preventive measures to respond to threats to
national security. It concludes that the Security
Service of Ukraine plays a fundamental role in
the implementation of sanctions and proposes
ways to enhance the effectiveness of these
restrictive measures.
Keywords: sanctions, security, Security Service
of Ukraine, state, Ukraine.
1
Doctor of Science in Law, Professor, Vice-rector for scientific work, National Academy of the Security Service of Ukraine, Kyiv,
Ukraine.
2
Ph.D (Law), Security Service of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine.
3
Ph.D (Law), Security Service of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine.
4
Doctor of Science in Economics, Professor, National Academy of the Security Service of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine.
5
Doctor of Science in Law, Security Service of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine.
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Introduction
From the first days of the large-scale military
invasion of the aggressor country, one of the key
issues to confront the enemies was the
application of restrictive measures (sanctions) to
entities whose actions pose a threat to national
security, support peace and democracy,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine,
and contribute to the putin regime in the
implementation of illegal intentions to occupy
territories of Ukraine.
The sanctions imposed by many countries and
world organizations have become one of the
decisive tools of influence on the aggressor’s
behaviour on the global stage. Sanctions are
preventive measures which allow to respond
swiftly to political challenges and developments
that go against its objectives and values of the
countries that apply them.
The efficacy of sanctions can be limited in some
features. Despite the efforts of states that impose
restrictions, the economy of the Russian
Federation still runs using alternative ways to
solve its problems.
Therefore, the essence of the formation and
implementation sanctions as a policy tool of
Ukraine against the Russian Federation is
sanction duration, the coalition of the initiating
states and active monitoring of the effectiveness
of restrictions that have already been applied to
adapt the sanction policy of our state and partners
states consolidations.
Taking into account the fact that the Russian
Federation is currently one of the most
sanctioned state in the global politics, it should
be considered that the imposing sanctions of
Ukraine and its allies are not sufficient at this
stage and in future needs to be strengthened and
be far more effective, in particular, not only
forcing restrictive measures, but also ensuring
compliance with sanctions regimes,
implementing intentions to circumvent them and
in bringing about the intended results.
In this scientific article, we will analyze
sanctions as a policy tool of Ukraine against the
aggressor country of the Russian Federation,
theoretical prerequisites, and practical
experience of increasing the effectiveness of
restrictive and coordinated measures, and the role
of the Security Service of Ukraine in this policy.
Literature Review
The analysis in this sphere highlights a special
scientific interest in the study of international
sanctions as a tool for countering threats to the
national security of Ukraine to disrupt Russian
aggression. In particular, O. Kukartsev, O. Motsyk,
K Rashevska, and O. Sharov have studied the role
of the EU and US sanctions policy in the context of
countering Russian aggression in Ukraine by
putting pressure on military and political leadership
of the aggressor state, as well as bringing it to justice
for aggression against democratic countries
(Kukartsev, 2023; Motsyk, 2020; Rashevska, 2020;
Sharov, 2016).
The analysis of the Russian economy risks and the
dynamics of its economic development under the
USA, European and Western countries that support
severe sanctions is in the scope of scientific research
has been discussed by A. Bykov, A. Gryshchenko
and O. Cherkasets (Bykova, 2018; Hryshchenko,
2017; Cherkasets, 2022).
Horbulin V.P. and Bershed E.R. have studied the
sanctions policy of Ukraine in synergistic
relationship with its priority of forming and
implementing the project of building a democratic
society in a large European post-Soviet state, which
can become the high-quality example and the
model of successful democracy for Russians
(Horbulin, & Bersheda, 2021).
A. Ivanskyi and Y. Sedlyar have studied the
political and financial-legal approaches of the
implementation of international sanctions, their
theoretical basis, legal nature, and characteristics at
the monographic level (Ivanskyi, 2019; Sedliar,
2013).
S. Erlanger and I. Osypchuk have studied the
approach of Russia’s circumvention of
international restrictive measures and its nuclear
blackmail of democratic countries in order to
mitigate sanctions (Osypchuk, 2022; Erlanger,
2022).
It should be noted that the great attention is paid
to the subject of the study used by scholars and
practitioners, at the same time, and theoretical
and applied approaches of increasing the
effectiveness of restrictive measures and the role
of the Security Service of Ukraine in this policy
remain outside the experts’ attention.
