Volume 13 - Issue 75
/ March 2024
173
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2024.75.03.15
How to Cite:
Diachuk, L. (2024). Manipulation of lexical choice aspects in the creation of stereotypes and ideas in Russian
propaganda. Amazonia Investiga, 13(75), 173-184. https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2024.75.03.15
Manipulation of lexical choice aspects in the creation of stereotypes
and ideas in Russian propaganda
Маніпуляція аспектами лексичного вибору у створенні cтереотипів та уявлень у російській
пропаганді
Received: February 12, 2024 Accepted: March 25, 2024
Written by:
Liudmyla Diachuk1
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0076-5236
Abstract
The aim of the research is to analyse the
mechanisms of manipulation of lexical choice
aspects in the creation of mass stereotypes and
ideas in Russian propaganda (based on examples
of the analysis of Russian mass media and blogs).
The research employed the methods of
quantitative, comparative, and statistical
analysis. In the course of the study, results were
obtained in the form of a count of lexical units
used in five sources of Russian propaganda and
an assessment of their meaning. The results give
reason to draw a conclusion about the use of
certain lexical choices (euphemisms,
emotionally charged vocabulary, slogans, hate
speech, historical myths and falsifications) by
Russian propaganda to redefine military realities
and justify the war crimes of the Russian
occupation army. The academic novelty of the
study is the selected various academic sources to
illustrate the imperial thinking of Russian mass
media correspondents. Prospects. Further
research may diversify the materials for the
lexical analysis of the mechanisms of Russian
propaganda in mass media.
Keywords: propaganda materials, lexemes,
lexical choice, manipulation of consciousness,
propaganda, word combinations.
1
PhD in Philology, Research Department of Post-Soviet Space and Slavic Cultures, Faculty of Translation and Interpretation (FTI-
EII), University of Mons, Belgium. WoS Researcher ID: N-1723-2016
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Introduction
Relevance
In connection with the active phase of the
Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukrainians face new
challenges in terms of the need for not only
physical, but also informational self-defence
against hostile propaganda. It is important to
analyse the mechanisms of propaganda used in
mass media, official sources and speeches of
public figures of the Russian Federation in order
to understand how to build counter-propaganda
mechanisms.
The need to define the term “lexical choice” is
significant. A. Lan and I.Paraboni characterize
lexical choice as “the task of choosing words to
express the meaning of a representation of a
particular definition” (Lan & Paraboni, 2018,
2999). Accordingly, researchers characterize the
phenomenon of lexicalization of descriptions as
the implementation of the task of selecting the
most relevant signifiers for a certain described
concept. We observe the phenomenon of
linguistic variability in the selection of certain
characteristics of an object or phenomenon,
which may change depending on the speaker’s
perspective. This gives grounds to draw a
conclusion about the dependence of the
interpretation of information by perceivers in a
certain way depending on the lexical choice of
media representatives or other figures who shape
public opinion.
A corpus study is usually carried out for the
analysis of lexical choice, which is based on the
collection of linguistic samples, most often used
to denote a particular phenomenon (Lan &
Paraboni, 2018, 2999). In this study, the
methodology will be distinguished by focusing
not only on the lexical meanings of certain myths
of Russian propaganda, but on the contexts of
their use and the purpose of using certain
characteristics to create a false media reality.
In connection with the active phase of the
Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukrainians face new
challenges regarding the need to protect not only
physical but also informational space from
aggressive propaganda. In the modern world,
information has become a potent weapon capable
of influencing consciousness and people’s
thoughts and actions. Understanding this, Russia
uses propaganda as a critical tool to achieve its
political goals. The article mainly focuses on
analysing one of the main aspects of Russian
propaganda - the manipulation of lexical choice.
The study’s primary purpose is to reveal how,
through the skilful use of certain words and
expressions, Russia forms stereotypes and ideas
that are beneficial to it and how this affects
society’s perception of reality.
Unexplored issues
Issues that currently require research and
analysis are the nature of the use by
representatives of the Russian authorities of the
lexical choice of residents of certain territories
for geopolitical purposes: in order to justify their
own imperialist actions in the form of occupation
of the territories of other states. The academic
novelty of the research is the examination of the
imperialist nature of not only the official
propaganda of the Russian government, but also
the latent and conquering thinking of
representatives of the opposition mass media and
blogs of the Russian Federation. Researchers
usually focus on the use of the language issue
only with the aim of establishing a totalitarian
system directly by the Russian authorities,
forgetting about the imperial thinking of
opposition representatives as well, which leads to
the need to abolish Russian culture in a broader
sense, without attempting to search for its more
conscious representatives.
