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Sanctions as a policy tool of Ukraine in countering threats to national security

Політика санкцій України у протидії загрозам державній безпеці

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Abstract

The article analyzes the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of Ukrainian policy against Russian aggression. It examines the role of the Security Service of Ukraine in identifying individuals and entities subject to sanctions and presenting them to the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. The study employs a polymethodological approach, combining philosophical, general scientific, and legal methods. The findings reveal that sanctions are key preventive measures to respond to threats to national security. It concludes that the Security Service of Ukraine plays a fundamental role in the implementation of sanctions and proposes ways to enhance the effectiveness of these restrictive measures.

Keywords: sanctions, security, Security Service of Ukraine, state, Ukraine.

Анотація

У статті аналізується ефективність санкцій як інструменту української політики проти російської агресії. Розглядається роль Служби безпеки України у процесі виявлення фізичних та юридичних осіб, які підлягають санкціям, та поданні їх до Ради національної безпеки і оборони України.

Результати дослідження свідчать, що санкції є ключовими превентивними заходами для реагування на загрози національній безпеці. На підставі критичного аналізу доходимо висновку, що Служба безпеки України відіграє фундаментальну роль у запровадженні санкцій. При цьому пропонуються шляхи підвищення ефективності вказаних обмежувальних заходів. У дослідженні використовується поліметодологічний підхід, поєднуючи філософські, загальнонаукові та юридичні методи.

Ключові слова: безпека, держава, санкції, Служба безпеки України, Україна.

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Introduction

From the first days of the large-scale military invasion of the aggressor country, one of the key issues to confront the enemies was the application of restrictive measures (sanctions) to entities whose actions pose a threat to national security, support peace and democracy, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and contribute to the Putin regime in the implementation of illegal intentions to occupy territories of Ukraine.

The sanctions imposed by many countries and world organizations have become one of the decisive tools of influence on the aggressor's behaviour on the global stage. Sanctions are preventive measures which allow to respond swiftly to political challenges and developments that go against its objectives and values of the countries that apply them.

The efficacy of sanctions can be limited in some features. Despite the efforts of states that impose restrictions, the economy of the Russian Federation still runs using alternative ways to solve its problems.

Therefore, the essence of the formation and implementation of sanctions as a policy tool of Ukraine against the Russian Federation is sanction duration, the coalition of the initiating states and active monitoring of the effectiveness of restrictions that have already been applied to adapt the sanction policy of our state and partners states consolidations.

Taking into account the fact that the Russian Federation is currently one of the most sanctioned states in the global politics, it should be considered that the imposing sanctions of Ukraine and its allies are not sufficient at this stage and in future needs to be strengthened and be far more effective, in particular, not only forcing restrictive measures, but also ensuring compliance with sanctions regimes, implementing intentions to circumvent them and in bringing about the intended results.

In this scientific article, we will analyze sanctions as a policy tool of Ukraine against the aggressor country of the Russian Federation, theoretical prerequisites, and practical experience of increasing the effectiveness of restrictive and coordinated measures, and the role of the Security Service of Ukraine in this policy.

Literature Review

The analysis in this sphere highlights a special scientific interest in the study of international sanctions as a tool for countering threats to the national security of Ukraine to disrupt Russian aggression. In particular, O. Kukartsev, O. Motsyk, K. Rashevskaya, and O. Sharov have studied the role of the EU and US sanctions policy in the context of countering Russian aggression in Ukraine by putting pressure on military and political leadership of the aggressor state, as well as bringing it to justice for aggression against democratic countries (Kukartsev, 2023; Motsyk, 2020; Rashevskaya, 2020; Sharov, 2016).

The analysis of the Russian economy risks and the dynamics of its economic development under the USA, European and Western countries that support severe sanctions is in the scope of scientific research has been discussed by A. Bykov, A. Gryshchenko and O. Cherkasets (Bykova, 2018; Hryshchenko, 2017; Cherkasets, 2022).