This article intends to approach this matter in
analyzing sanctions as a policy tool of Ukraine
against the aggressor country of Russian
Federation, theoretical prerequisites, and
Naidon, Y., Naumiuk, S., Rybynskyi, Y., Shemayeva, L., Peliukh, O. / Volume 13 - Issue 76: 103-112 / April, 2024
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practical experience for increasing effectiveness
of restrictive and coherent measures and the role
of the Security Service of Ukraine in this policy.
Methodology
A poly methodological approach was used for the
research. It covers the following groups of
methods: general philosophical (dialectical,
phenomenological, axiological, hermeneutic,
anthropological, synergistic, etc.); general
scientific (abstraction, analysis and synthesis,
system analysis, etc.); special (questionnaires,
content analysis, deontic, etc.); legal (historical-
legal, comparative-legal, formal-dogmatic, etc.).
The dialectical thinking study is used to research
theoretical and legal approaches through
examining sanctions as a tool for countering
threats to national security. The synergetic
approach is used to understand the essence of the
applicable rules to the state sanction policy, to
determine its theoretical and legal nature.
Research methods of analysis, synthesis,
induction, and deduction are used in the essence
of sanctions policy as a phenomenon of ensuring
the national security of Ukraine and to define its
concept and systematize sanctions tools in
countering threats to national security.
The method of analogies is used to conclude the
principles of applying sanctions to entities that
support and implement the armed aggression of
the Russian Federation against Ukraine. By
means of the praxeological approach, the concept
of the sanctions policy of Ukraine as a tool of
restrictive measures of unilateral or multilateral
nature is highlighted. These measures targeted at
protecting sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
the rule of law of Ukraine in repelling Russian
armed aggression.
During the study, the law enforcement practice of
the Security Service of Ukraine regarding special
economic and other sanctions (restrictive
measures) and their implementation in the
conditions of Russian armed aggression against
Ukraine was analyzed.
Results and Discussion
Sanctions as a policy tool of Ukraine is a tool of
unilateral or multilateral sanctions aimed at
protecting sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
the rule of law, repelling armed aggression
against Ukraine, guaranteeing economic and
information security, countering terrorism,
protecting national interests, and observance of
international human rights obligations by foreign
states (Law of Ukraine No. 5191, 2021).
Since the full-scale invasion a number of measures
(as of 01.08.2023) to impose sanctions on 11,982
entities (3 individual entrepreneurs, 6,670
individuals and 5,309 legal entities) who supported
Russian armed aggression against Ukraine have
been launched by the Security Service of Ukraine
to the National Security and Defense Council of
Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as NSDC). This
cooperation is based on the work between state
bodies of Ukraine, such as the Cabinet of Ministers,
the National Agency for the Prevention of
Corruption, the National Bank and representatives
of the Intelligence community, such as the Foreign
Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Defense, the
Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of
Defense, within the framework of the Interagency
Working Group on the Implementation of the State
Sanctions Policy, enforced by a decree of the
President of Ukraine under the provision of
Cabinet of Ministers.
At present, the authorized sanctions have been
imposed against almost 17,200 entities, among
them 15,600 entities that are at the initiative of
the Security Service of Ukraine (as of February
2024) and the total number of sanctioned entities
is almost 90% (National Security and Defense
Council of Ukraine, 2024).
Sanctions to individual entrepreneurs,
individuals and legal entities have been enacted
and applied. President of Ukraine Volodymyr
Zelenskyy signed Decree No. 36/2024 ‘On the
Decision of the National Security and Defence
Council of Ukraine dated 29 January 2024 ‘On
Approval of the Regulation on the State Register
of Sanctions’. The Secretary of the National
Security and Defence Council of Ukraine shall be
responsible for monitoring the implementation of
the decision of the NSDC of Ukraine enacted by
this Decree. The Regulation on the State Register
of Sanctions defines the procedure for
maintaining and accessing the unified State
Register of Sanctions, as well as providing
information from it (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,
2024).