Aim
The aim of the study is to analyse the mechanism
of manipulation of lexical choice aspects in the
creation of stereotypes and ideas in Russian
propaganda.
Objectives/questions
The aim of the research implied the fulfilment of
the following research objectives:
1. Describe the nature of the manipulation of
aspects of lexical choice in the rhetoric of the
official sources of the party representing the
Russian government - All-Russian Political
Party “United Russia”.
2. Analyse the use of lexical choice to appeal
to the myth of the unity of peoples in the
propaganda carried out by the media
resources of the Russian occupation
administrations in the temporarily occupied
territories;
3. Demonstrate the discovery of imperial
mythologemes in the worldview of even
apparently oppositional Russian bloggers
and media figures.
Diachuk, L. / Volume 13 - Issue 75: 173-184 / March, 2024
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Literature review
Means of Russian propaganda are the subject of
lexical analysis of a significant number of
studies. Furthermore, the use of certain lexemes
to spread narratives broadcast by the Kremlin
authorities is analysed.
First of all, there are theoretical studies of the use
of the “lexical choice” category. In particular, A.
Lan and I. Paraboni analyse the specifics of the
lexical choice made by different individuals
when describing the features of identical human
faces. The phenomenon of lexicalization of
descriptions illustrates the variety of epithets
used by a person to describe the same object or
phenomenon according to the five most common
psychological dimensions of human personality
– openness to experience, conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism
(Lan & Paraboni, 2018, 3000).
Apart from that, A. Hampton and V. Shalin
(2017) analyse the factors of lexical choice
among synonyms of certain characteristics of
phenomena described in the media. The terms
which are most often chosen among antonym
pairs to describe natural disasters were identified
using the example of Twitter coverage of
Hurricane Sandy, the tornado in Oklahoma, and
the Boston bombing.
Special attention is paid to the comparative
analysis of lexemes used in the mass media to
describe the realities of the Russian-Ukrainian
war. Therefore, E. El Fallaki (2022) and A. Graef
(2023) analyze propaganda in the media and
political publications. M. Osnabrügge et al.
(2021) examine the features of political texts in
general. O. Komarnytska and M. Karpushyna
(2022) analyze the lexical and grammatical
features of reporting on the course of military
operations. N. Roman et al. (2017) and S.
Stankova (2023) describe the specifics of the
formation of media discourse of information
warfare in the world. M. Lorincz (2023)
examines lexemes used by reputable British
news outlets in describing the positions of the
Ukrainian and Russian governments. As basic
methods, the article uses keyword analysis,
expression analysis, and lexeme analysis. Hence,
the frequency of using negative and positive
expressions is compared in order to describe the
actions of representatives of the governments of
warring countries. Descriptions of linguistic
characteristics are based on the specifics of the
use of certain lexical and grammatical patterns.
A limitation of the study is that
“decontextualized keywords may not be self-
explanatory and could potentially lead to
incorrect research conclusions” (Lorincz, 2023,
120).
V. Solopova et al. (2023) carried out a lexical
analysis of descriptions of the Russian-Ukrainian
war in the news Telegram channels of Ukraine,
Russia, France, and Romania. Their analysis is
aimed both at reviewing the narrative strategies
of describing the war in general, and at
identifying the most used clichés of propaganda
sources. While fake news forms a large
proportion of the propaganda tools, propaganda
also relies on a specific combination of words,
appealing to emotions or stereotypes, ‘flag-
waving’ and detachment techniques, such as red
herrings or whataboutism (Solopova et al., 2023,
6). The material of the research is the names,
terms and expressions included in the glossary of
the National Security Service of Ukraine
recommended for use by public figures in
diplomatic affairs to describe the realities of the
Russian-Ukrainian war. As a result of the
analysis of the semantic content of various
lexical means used to describe the war, a number
of observations were made regarding the nature
of their use. Fake news is characterized by an
excessively emotional choice of words in order
to interest the recipient. Accordingly, sentimental
messages with positive and negative semantics
were analysed.