Horbulin V.P. and Bershed E.R. have studied the sanctions policy of Ukraine in synergistic relationship with its priority of forming and implementing the project of building a democratic society in a large European post-Soviet state, which can become the high-quality example and the model of successful democracy for Russians (Horbulin, & Bershed, 2021).

A. Ivanskyi and Y. Sedlyar have studied the political and financial-legal approaches of the implementation of international sanctions, their theoretical basis, legal nature, and characteristics at the monographic level (Ivanskyi, 2019; Sedliar, 2013).

S. Erlanger and I. Osypchuk have studied the approach of Russia's circumvention of international restrictive measures and its nuclear blackmail of democratic countries in order to mitigate sanctions (Osypchuk, 2022; Erlanger, 2022).

It should be noted that the great attention is paid to the subject of the study used by scholars and practitioners, at the same time, and theoretical and applied approaches of increasing the effectiveness of restrictive measures and the role of the Security Service of Ukraine in this policy remain outside the experts' attention.

This article intends to approach this matter in analyzing sanctions as a policy tool of Ukraine against the aggressor country of Russian Federation, theoretical prerequisites, and

practical experience for increasing effectiveness of restrictive and coherent measures and the role of the Security Service of Ukraine in this policy.

Methodology

A poly methodological approach was used for the research. It covers the following groups of methods: general philosophical (dialectical, phenomenological, axiological, hermeneutic, anthropological, synergistic, etc.); general scientific (abstraction, analysis and synthesis, system analysis, etc.); special (questionnaires, content analysis, deontic, etc.); legal (historical-legal, comparative-legal, formal-dogmatic, etc.).

The dialectical thinking study is used to research theoretical and legal approaches through examining sanctions as a tool for countering threats to national security. The synergetic approach is used to understand the essence of the applicable rules to the state sanction policy, to determine its theoretical and legal nature. Research methods of analysis, synthesis, induction, and deduction are used in the essence of sanctions policy as a phenomenon of ensuring the national security of Ukraine and to define its concept and systematize sanctions tools in countering threats to national security.

The method of analogies is used to conclude the principles of applying sanctions to entities that support and implement the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. By means of the praxeological approach, the concept of the sanctions policy of Ukraine as a tool of restrictive measures of unilateral or multilateral nature is highlighted. These measures targeted at protecting sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the rule of law of Ukraine in repelling Russian armed aggression.

During the study, the law enforcement practice of the Security Service of Ukraine regarding special economic and other sanctions (restrictive measures) and their implementation in the conditions of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine was analyzed.

Results and Discussion

Sanctions as a policy tool of Ukraine is a tool of unilateral or multilateral sanctions aimed at protecting sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the rule of law, repelling armed aggression against Ukraine, guaranteeing economic and information security, countering terrorism, protecting national interests, and observance of

international human rights obligations by foreign states (Law of Ukraine No. 5191, 2021).

Since the full-scale invasion a number of measures (as of 01.08.2023) to impose sanctions on 11,982 entities (3 individual entrepreneurs, 6,670 individuals and 5,309 legal entities) who supported Russian armed aggression against Ukraine have been launched by the Security Service of Ukraine to the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as NSDC). This cooperation is based on the work between state bodies of Ukraine, such as the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, the National Bank and representatives of the Intelligence community, such as the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Defense, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, within the framework of the Interagency Working Group on the Implementation of the State Sanctions Policy, enforced by a decree of the President of *Ukraine* under the provision of Cabinet of Ministers.

At present, the authorized sanctions have been imposed against almost 17,200 entities, among them 15,600 entities that are at the initiative of the Security Service of Ukraine (as of February 2024) and the total number of sanctioned entities is almost 90% (National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, 2024).