The NSDC of Ukraine has imposed sanctions on
entities that:
− develop, produce and supply weapons and
military equipment in order to support the
armed forces of the Russian Federation;
components for electronic equipment;
hardware and software complex; software
for the Russian military-industrial complex;
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high-tech equipment and military munition
used by Russians against Ukraine; facilities
of ensuring information security and
integrated security systems for the military-
industrial complex and law enforcement
agencies involved in the supply of dual-use
goods and components that are further used
by the aggressor state in production and
development of military goods and weapons
of mass destruction; undertake illegal
economic activities, in particular related to
ensuring the functioning of the occupied
territories in eastern and southern Ukraine,
(hereinafter referred to as the TOT of
Ukraine);
− are involved in the ‘legitimization’ of the
temporary occupied territories of Ukraine by
making decisions on the admission to the
Russian Federation of the so-called ‘new
territories’ seized by armed forces, the
formation of new entities of the Russian
Federation; participate in the organization
and taking so-called ‘referendums on entry’
on the temporarily occupied territories of
Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, Donetsk and
Kherson regions, as well as in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea;
− justify and recognize the armed aggression
of the Russian Federation against Ukraine
and the annexation of the territories of our
state as legitimate; blessing servicemen of
the Russian armed forces and members of
illegal armed groups controlled and financed
by the Russian Federation; participate in
mass events in support of Russian military
actions against Ukraine; create and
disseminate narratives of Russian
propaganda aimed at refusing to
acknowledge the sovereignty and integrity
of Ukraine and the very existence of
Ukrainian people as a nation; support ideas
of Russian ‘greatness and dominance’ in the
global world;
− are actual participants of mass abduction,
illegal deportation and child trafficking from
the temporarily occupied territories to the
Russian Federation organized by Russian
authorities;
− participate in the political life of the
aggressor country, have a significant impact
on the media, or the ultimate beneficiaries of
business entities holding monopoly
positions in the financial, banking,
industrial, scientific, technical sectors of the
economy, logistics, communications, and
there are Russian backbone enterprises of
strategic management that provide economic
support and long lasting financial assistance
to combat military operations on the territory
of Ukraine;
− are involved in the activities of the Russian
state corporation ‘Rosatom’, which illegally
established control over Europe’s largest
nuclear power plant– ‘Zaporizhzhia NPP’;
− are involved in the management and
functioning of the so-called ‘private military
companies’ that are under the direct
supervision of the Ministry of Defense of the
Russian Federation and whose members are
actively participated in the military aggression
against Ukraine;
− own assets on the territory of Ukraine, their
profits are used to support millitry
aggression of the Russian Federation;
− participate in making deliberate abuse
through the adoption of judgement with
deliberate violation of human rights and
freedoms guaranteed by international
treaties.
In response to the application of these sanctions,
the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine sent relevant
claims to the High Anti-Corruption Court. They
have been approved and determined as an asset
recovery process of sanctioned entities to the
state.
The assets of Russian oligarchs such as A.
Deripaska, A. Rotenberg, M. Shelkov, E. Giner,
S. Chemezov, V. Yevtushenkov and former
President of Ukraine V. Yanukovych were seized
into the state budget, as well as assets worth
about 190 billion UAH were seized in criminal
proceedings. Moreover, corporate rights and real
estate of a number of enterprises, the final
beneficial Russian corporations’ owners such as
‘Rosneft’, ‘Gazprom’, ‘Rosatom’, ‘Rusal’,
‘Rostec’, ‘Tatneft’, ‘HMS Group’were seized
into the state budget too.
Sanctions policy of Ukraine is carried out under
specific terms and conditions. Unlike almost all
sanctions decisions that came into force in
Europe after 1945 (with the exception of EU
sanctions against Argentina during the war over
the Falkland Islands), Ukraine has been
implementing a policy of sanctions in terms of its
military occupation of the territory. Moreover,
Ukraine has been in striking danger in the face of
a cruel enemy that possesses nuclear weapons
and is a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the
UN).
Civilian infrastructure and critical infrastructure
facilities were damaged as a result of the enemy
shelling. The largest number of attacks struck
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residential buildings, energy infrastructure
facilities, industrial facilities, transport
infrastructure, as well as agriculture and animal
husbandry (Chernysh et al., 2023). The UN
Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
has initiated criminal cases against humanity and
war crimes committed by the Russian Federation
in Ukraine. The UN Special Rapporteur on
torture and other cruel has stated that the use of
torture is the essential part of the Russian state in
Ukraine (Gall, 2023).