Thus, N. Karpchuk and B. Yuskiv (2021)
examine the main lexemes used by Russian
propaganda using reports from the “Russia
Today” resource as an example. The main
material for the research was the titles of
publications of the outlined media. First, the
semantic features of the lexemes of the
vocabulary corpus were reconstructed, followed
by the creation of a structural thematic model of
the expressions most used in propaganda, and the
connotative meanings of emotionally charged
lexemes were analysed to describe the war. The
study is focused on the vocabulary structure of
analytical materials and the thematic content of
resource messages. The conclusion was made
that the personalities of the Ukrainian authorities
are of no importance for Russian propaganda,
because both Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr
Zelenskyi are described using expressive,
negatively coloured vocabulary.
Furthermore, D. Geissler et al. (2023) also
conduct a quantitative analysis of Russian
propaganda-related lexemes in social networks.
In particular, the researchers focus on analysing
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the frequency of posts in support of Russia and
Ukraine in Twitter. The search for materials was
carried out using popular hashtags in support of
countries. The Prolific service employees
classified the obtained information according to
the content into “pro-Russian”, “pro-Ukrainian”
or “neutral/inaccurate/irrelevant”. The
Botometer (specializes in detecting bots by
analysing account content) and Bot Sentinel
(detects not only bots, but also trolls and curated
accounts) programmes were used to identify bots
(Geissler et al., 2023, 5). Miller’s research (2019)
is also related to the analysis of emotional
vocabulary used by Russian propaganda. For
example, pro-Russian news pages, such as the so-
called Internet Research Agencies deliver
propaganda to the Western media space. Thus,
lexemes associated with fear and anger are most
often used to manipulate mass consciousness.
“…It is worth noting that potentially violent
language, including terms such as ‘kill’, ‘hate’,
‘attack’ and ‘protest’, is present in several themes
in both thematic model results”. An illustration is
the US presidential election, where a positive
image was created of the candidate with a more
pro-Russian position - Donald Trump, as
opposed to Hilary Clinton with a democratic and
pro-European course.
In the collection “Wars and Worlds” devoted to
the exposure of Russian propaganda, V. Moroz
also describes the informational influence of
media controlled by Russia in the section
“Networks of Illusions”... “Social networks have
now become information channels through
which authoritarian regimes like Russia export
‘hybrid warfare’ to democratic countries”
(Moroz, 2017, 62). Hence, the author emphasizes
that even social networks (for example,
vkontakte.ru and LiveJournal), which were
oppositional in nature from the beginning of their
existence, become pro-government due to the
persecution of the owners and the purchase of
rights to the holdings of the social networks. As
a method of Ukraine’s struggle against Russian
propaganda, the author singles out the tactics of
Internet regulation in the form of blocking the
sites of the aggressor country that may contain
information posing a danger to Ukrainian
sovereignty.
Researcher O. Shaparenko analyses new lexical
frames (abbreviation, affixation, formation of
new word combinations) that arose when the
hydride war, which had been going on since
2014, grew into a full-scale one in 2022. The
researcher used the methods of observation,
comparative analysis, and synthesis
(Shaparenko, 2022). The proposed analysis
reveals a clear connection between society and
the language lexicon. The metaphorical and
emotional colouring of the used lexemes also
becomes important.
Moreover, A. Erlich and C. Garner (2023)
investigated the degree of vulnerability of
Ukrainian residents to Russian propaganda
through social surveys. It was concluded that the
majority of Ukrainians perceive Russian
propaganda critically and are able to adequately
counter it. However, it was noted that
Ukrainians, who have a greater ethno-linguistic
attachment to Russia, are more vulnerable to
disinformation from Kremlin sources.
Methods
Research design
The materials of the research are articles from
propaganda Internet resources distributed in the
territories temporarily occupied by Russia,
namely, Rg.Ru, Gazeta.ru, Tavria.tv, articles
from the official website of the largest pro-
government party in Russia - All-Russian
Political Party “Единая Россия” (“United
Russia”) and posts from Telegram channels of
bloggers who claim about their opposition,
having imperial ideas − “Котики и корона на
голове Беллы Рапопорт” (“Cats and a Crown on
the Head of Bella Rapoport”), “Кровавая
барыня” (“Bloody Lady”), etc.