Sanctions to individual entrepreneurs, individuals and legal entities have been enacted and applied. President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed Decree No. 36/2024 'On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine dated 29 January 2024 'On Approval of the Regulation on the State Register of Sanctions'. The Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine shall be responsible for monitoring the implementation of the decision of the NSDC of Ukraine enacted by this Decree. The Regulation on the State Register of Sanctions defines the procedure for maintaining and accessing the unified State Register of Sanctions, as well as providing information from it (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2024).

The NSDC of Ukraine has imposed sanctions on entities that:

- develop, produce and supply weapons and military equipment in order to support the armed forces of the Russian Federation; components for electronic equipment; hardware and software complex; software for the Russian military-industrial complex;

- high-tech equipment and military munition used by Russians against Ukraine; facilities of ensuring information security and integrated security systems for the military-industrial complex and law enforcement agencies involved in the supply of dual-use goods and components that are further used by the aggressor state in production and development of military goods and weapons of mass destruction; undertake illegal economic activities, in particular related to ensuring the functioning of the occupied territories in eastern and southern Ukraine, (hereinafter referred to as the TOT of Ukraine);
- are involved in the ‘legitimization’ of the temporary occupied territories of Ukraine by making decisions on the admission to the Russian Federation of the so-called ‘new territories’ seized by armed forces, the formation of new entities of the Russian Federation; participate in the organization and taking so-called ‘referendums on entry’ on the temporarily occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, Donetsk and Kherson regions, as well as in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea;
 - justify and recognize the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the annexation of the territories of our state as legitimate; blessing servicemen of the Russian armed forces and members of illegal armed groups controlled and financed by the Russian Federation; participate in mass events in support of Russian military actions against Ukraine; create and disseminate narratives of Russian propaganda aimed at refusing to acknowledge the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine and the very existence of Ukrainian people as a nation; support ideas of Russian ‘greatness and dominance’ in the global world;
 - are actual participants of mass abduction, illegal deportation and child trafficking from the temporarily occupied territories to the Russian Federation organized by Russian authorities;
 - participate in the political life of the aggressor country, have a significant impact on the media, or the ultimate beneficiaries of business entities holding monopoly positions in the financial, banking, industrial, scientific, technical sectors of the economy, logistics, communications, and there are Russian backbone enterprises of strategic management that provide economic support and long lasting financial assistance

to combat military operations on the territory of Ukraine;

- are involved in the activities of the Russian state corporation ‘Rosatom’, which illegally established control over Europe’s largest nuclear power plant– ‘Zaporizhzhia NPP’;
- are involved in the management and functioning of the so-called ‘private military companies’ that are under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and whose members are actively participated in the military aggression against Ukraine;
- own assets on the territory of Ukraine, their profits are used to support military aggression of the Russian Federation;
- participate in making deliberate abuse through the adoption of judgement with deliberate violation of human rights and freedoms guaranteed by international treaties.

In response to the application of these sanctions, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine sent relevant claims to the High Anti-Corruption Court. They have been approved and determined as an asset recovery process of sanctioned entities to the state.

The assets of Russian oligarchs such as A. Deripaska, A. Rotenberg, M. Shelkov, E. Giner, S. Chemezov, V. Yevtushenkov and former President of Ukraine V. Yanukovich were seized into the state budget, as well as assets worth about 190 billion UAH were seized in criminal proceedings. Moreover, corporate rights and real estate of a number of enterprises, the final beneficial Russian corporations’ owners such as ‘Rosneft’, ‘Gazprom’, ‘Rosatom’, ‘Rusal’, ‘Rostec’, ‘Tatneft’, ‘HMS Group’ were seized into the state budget too.

Sanctions policy of Ukraine is carried out under specific terms and conditions. Unlike almost all sanctions decisions that came into force in Europe after 1945 (with the exception of EU sanctions against Argentina during the war over the Falkland Islands), Ukraine has been implementing a policy of sanctions in terms of its military occupation of the territory. Moreover, Ukraine has been in striking danger in the face of a cruel enemy that possesses nuclear weapons and is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the UN).