It is obvious that at present there is a tendency of
intensity of war crimes that leads to an excessive
burden on the investigative bodies. According to
the UN Independent International Commission
of Inquiry on Ukraine, such an increase in work
would be a challenge for any criminal justice
system, even in peacetime.
Ukraine is considering all possible ways of ‘non-
military’ compensation for damages caused by
war, however, it is not sufficient and acceptable.
The number of suspects in criminal proceedings
for war crimes or crimes against humanity that
are under law enforcement bodies’ control of
Ukraine is desperately low. Among the 50,625
cases of international crimes, only 552 offenders
were arrested or released on bail. As for criminal
cases of violation of the laws and customs of war
there are 49,483 cases, among which only 85 are
offenders, respectively.
It turns out that neither deterrence of hostile
actions nor compensation for damages caused by
Russian aggression to legal means developed for
peacetime has been out of the question.
The Security Service of Ukraine performs
several roles in the sanctions policy:
1. As the key agency for national security, it
has the direct authority to submit NSDC of
Ukraine proposals for the application,
amendment, and cancellation of restrictive
measures (sanctions). It should be noted that
the vast majority of the submitted proposals
were initiated by the Security Service of
Ukraine.
2. As an investigative agency, the investigation
of war crimes is under its jurisdiction, and in
accordance with the Draft Law of Ukraine
No. 5191, from 02.03.2021, it has been
decided to include the investigation of
criminal offenses related to the
circumvention of sanctions (Law of Ukraine
No. 5191, 2021).
3. As a agency that collects evidence from
official sources and provides them to the
countries expanding the alliance to enforce
sanctions.
Nevertheless, determining the grounds for the
implementation of sanctions, the certain
challenges have occurred both at the domestic
and international levels.
The sanctions as a policy tool for countering
threats to the national security of Ukraine
(Kostenko et al., 2021) should be aimed either at
changing the behavior of the entity or individual
to which it is applied (eliminating, averting,
neutralizing threats, etc.), or, if it is impossible to
change, it should be aimed at reduction of
Russian economic and technological proficiency
to conduct the war.
In future, depending on the chosen target, it is
obligatory to form the grounds for the application
of sanctions; they will be based on the behavior
that we are trying to change, correct or limit the
ability to participate in it.
Sanctions policy of Ukraine should be based on
exercising its inevitable right to self-defense,
under Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations (Statute Organization of the United
Nations, s.f).
However, the main initiative of sanctions policy
of Ukraine concurs with the initiative of self-
defense as a state-victim of aggression: people
and integrity protection, enemy defeating,
undermining its economic potential, de-
occupation of territories and compensation for
damages Ukraine is an integral part of military
efforts in the global armed conflict during which
the Russian Federation commits cruel actions
and crimes. This initiative is underlined by the
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the peace
plan for Ukraine that was approved on
23.02.2023 by the resolution of the UN General
Assembly (United Nations, 2023).
Taking into account that sanctions are mostly
have an individual nature, their addressee is the
Russian federation, and not only a resident or a
legal entity. Sanctions policy of Ukraine should
be aimed not only at the behavior of the entity or
individual to which the restrictive measures are
directly applied, but also at a wider range of
individuals and legal entities, and the example of
applying sanctions might have a preventive
effect. In other words, sanctions themselves still
act as a warning to everyone that there will be
consequences for those who support Russian
aggression.
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The imposed restrictive measures (sanctions)
against the Russian economy do not have a
simultaneous effect, it will be intensifying over
time. The application of sanctions enforces their
implementation, as well as reduces the risks of
circumventing them. The complicity of the
effectiveness of trade restrictions on the country
is that they can be circumvented technically
using ‘gray’ imports or neutral countries.
Furthermore, let’s try to highlight the theoretical
and practical basis for increasing the
effectiveness of the implementation of restrictive
measures against the aggressor country.