The main lexemes related to the realities of the
active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war are
singled out from the titles of the texts and the
texts themselves. Their emotional and lexical
load is characterized, their lexical choice is
justified, and their function in propaganda
journalistic materials is explained. Accordingly,
lexemes are categorized according to the
functions performed in journalistic propaganda
materials. Quotations of headlines and wording
of bloggers using the outlined phrases are also
provided.
Sampling
The choice of methods and materials is
determined by the need for a multifaceted study
of the specifics of the use of certain clichéd
expressions in Russian journalistic materials of
different semantic and emotional load and
stylistics. The number of analysed sources and
their heterogeneous nature can be explained by
the need to carry out a careful analysis of their
content to a greater extent than to create a larger
sample of studied materials. Six disparate
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sources – from the official website of the United
Russia party to bloggers’ records – can be
explained by the need for a thorough
understanding of the working mechanism of
Russian propaganda in the context of an
information war, not only in official pro-
government propaganda materials, but also in
sources that pretend to be oppositional. The
selection criterion is the direct or indirect
expression of positions that are completely
identical or similar to the narratives formulated
by the Russian authorities.
The meaning and functions of identified lexical
units in Russian propaganda are analysed, in
particular, when it comes to the choice of words
or phrases of certain semantics among words in a
synonymous series. A tendency has been
observed for Russian propaganda publications to
erase negative connotations associated with
terrorism and the illegal occupation of territories,
attributing them to the Ukrainian army because
of the choice of words with a certain emotional
connotation.
Methods
This study employs quantitative (selection and
description of lexical units) and comparative
(comparison of the nature and connotations of
use and semantic meaning of lexemes used in
Russian propaganda). Methods of statistical
analysis were also used (the number and
frequency of mention of certain lexemes were
calculated). These methods include attention to
lexical choice in the context of using certain
words, phrases, and word combinations in order
to form a certain vision of the war by its
audience. Attention is focused on the meanings
acquired by word combinations in certain
contexts and on their emotional load, in
particular, in situations when Russian
propaganda tries to redefine words to denote
military realities.
Ethical criteria
The research was carried out independently at
each stage - from the selection of sources to the
actual process of writing the text. Work on
sources in the form of keyword analysis,
understanding their meaning, identifying and
abstracting key theses was done independently.
The principle of irreplaceability of cited sources
was observed during the research. The culture of
referring to the studies of researchers whose
articles are used in the theoretical section of the
article has been observed. The contribution of
previous researchers of related issues is noted.
The materials are publicly available. No
infringing software, including AI, was used when
writing.
Results
The choice of words to describe the activities of
various military groups is indicative. Moreover,
the lexemes “терористи” (“terrorists”) and
“бойовики” (“militants”) are used by the pro-
Russian mass media in the temporarily occupied
territories to refer to the armed forces, in the
context of fake news, which demonstrates the
desire to establish a negative image of the
Ukrainian army in direct contrast to the term
“військові” (“the military”) which characterizes
members of the Russian occupation army.
Sometimes, juxtaposition of these two terms is
observed in one sentence of the title: “Более 80
боевиков ВСУ ликвидировали военные
группировки «Днепр»” (“The Dnipro military
group liquidated more than 80 militants of the
Armed Forces of the Ukraine”), “На
Херсонском направлении военные РФ
ликвидировали место скопления живой силы
и лодку ВСУ” (“In the Kherson direction, the
Russian military eliminated a place of
concentration of militants and a boat of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine”), “За сутки военные
РФ ликвидировали более 35 боевиков ВСУ”
(“In a day, the Russian military liquidated more
than 35 militants of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine”) (Tavria, 2023). In addition, they try to
impose the idea of the illegitimacy of the
Ukrainian army with the use of word “militants”
in order to reinforce the narrative about Ukraine
as a whole as a failed state, which favourably
coincides with the rhetoric of Russian
propaganda about the need to merge the
territories of Ukraine and Belarus with Russia. It
is also interesting that the lexeme “military” in
propaganda news has several meanings:
1. Part of the lexemes “військові
кореспонденти” (“military
correspondents”) and “військові слідчі”
(“military investigators”), which should
legitimize the actions of the legal bodies of
the occupation administration;
2. “Військові” (“The military”) in reference to
members of the occupying army.