Civilian infrastructure and critical infrastructure facilities were damaged as a result of the enemy shelling. The largest number of attacks struck

residential buildings, energy infrastructure facilities, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, as well as agriculture and animal husbandry (Chernysh et al., 2023). The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has initiated criminal cases against humanity and war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel has stated that the use of torture is the essential part of the Russian state in Ukraine (Gall, 2023).

It is obvious that at present there is a tendency of intensity of war crimes that leads to an excessive burden on the investigative bodies. According to the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, such an increase in work would be a challenge for any criminal justice system, even in peacetime.

Ukraine is considering all possible ways of ‘non-military’ compensation for damages caused by war, however, it is not sufficient and acceptable. The number of suspects in criminal proceedings for war crimes or crimes against humanity that are under law enforcement bodies’ control of Ukraine is desperately low. Among the 50,625 cases of international crimes, only 552 offenders were arrested or released on bail. As for criminal cases of violation of the laws and customs of war there are 49,483 cases, among which only 85 are offenders, respectively.

It turns out that neither deterrence of hostile actions nor compensation for damages caused by Russian aggression to legal means developed for peacetime has been out of the question.

The Security Service of Ukraine performs several roles in the sanctions policy:

1. As the key agency for national security, it has the direct authority to submit NSDC of Ukraine proposals for the application, amendment, and cancellation of restrictive measures (sanctions). It should be noted that the vast majority of the submitted proposals were initiated by the Security Service of Ukraine.
2. As an investigative agency, the investigation of war crimes is under its jurisdiction, and in accordance with the Draft Law of Ukraine No. 5191, from 02.03.2021, it has been decided to include the investigation of criminal offenses related to the circumvention of sanctions (Law of Ukraine No. 5191, 2021).
3. As a agency that collects evidence from official sources and provides them to the

countries expanding the alliance to enforce sanctions.

Nevertheless, determining the grounds for the implementation of sanctions, the certain challenges have occurred both at the domestic and international levels.

The sanctions as a policy tool for countering threats to the national security of Ukraine (Kostenko et al., 2021) should be aimed either at changing the behavior of the entity or individual to which it is applied (eliminating, averting, neutralizing threats, etc.), or, if it is impossible to change, it should be aimed at reduction of Russian economic and technological proficiency to conduct the war.

In future, depending on the chosen target, it is obligatory to form the grounds for the application of sanctions; they will be based on the behavior that we are trying to change, correct or limit the ability to participate in it.

Sanctions policy of Ukraine should be based on exercising its inevitable right to self-defense, under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (Statute Organization of the United Nations, s.f).

However, the main initiative of sanctions policy of Ukraine concurs with the initiative of self-defense as a state-victim of aggression: people and integrity protection, enemy defeating, undermining its economic potential, de-occupation of territories and compensation for damages Ukraine is an integral part of military efforts in the global armed conflict during which the Russian Federation commits cruel actions and crimes. This initiative is underlined by the President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the peace plan for Ukraine that was approved on 23.02.2023 by the resolution of the UN General Assembly (United Nations, 2023).

Taking into account that sanctions are mostly have an individual nature, *their addressee is the Russian federation, and not only a resident or a legal entity*. Sanctions policy of Ukraine should be aimed not only at the behavior of the entity or individual to which the restrictive measures are directly applied, but also at a wider range of individuals and legal entities, and the example of applying sanctions might have a preventive effect. In other words, sanctions themselves still act as a warning to everyone that there will be consequences for those who support Russian aggression.

The imposed restrictive measures (sanctions) against the Russian economy do not have a simultaneous effect, it will be intensifying over time. The application of sanctions enforces their implementation, as well as reduces the risks of circumventing them. The complicity of the effectiveness of trade restrictions on the country is that they can be circumvented technically using 'gray' imports or neutral countries.

Furthermore, let's try to highlight the theoretical and practical basis for increasing the effectiveness of the implementation of restrictive measures against the aggressor country.