Grounded theory and content analysis for
studying international sanctions policy is
discussed in the research of Y. Sedlar
‘International Sanctions in World Politics:
Theory and Practice’ (Sedliar, 2013). However,
one of the first fundamental studies that examines
the effectiveness of international sanctions policy
was the collective monograph of American
experts G. Hufbauer, J. S. Wilson. Their analysis
submits that the effectiveness of the
implementation of international sanctions in
achieving their intended foreign policy goals is
about 30%, and this effectiveness would even
increase if there were risks to provide evaluation
of political and economic development of the
target country (Hufbauer et al., 1983). In the
another research the scholars determine
economic sanctions failures that are caused by
the influence of the following factors:
− if policy goals do not correspond with
foreign sanctions, they should be considered
as a critical element of the state foreign
policy in the target country;
− if allies distance themselves or there are
significant commercial losses within the
state, the effectiveness of the sanctions
policy is gradually decreased;
− influential allies can be forced by sanctions
of the target country and participate as a
‘black knight’, providing support to the
target country as compensation for damages
that may be caused by the sanctions policy;
− sanctions effects may cause own
countermeasures, forcing to integrate the
destination country at the government and
commercial levels (Hufbauer et al., 1983).
Since the formal publication in a scholarly
journal, the political essence of international
relations has been enriched with subject matter
studies regarding sanctions policy.
According to Professor R. Nyunhem’s research,
the key factors that affect the formation of
sanctions policy against the target country is its
political system. Using the experience of
assessing the effectiveness of international
sanctions in preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons by Iran, Libya and North Korea,
the scientist urges that sanctions would probably
be much more successful if the target regime
were at least partially democratically open
(Newnham, 2010). D. Drezner supports this idea
and considers that the implementation of
international sanctions to the democratic
countries is much more effective than to target
states using authoritarian regimes (Drezner,
1999).
The next key factor that affects the success of
sanctions is comprehensive international
support. This factor has been highlighted in the
studies of G. Gardner, C. Kimbrow, M. Doxey
(Gardner & Kimbrough 1990).
According to the scholars’ observations who
researched effectiveness of geographical factors
on the economic sanctions from the Institute for
International Economics in Washington, it has
been stated that the closer the sanctioning state is
to the target country, the more influence it’ll have
to achieve its foreign policy goals through the
implementation of sanctions policy (Hufbauer et
al., 1983). As a result, the relationship between
places reflects both variables of size and
distance. This model to international sanctions
policy was later characterized as ‘gravitational’.
Therefore, the geopolitical support factor for
sanctions measures is essential, especially from
first order neighborhood. Consideration of the
introduction of such an indicator has been
justified by the fact that with the involvement of
neighboring countries in the implementation of
sanctions against the target state, the problem of
physical control over its borders will be solved,
and, therefore, the required level of monitoring
over the implementation of sanctions measures
will be ensured.
The results of the Japanese expert M. Miyagawa
are based on the idea of international sanctions
policy. The researcher has pointed out the
general prerequisites that can have a significant
impact on the target state, great influence on
international trade and insufficient development
of the domestic economy; political and trade
partners participation in sanctions measures of
the target country; limited ability of the target
state to change export and import markets; small
foreign exchange reserves of the target country
(Miyagawa, 1992).
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Consequently, on the basis of the methodological
synthesis of the theory of implementation of
international sanctions and taking into account
the studied approaches and models, it can be
considered that effectiveness of the
implementation of the policy of international
sanctions depends on:
− the legal mechanisms of a regulatory
framework that sets up principles and
regulates the restrictive sanctions against the
target state;
− institutional support for the implementation
of sanctions measures;
− political consensus in the state implementing
the sanctions policy using expediency, basic
principles and methods of its
implementation; and it ensures the
efficiency and application completeness;
− the sanctioning state affects export-import
dependence of the target country; and it
arises due to previous positive political
relations between the sanctioning country
and the target country;
− the broad international sanctions support at
all stages from the global leading countries
of their implementation and the use of a
‘gravitational’ model in the implementation
of sanctions policy;
− the presence of an opposition in the target
country that supports the state in a political
way imposing sanctions and is ready to
achieve goals with democratic power
transition to the target country (Sedliar,
2013).