The juxtaposition of the terms “Ukrainian
language” and “Russian language” is relevant, as
it is the use of the Russian language in the East
and South of Ukraine that Russian propaganda
tries to use to legitimize armed aggression and
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occupation. Therefore, the juxtaposition of the
Ukrainian and Russian languages in the news
headlines of the media under the occupation
authorities is mentioned in the context of
portraying the Ukrainian legislation on the de-
Russification and the need to use the state
language in public places in a negative light —
as a violation of the right to self-identification of
a person. “Военных ВСУ отправят на курсы
украинского языка” (“The military of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine will be sent to
Ukrainian language courses”), “Рогов: В
подконтрольном Киеву Запорожье меняют
вывески на русском языке” (“Rogov: they
change signs in Russian in Kyiv-controlled
Zaporizhzhia”) (Rg.Ru, 2024). Besides,
examples of statements by Ukrainian media
persons regarding the need to use the Ukrainian
language are used in a distorted light.
“Экс-депутат Рады Фарион похвасталась
ненавистью внучки к русскоговорящим” (“I.
Farion, Ex-deputy of the Verkhovna Rada
boasted of her granddaughter’s hatred of Russian
speakers”) (Rg.Ru, 2024). News related to the
Russian language is also aimed at the fulfilment
of such opposite tasks of the propagandists, as the
demonstration of measures to spread the Russian
language in states whose authorities supported
the aggressor country: “Студенты из Китая
практикуют свой русский в детском саду”
(“Students from China practice Russian in
kindergarten”), “Власти провинции КНР
Ляонин: Русский в вузах региона изучают 4
тысячи студентов” (“Liaoning Provincial
authorities in People’s Republic of China: 4
thousand students are studying Russian in
regional universities”) (Rg.Ru, 2024), on the one
hand, while showing how the Russian language
is supposedly being repressed in Ukraine and in
the Western countries of the world, on the other.
In addition to Ukrainian language legislation, the
legislation of the Baltic countries is criticized
regarding the need for migrants to learn the state
languages of their countries of residence.
“Минобразования Литвы считает
правильным отказ от русского языка как
иностранного” (“The Ministry of Education of
Lithuania considers it correct to abandon the
Russian language as foreign”) (Rg.Ru, 2024).
Such a contextual choice is an attempt to justify
Russia’s colonial expansion of territories under
the pretext of the propaganda task of “protecting
the Russian-speaking population of other
regions” from pretended oppression. Attempts to
describe the actions of countries that support the
aggression of the Putin government in a
complimentary tone are also observed in the use
of the phrase ‘national minorities’, because the
main context in which this idiom is used in the
propaganda media is the statement about the
concern of Russia and its allies for the rights of
national minorities. “Венгрия и Румыния
добились от Украины улучшения прав
нацменьшинств” (“Hungary and Romania
helped Ukraine improve the rights of national
minorities”) (Gazeta.ru, 2023).
An important place in Russian propaganda is the
manipulation of the religious preferences of
believers to promote Kremlin narratives. The
Russian Orthodox Church (ROCh), which has
long been performing the functions of not so
much uniting the community of believers as
delivering propaganda messages, is mentioned in
the Russian mass media in three main contexts:
1. Criticism of the actions of the Ukrainian
authorities: “Раскольники избили
прихожанина про захвате храма УПЦ на
Украине” (“Dissidents beat a parishioner
about the capture of the Orthodox Church in
Ukraine”), “Зеленский потребовал у Рады
принять закон о запрете деятельности
УПЦ” (“Zelenskyi demanded that the
Council adopt a law on the prohibition of the
activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church”) (Gazeta.ru, 2023);
2. Support for Russian military aggression:
“Патриарх доказал допустимость
причащения бойцов СВО на
историческом примере” (“Patriarch
proved the possibility of communion with
soldiers involved in a special military
operation using a historical example”)
(Gazeta.ru, 2023).
3. Criticism of Western inclusion and its
opposition to “духовних скреп” (“spiritual
bonds”): “Глава РПЦ призвал пустить
священников на консультации перед
абортом” (“The head of the Russian
Orthodox Church called on priests to consult
before abortion”), “Российские католики
выступили против декларации Ватикана
о благословении гомосексуалов”
(“Russian Catholics opposed the Vatican’s
declaration on the blessing of
homosexuals”) (Gazeta.ru, 2023).
The last point of our analysis is an overview of
the lexical aspects of the Telegram channels of
bloggers who position themselves as the Russian
opposition, but demonstrate imperial narratives
in their reflections on news concerning Ukraine.