Grounded theory and content analysis for studying international sanctions policy is discussed in the research of Y. Sedlar 'International Sanctions in World Politics: Theory and Practice' (Sedlar, 2013). However, one of the first fundamental studies that examines the effectiveness of international sanctions policy was the collective monograph of American experts G. Hufbauer, J. S. Wilson. Their analysis submits that the effectiveness of the implementation of international sanctions in achieving their intended foreign policy goals is about 30%, and this effectiveness would even increase if there were risks to provide evaluation of political and economic development of the target country (Hufbauer et al., 1983). In the another research the scholars determine economic sanctions failures that are caused by the influence of the following factors:

- if policy goals do not correspond with foreign sanctions, they should be considered as a critical element of the state foreign policy in the target country;
- if allies distance themselves or there are significant commercial losses within the state, the effectiveness of the sanctions policy is gradually decreased;
- influential allies can be forced by sanctions of the target country and participate as a 'black knight', providing support to the target country as compensation for damages that may be caused by the sanctions policy;
- sanctions effects may cause own countermeasures, forcing to integrate the destination country at the government and commercial levels (Hufbauer et al., 1983).

Since the formal publication in a scholarly journal, the political essence of international relations has been enriched with subject matter studies regarding sanctions policy.

According to Professor R. Nyunhem's research, the key factors that affect the formation of sanctions policy against the target country is its political system. Using the experience of assessing the effectiveness of international sanctions in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by Iran, Libya and North Korea, the scientist urges that sanctions would probably be much more successful if the target regime were at least partially democratically open (Newnham, 2010). D. Drezner supports this idea and considers that the implementation of international sanctions to the democratic countries is much more effective than to target states using authoritarian regimes (Drezner, 1999).

The next key factor that affects the success of sanctions is comprehensive international support. This factor has been highlighted in the studies of G. Gardner, C. Kimbrow, M. Doxey (Gardner & Kimbrough 1990).

According to the scholars' observations who researched effectiveness of geographical factors on the economic sanctions from the Institute for International Economics in Washington, it has been stated that the closer the sanctioning state is to the target country, the more influence it'll have to achieve its foreign policy goals through the implementation of sanctions policy (Hufbauer et al., 1983). As a result, the relationship between places reflects both variables of size and distance. This model to international sanctions policy was later characterized as 'gravitational'. Therefore, the geopolitical support factor for sanctions measures is essential, especially from first order neighborhood. Consideration of the introduction of such an indicator has been justified by the fact that with the involvement of neighboring countries in the implementation of sanctions against the target state, the problem of physical control over its borders will be solved, and, therefore, the required level of monitoring over the implementation of sanctions measures will be ensured.

The results of the Japanese expert M. Miyagawa are based on the idea of international sanctions policy. The researcher has pointed out the general prerequisites that can have a significant impact on the target state, great influence on international trade and insufficient development of the domestic economy; political and trade partners participation in sanctions measures of the target country; limited ability of the target state to change export and import markets; small foreign exchange reserves of the target country (Miyagawa, 1992).

Consequently, on the basis of the methodological synthesis of the theory of implementation of international sanctions and taking into account the studied approaches and models, it can be considered that effectiveness of the implementation of the policy of international sanctions depends on:

- the legal mechanisms of a regulatory framework that sets up principles and regulates the restrictive sanctions against the target state;
- institutional support for the implementation of sanctions measures;
- political consensus in the state implementing the sanctions policy using expediency, basic principles and methods of its implementation; and it ensures the efficiency and application completeness;
- the sanctioning state affects export-import dependence of the target country; and it arises due to previous positive political relations between the sanctioning country and the target country;
- the broad international sanctions support at all stages from the global leading countries of their implementation and the use of a 'gravitational' model in the implementation of sanctions policy;
- the presence of an opposition in the target country that supports the state in a political way imposing sanctions and is ready to achieve goals with democratic power transition to the target country (Sedliar, 2013).