The assessment of sanctions effectiveness
against the russian federation is plausible taking
into account its impact on the macroeconomic
situation in the aggressor country and on sectoral
changes. It can be argued that during 2022-2023
the russian federation was able to avoid serious
destabilization and still maintains the capacity to
finance the war against Ukraine (Vlasenko et al.,
2020). However, in the short and long terms
perspectives, economic stability in the russian
federation can be under threat and deterioration
due to the destruction of economic cooperation
with partner countries that support Ukraine in the
war against the Russian Federation.
Partner countries have been actively working at
implementation of controversial issues in the
sanctions policy, as for Russian evasion and
circumvention of restrictive measures in
cooperation with Ukraine. The strengthening of
the sanctions policy is focused on the transport
and energy sectors, the military-industrial
complex (hereinafter referred to as the MIC), the
risks of production and export of energy
resources and raw materials (Sanctions). As a
result of sanctions imposed on Russia for its
aggressive war against Ukraine, including
sanctions on Russian oil and gas, investment and
financing, such measures will lead to a gradual
decrease in oil and gas production and exports.
The United States, the EU, Canada and other
countries have imposed massive and
unprecedented sanctions against Russia in
response to the military aggression against
Ukraine. The measures are designed to weaken
Russian economy, depriving it of advanced
technologies and markets and significantly
curtailing its capacity to wage war, to stop not
only international flights but also domestic
flights, to limit cooperation in the space industry.
The sanctions ban international flights with the
countries that have imposed sanctions, restrict an
access to their airports, limit the supply of
aircrafts, spare parts and aircraft equipment to the
Russian Federation, as well as sanctions to ban
insurance, maintenance and repair services for
aircraft equipment, export of goods and
technologies for the space industry.
Nevertheless, airline companies and importers of
the Russian Federation adopted ‘friendly’
countries sanctions solving the problems of
lacking aircraft parts. According to the survey,
from May 2022 prior to June 2023 Russian
airline companies imported spare parts for
aircraft industry worth $1.2 billion through
intermediaries in Tajikistan, the United Arab
Emirates, Turkey, China and Kyrgyzstan. These
countries have not joined Western sanctions
against the Russian Federation (Gauthier-Villars
& Stolyarov, 2023).
In order to strengthen the sanctions regime in this
sphere, any effective control of the supply chain
has to begin with the initial sale of an item to a
distributor as it becomes increasingly
complicated to trace its physical whereabouts
and impede any illicit activities post-sale. The
tracking system should control the movement of
spare parts, equipment from the manufacturer to
the customer (an airline company). Sanctions
restrictions should be considered, with the
provision of guarantees and a cash deposit by the
customer of these goods (through an airline
company or an intermediary) to ensure the
delivery of these goods to their destination.
The sanctions imposed by ‘friendly’ countries
have also caused heavy losses to the Russian
automobile industry and related sectors of the
Russian economy. Therefore, the sanctions
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policy of Ukrainian partner countries bans the
supply of vehicles that are classified as luxury
goods (the EU has set the maximum cost of such
cars from 50 thousand euros), as well as
components and spare parts for them to the
Russian Federation. Moreover, sanctions were
imposed against the company KAMAZ PTC,
whose products are actively used by the Ministry
of Defense of the Russian Federation in the war
against Ukraine. Later, in order to limit the
industrial potential of the aggressor country, the
supply of technologies, components, items and
other automobile goods to the Russian
Federation was limited with certain exceptions
(European Union, 2014).
Instead of integration process in the automobile
industry on the global market, the Russian
Federation has chosen the way of achieving
technological sovereignty and import
dependence on China. In the context of sanctions
restrictions, it might be to hinder this sector
development in Russian economy (European
Union, 2014).
The sanctions of partner countries have also
affected the metallurgy industry of the Russian
Federation. In particular, in the field of
metallurgical products, restrictions on their
import and transportation to third countries have
been imposed, import duties have been
increased, and the ‘most favored nation’ status
has been removed. Moreover, sanctions have
been applied directly to metallurgical enterprises.
Despite the reduction in steel sector and its
export abroad, we observe a significant increase
in the supply of steel products for the needs of
military-industry in Russia.
Refer to the present situation, Ukraine should
focus its efforts on political and diplomatic arena
to strengthen sanctions against the metallurgy
industry of the Russian Federation, to create
conditions to prevent their circumvention, to
replace metal products and ores of Russian
producers by products of the Ukrainian mining
and metallurgical complex on the EU market.