Thus, Bella Rapoport, a Russian feminist
blogger, despite her participation in protests
against the invasion of Ukraine since the
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beginning of the active phase of the full-scale
war, has now changed her rhetoric to one critical
of both sides of the armed conflict, thereby
unacceptably equating the aggressor and the
victim. We observe irony over calling the
Russian occupiers “orcs” (a lexeme borrowed
from R.J. Tolkien’s novels), and the Ukrainian
military — “elves”. So, the propaganda function
of creating an “ambiguous” picture of the war for
the mass media is fulfilled.
“Все эти два года не уставала повторять –
отождествление Украины как государства и
украинских политиков с гражданами страны,
а также бездумное воспевание некоего
особого эльфийского народа, не способного
на коррупцию, пытки, насилие – в качестве
противопоставления оркам, которые по сути
своей тлетворной все такие, запрет на
разговор о внутренних проблемах – это
прежде всего удар по украинцам же” (“All
these two years, I hadn’t got tired of repeating −
the identification of Ukraine as a state and
Ukrainian politicians with the citizens of the
country, as well as the mindless praise of a
certain elven people, incapable of corruption,
torture, violence − as a counterpoint to the Orcs,
who are inherently corrupt, the ban on talking
about internal problems is, first of all, a blow to
Ukrainians themselves”) (Telegram, 2023). We
also see manipulation in the form of speculation
about the use of the Russian language by a certain
part of the residents of Ukraine as creating a false
impression of the common mentality of the
peoples. “…Настя Травкина авторка того
самого текста, где на примере трех или там
четырех пар слов сравнивались украинский и
русский языки на предмет того, какой один из
них рабский и орочий, а другой — сильный и
эльфийский” (“...Nastya Travkina is the author
of the same text, where, using the example of
three or four pairs of words, the Ukrainian and
Russian languages were compared for which one
of them is servile and orcish, and which one is
strong and elfin”) (Cats and a Crown on the Head
of Bella Rapoport). The use of the preposition
“on” in relation to Ukraine is notable in this
fragment, which is an imperial marker of treating
Ukraine as a territory, not a state. We can also
observe indignation at the translation of Soviet
films, and accordingly – their perception as
untranslatable and inviolable works (Table 1).
Table 1.
The specifics of the use of lexical units in Russian propaganda
Lexeme
Source
Number of mentions
Meaning
Militants
Rg.Ru Gazeta.ru
United Russia’s website Cats and a Crown on the Head of
Bella Rapoport Bloody Lady
10,000 33,250 650 14
44
Negative characteristics
of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, creating doubts
about the legitimacy of
the Ukrainian army
Terrorists
Rg.Ru Gazeta.ru
United Russia’s website Cats and a Crown on the Head of
Bella Rapoport Bloody Lady
10,000 24,258 1,007 63
118
Negative characteristics
of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, Ukrainian
activists, and the
Ukrainian authorities
The military
Rg.Ru Gazeta.ru
United Russia’s website Cats and a Crown on the Head of
Bella Rapoport Bloody Lady
10,000 187,141 10,000 324
1,031
Attach a neutral marker
to the occupying forces
Russian language
Rg.Ru Gazeta.ru
United Russia’s website Cats and a Crown on the Head of
Bella Rapoport Bloody Lady
1,275 14,264 1,985 67
57
The establishment of the
Russian language as the
language of hegemony
Ukrainian language
Rg.Ru Gazeta.ru
United Russia’s website Cats and a Crown on the Head of
Bella Rapoport Bloody Lady
280 4,540 211 13
17
Criticism of Ukrainian
language policy,
colonialist claims in
temporarily occupied
territories
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National minorities
Rg.Ru Gazeta.ru
United Russia’s website Cats and a Crown on the Head of
Bella Rapoport Bloody Lady
78 2,971 94 1
3
Creation of the illusion of
protection of national
minorities in the Russian
Federation
New regions
Rg.Ru Gazeta.ru
United Russia’s website Cats and a Crown on the Head of
Bella Rapoport Bloody Lady
5,998 38,317 10,000 22
197
Attachment of a neutral
meaning to an act of the
occupation of territories
Liberated territories
Rg.Ru Gazeta.ru
United Russia’s website Cats and a Crown on the Head of
Bella Rapoport Bloody Lady
174 5,142 1,297 3
11
Attachment of a positive
meaning to an act of the
occupation of territories
The Armed Forces
of Ukraine
Rg.Ru Gazeta.ru
United Russia’s website Cats and a Crown on the Head of
Bella Rapoport Bloody Lady
7,633 30,730 192 123
114
Discrediting the
Ukrainian army
Source: created by the authors based on the results of the study
Exact number of lexical units used in certain
publications or blogs were calculated by using
the search window on the indicated Russian
propaganda websites, with the exact wording of
the relevant phrases in the search queries. Table
2 presents a generalization of the use of lexical
choice in Russian propaganda.