The assessment of sanctions effectiveness against the Russian Federation is plausible taking into account its impact on the macroeconomic situation in the aggressor country and on sectoral changes. It can be argued that during 2022-2023 the Russian Federation was able to avoid serious destabilization and still maintains the capacity to finance the war against Ukraine (Vlasenko et al., 2020). However, in the short and long terms perspectives, economic stability in the Russian Federation can be under threat and deterioration due to the destruction of economic cooperation with partner countries that support Ukraine in the war against the Russian Federation.

Partner countries have been actively working at implementation of controversial issues in the sanctions policy, as for Russian evasion and circumvention of restrictive measures in cooperation with Ukraine. The strengthening of the sanctions policy is focused on the transport and energy sectors, the military-industrial complex (hereinafter referred to as the MIC), the

risks of production and export of energy resources and raw materials (Sanctions). As a result of sanctions imposed on Russia for its aggressive war against Ukraine, including sanctions on Russian oil and gas, investment and financing, such measures will lead to a gradual decrease in oil and gas production and exports.

The United States, the EU, Canada and other countries *have imposed* massive and unprecedented *sanctions* against Russia in response to the military aggression against Ukraine. The measures are designed to **weaken Russian economy**, depriving it of advanced technologies and markets and significantly curtailing its capacity to wage war, to stop not only international flights but also domestic flights, to limit cooperation in the space industry. The sanctions ban international flights with the countries that have imposed sanctions, restrict an access to their airports, limit the supply of aircrafts, spare parts and aircraft equipment to the Russian Federation, as well as sanctions to ban insurance, maintenance and repair services for aircraft equipment, export of goods and technologies for the space industry.

Nevertheless, airline companies and importers of the Russian Federation adopted 'friendly' countries sanctions solving the problems of lacking aircraft parts. According to the survey, from May 2022 prior to June 2023 Russian airline companies imported spare parts for aircraft industry worth \$1.2 billion through intermediaries in Tajikistan, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, China and Kyrgyzstan. These countries have not joined Western sanctions against the Russian Federation (Gauthier-Villars & Stolyarov, 2023).

In order to strengthen the sanctions regime in this sphere, any effective control of the supply chain has to begin with the initial sale of an item to a distributor as it becomes increasingly complicated to trace its physical whereabouts and impede any illicit activities post-sale. The tracking system should control the movement of spare parts, equipment from the manufacturer to the customer (an airline company). Sanctions restrictions should be considered, with the provision of guarantees and a cash deposit by the customer of these goods (through an airline company or an intermediary) to ensure the delivery of these goods to their destination.

The sanctions imposed by 'friendly' countries have also caused heavy losses to the Russian automobile industry and related sectors of the Russian economy. Therefore, the sanctions

policy of Ukrainian partner countries bans the supply of vehicles that are classified as luxury goods (the EU has set the maximum cost of such cars from 50 thousand euros), as well as components and spare parts for them to the Russian Federation. Moreover, sanctions were imposed against the company KAMAZ PTC, whose products are actively used by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the war against Ukraine. Later, in order to limit the industrial potential of the aggressor country, the supply of technologies, components, items and other automobile goods to the Russian Federation was limited with certain exceptions (European Union, 2014).

Instead of integration process in the automobile industry on the global market, the Russian Federation has chosen the way of achieving technological sovereignty and import dependence on China. In the context of sanctions restrictions, it might be to hinder this sector development in Russian economy (European Union, 2014).

The sanctions of partner countries have also affected the metallurgy industry of the Russian Federation. In particular, in the field of metallurgical products, restrictions on their import and transportation to third countries have been imposed, import duties have been increased, and the 'most favored nation' status has been removed. Moreover, sanctions have been applied directly to metallurgical enterprises. Despite the reduction in steel sector and its export abroad, we observe a significant increase in the supply of steel products for the needs of military-industry in Russia.