The collapse of bank capital in Russia was the
result of the sanctions imposed by Ukrainian
Western partners at the end of February 2022.
After a year and a half of cutting Russia’s access
to capital markets by the EU, experts consider
that they have not led the Russian banking sector
and key market players to the bankruptcy.
Moreover, the Russian banking sector has a
strong resilience margin. However, the essential
consequence of the imposed sanctions has been
Russia’s isolation from the international financial
infrastructures. Sanctions have cut Russia off
from money transfer channels, the most
technologically advanced banking sectors, and
have backed Russian banking sector in soviet
times (International Security and European
Integration of Ukraine, 2022).
The USA government and its allies have also
made significant efforts to reduce military
industry of the Russian Federation. Firstly, it was
aimed at preventing the Russian Military
industry from obtaining items, elements, and
materials. At present the sanctions of partner
countries and Ukraine against the military-
industrial complex of the Russian Federation are:
− make a shortage of certain high-quality
components and force the Ministry of
Defense and military-industrial complex to
replace them with low-quality items;
− government attempts to acquire high-end
microchips produced by the global leading
companies that have attracted significant
attention and enhance control from the
beginning of the war;
− the sanctions implementations on the
engines production will have long-term
consequences for the armed forces,
primarily in terms of their restoration, repair
and technology enhancement, as well as on
efforts to sophisticate new military
technologies in this sphere, including
aircraft building;
− Russia could be facing a shortage of
advanced optical systems, this process is
leading to tanks reequipment with lower-
quality and outdated technologies and
additional losses during hostilities;
− Russia could be experiencing a shortage of
bearings, that have negativ impact on
vehicles production (military and civilian).
However, Russia is trying to replace the
components shortage with lower-quality
items produced in Asia.
Conclusions
The implemented sanctions against Russia
imposed by partner countries and international
organizations have positive outcomes and affect
the Russian economy and politics. The sanctions
aim to weaken Russia’s ability to finance the
war and specifically target the political, military
and economic elite responsible for the invasion.
Sanctions policy of Ukraine has already led to the
reduction in foreign investment, limited access to
financial markets, reduced exports and imports of
goods, as well as restricted economic and
political measures for Russian individuals,
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/ April 2024
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entities, officials and businessmen. However, it
should be considered that the effectiveness of
sanctions in some spheres against the Russian
Federation has been limited yet.
Measures listed below, in particular, insufficient
states involvement of the geopolitical
environment of the target country in the
implementation of international sanctions; an
aggressor state autocracy and the absence of the
viable opposition in the government that could be
politically oriented towards the state imposing
sanctions, as well as could demonstrate
democratic transition in the power of the target
country reduce the effectiveness of the
implementation of international sanctions against
the Russian Federation.
The key factor to improving the effectiveness of
sanctions against the Russian Federation is the
duration of sanctions policy implementation, the
coalition of the initiating states and current
monitoring of the effectiveness of the restrictive
measures applied for the viable adaptation of the
sanctions policy.
In our opinion, the implementation of a set of
measures aimed at strengthening analytical
capabilities, internal cooperation, international
cooperation, etc., will contribute to increasing the
role of the Security Service of Ukraine in the
implementation of Ukraine’s sanctions policy in
countering threats to state security.
Analytical capabilities. Strengthening analytical
capabilities will allow employees of the Security
Service of Ukraine to identify potential threats
more effectively to state security and organize
countermeasures.
Internal cooperation. Strengthening cooperation
between various services and departments in
Ukraine, such as customs, law enforcement
agencies, financial institutions, etc., will allow
faster and more effective detection and response
to sanctions violations.
International cooperation. Cooperation with
other countries and international organizations to
exchange information and coordinate efforts to
implement sanctions will increase their
effectiveness.
Implementation of technologies. The use of
modern technologies such as artificial
intelligence, big data analysis and cyber defense
will also significantly increase the analytical
capabilities and effectiveness of sanctions
control.
In general, the combination of these and other
measures will allow the Security Service of
Ukraine to become more effective in
implementing the sanctions policy and ensuring
the state security of Ukraine.
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