Table 2.
The use of lexical choice in Russian propaganda
Reception
Example
Analysis
Euphemisms and
misinformation
“Special military operation” instead of
“war”
Conceals the true nature of the invasion,
minimizes its scale and brutality.
Euphemisms and
misinformation
“Victims of provocations” or “collateral
losses” instead of “civilian victims”
Downplays the significance of the deaths of
civilians, blames them for their own deaths.
Emotionally charged
vocabulary
“Fascists”, “Banderivites”, “Nazis”
about Ukrainians
Devalues Ukrainians, demonizes them,
justifies aggression.
Emotionally charged
vocabulary
“The Suffering of the Russian People”
Causes sympathy, mobilizes support for the
actions of the authorities.
Repetition and slogans
“Ours for ours”, “Russia is us”, “Let's
protect Donbas”
Simple, memorable slogans that convey
messages clearly.
Hate speech
Offensive words and phrases about
Ukrainians, LGBT, ethnic minorities
Inflames enmity, splits society.
Historical myths and
falsifications
“Russia has always sought to protect the
Slavic peoples”
Manipulation of historical facts,
mythologizing of the past.
Historical myths and
falsifications
“The Ukrainian state has no historical
right to exist”
Denial of Ukrainians' right to self-
determination.
Source: created by the authors based on the results of the study
Analysing Table 2, it is essential to note that
these are only a few examples. Russian
propaganda uses a wide range of lexical
techniques, which are constantly changing and
improving. The ability to recognize and analyse
these techniques is of great importance in order
to resist them and protect oneself from their
harmful influence.
The analysed material gives grounds to conclude
about the attempts of Russian propaganda to
change the semantics of terms to describe the
realities of the Russian-Ukrainian war with the
help of a certain lexical choice. We observe how
the selection of certain signifiers from the
synonymous series performs the function of
manipulating consciousness and justifying
military aggression.
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Discussion
As a result of the application of the described
methodology, the main lexemes used by Russian
publicists and bloggers to denote the realities of
war in order to change the focus of potential
propaganda addressees, mostly – the population
of the occupied territories, were calculated and
analysed by lexical meaning. The selected
language means were analysed according to the
frequency of use and functional load in
propaganda materials. This study can contribute
to further consideration of the main mechanisms
of propaganda language based on the choice of
certain tokens as means of expression. The
research could potentially be an interesting
opportunity to get acquainted with the analysis of
the functions most often performed by certain
lexemes in Russian propaganda, as well as with
the specifics of the redefinition of terminology
related to the description of the Russian-
Ukrainian war. Like previous lexical studies, the
article focuses on the semantic and pragmatic
functions of using certain phrases and sentences
in propaganda materials. The difference from
previous works is the greater variety of analysed
materials − from pro-government news websites
to opposition resources.
A theoretical study by Ash et al. (2021) contains
a general analysis of the influence of lexical
choice on the semantics of the text. Their analysis
is statistical and focuses on the evaluation of the
frequency of use of certain lexical units in
propaganda texts. The group of scientists E. Ash,
G. Gauthier, and Widmer, P. (2021) and E. Ash
and E. Labzina (2019) also analyse the use of
emotionally charged vocabulary in political
discourse, which is similar to the issue analysed
in this article. As in our study, R. Abbadi et al.
(2024) conducted a comparative analysis of the
speeches of the presidents of the United States,
Ukraine, and Russia during the war.