Refer to the present situation, *Ukraine should focus its efforts on* political and diplomatic arena to strengthen sanctions against the metallurgy industry of the Russian Federation, to create conditions to prevent their circumvention, to replace metal products and ores of Russian producers by products of the Ukrainian mining and metallurgical complex on the EU market.

The collapse of bank capital in Russia was the result of the sanctions imposed by Ukrainian Western partners at the end of February 2022. After a year and a half of cutting Russia's access to capital markets by the EU, experts consider that they have not led the Russian banking sector and key market players to the bankruptcy. Moreover, the Russian banking sector has a strong resilience margin. However, the essential consequence of the imposed sanctions has been Russia's isolation from the international financial

infrastructures. Sanctions have cut Russia off from money transfer channels, the most technologically advanced banking sectors, and have backed Russian banking sector in soviet times (International Security and European Integration of Ukraine, 2022).

The USA government and its allies have also made significant efforts to reduce military industry of the Russian Federation. Firstly, it was aimed at preventing the Russian Military industry from obtaining items, elements, and materials. At present the sanctions of partner countries and Ukraine against the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation are:

- make a shortage of certain high-quality components and force the Ministry of Defense and military-industrial complex to replace them with low-quality items;
- government attempts to acquire high-end microchips produced by the global leading companies that have attracted significant attention and enhance control from the beginning of the war;
- the sanctions implementations on the engines production will have long-term consequences for the armed forces, primarily in terms of their restoration, repair and technology enhancement, as well as on efforts to sophisticate new military technologies in this sphere, including aircraft building;
- Russia could be facing a shortage of advanced optical systems, this process is leading to tanks reequipment with lower-quality and outdated technologies and additional losses during hostilities;
- Russia could be experiencing a shortage of bearings, that have negativ impact on vehicles production (military and civilian). However, Russia is trying to replace the components shortage with lower-quality items produced in Asia.

Conclusions

The implemented sanctions against Russia imposed by partner countries and international organizations have positive outcomes and affect the Russian economy and politics. **The sanctions aim to weaken Russia's ability to finance the war** and specifically target the political, military and economic elite responsible for the invasion. Sanctions policy of Ukraine has already led to the reduction in foreign investment, limited access to financial markets, reduced exports and imports of goods, as well as restricted economic and political measures for Russian individuals,

entities, officials and businessmen. However, it should be considered that the effectiveness of sanctions in some spheres against the Russian Federation has been limited yet.

Measures listed below, in particular, insufficient states involvement of the geopolitical environment of the target country in the implementation of international sanctions; an aggressor state autocracy and the absence of the viable opposition in the government that could be politically oriented towards the state imposing sanctions, as well as could demonstrate democratic transition in the power of the target country reduce the effectiveness of the implementation of international sanctions against the Russian Federation.

The key factor to improving the effectiveness of sanctions against the Russian Federation is the duration of sanctions policy implementation, the coalition of the initiating states and current monitoring of the effectiveness of the restrictive measures applied for the viable adaptation of the sanctions policy.

In our opinion, the implementation of a set of measures aimed at strengthening analytical capabilities, internal cooperation, international cooperation, etc., will contribute to increasing the role of the Security Service of Ukraine in the implementation of Ukraine's sanctions policy in countering threats to state security.

Analytical capabilities. Strengthening analytical capabilities will allow employees of the Security Service of Ukraine to identify potential threats more effectively to state security and organize countermeasures.

Internal cooperation. Strengthening cooperation between various services and departments in Ukraine, such as customs, law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, etc., will allow faster and more effective detection and response to sanctions violations.

International cooperation. Cooperation with other countries and international organizations to exchange information and coordinate efforts to implement sanctions will increase their effectiveness.

Implementation of technologies. The use of modern technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data analysis and cyber defense will also significantly increase the analytical capabilities and effectiveness of sanctions control.

In general, the combination of these and other measures will allow the Security Service of Ukraine to become more effective in implementing the sanctions policy and ensuring the state security of Ukraine.

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