In the study of H. Sіuta (2022), statistical
analysis plays a similarly important role, as the
author focuses on the lexical and phraseological
means of the conscious choice of the Ukrainian
language by the majority of the population of
Ukraine as the main language of communication
with the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Moreover, the researcher analyses modern
Ukrainian political speeches (Sіuta, 2019). The
political peculiarities of the linguistic choice of
residents of the frontline areas are analyzed by
G. Hentschel and O. Palinska (2022).
Similar to the content of our study,
O. Kononenko focuses on lexical changes that
occurred as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian
war. However, unlike the outlined article, the
material for its research is the change in the
lexical composition in the Ukrainian language, in
particular, the appearance of neologisms,
lexemes-indicators, etc. so-called the “linguistic
shield” formed by key words that help to identify
the language of the occupiers (Kononenko,
2023). The emergence of soveregnomims and
other types of Internet neologisms during the
Russian-Ukrainian war is analyzed by
V. Zaskaleta et al. (2023) and O. Horkusha
(2023). In addition, N. Kramar (2023), A.Tkach
and M. Tkach (2023) examine modern Internet
slang.
D. Racek et al. (2023; 2024) also perform a
statistical analysis, studying the change in
language behaviour and language choice of
Ukrainians since the beginning of the full-scale
war using the material of Twitter posts. A. Halich
et al. (2023) also investigate the specifics of
Internet communication during the Russian-
Ukrainian war. O. Kravchenko and N. Fedotova
(2022) also study the lexemes that denote the
realities of war, furthermore, in the form of
enrichment of Internet folklore, analysing
language games in the era of actualization of the
contrast between “own” and “other”. The
researchers also analyse how demonic images are
transformed in modern Ukrainian folklore in
connection with the war (Kravchenko et al.,
2022).
I. Bozhko’s (2022) choice of research issue is
similar to our topic, as it deals with onymic
lexical units for expressing hate speech to denote
the realities of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
We can also mention the study of I. Renchka
(2020), where the linguistic behaviour of
Ukrainians during the war is analysed by using a
descriptive and comparative method based on the
story Dotsia (Daughter) by Tamara Gorikha-
Zernia. In contrast to our research, the material is
a text not in a journalistic style, but a fiction. The
author also has a study of changes in the
semantics of lexical unities in Ukrainian
economic lexicology, which is also characterized
by interdisciplinarity (Renchka, 2018). S. Fiialka
(2023), similarly, chooses Ukrainian war poetry
as her research material. Among the
interdisciplinary works, we can also single out S.
Tereschenko's analysis of the stylistic
oppositions of humorous texts during the
Russian-Ukrainian war (Tereshchenko, 2022).
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The reception of the Russian-Ukrainian war in
folklore is studied by O. Kravchenko et al. (2022)
and O. Lysenko (2023), where one can trace the
disclosure of the specifics of lexemes used to
denote the realities of war not only in journalistic
sources (as in our study) but also in oral folklore.
Recommendations
In order to avoid the limitations of this academic
article, it is recommended to get acquainted not
only with the sources of official propaganda of
the Russian mass media, but also with those that
contain hidden propaganda messages. This will
make it possible to better understand the role of
lexical choice in written sources of Russian
propaganda, to understand the requests of their
target audience and to conduct a productive
counter-propaganda information campaign.
Conclusions
The relevance of the work is the need to analyse
the aspects of the lexical choice in Russian
propaganda in order to resist the narratives
imposed by the propaganda materials of the
Russian pro-government mass media in the
information war. The research revealed the use of
certain lexical choices (euphemisms,
emotionally charged vocabulary, slogans, hate
speech, historical myths, and falsifications)
employed in Russian propaganda. The number of
lexemes used in selected journalistic sources of
Russian propaganda were identified in the course
of the study. They were classified according to
their meaning and functions performed in
propaganda materials, moreover, in the
temporarily occupied territories. The number of
lexical units used in Russian propaganda to
denote the realities of war was statistically
calculated. The outlined results are graphically
presented in the form of a table. The analysed
pro-Russian mass media most often use the
phrase “the military” (to denote the occupying
forces) (208,496 lex. units), “new regions”,
“militants” (43,928), negative characteristics of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine (38,792),
“terrorists” (35,446) etc. The results of the study
will contribute to a better understanding of the
propaganda mechanisms of the Russian
propaganda media. They can be used in further
lexical, sociolinguistic, and political studies on
the linguistic deconstruction of imperial
narratives. Research prospects. Further research
may focus on deepening the statistical analysis of
lexemes used by Russian propaganda, with the
addition of the method of field research in the
form of anonymous questionnaire surveys,
among others. The lexical idioms that are created
in the occupied territories to indicate the realities
of war can also be studied.
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