Volume 13 - Issue 75
/ March 2024
89
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2024.75.03.8
How to Cite:
Melnyk, V. (2024). The VI Century eastern roman empire: Steppe allies, western turks, and herat war. Amazonia Investiga, 13(75),
89-105. https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2024.75.03.8
The VI Century eastern roman empire: Steppe allies, western turks,
and herat war
Східна Римська імперія VI століття: степові союзники, західні турки та Гератська війна
Received: January 5, 2024 Accepted: February 25, 2024
Written by:
Viktor Melnyk1
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5640-0351
Abstract
The subject of the Herat War and the Ctesiphon
Peace Treaty of 591 is relevant since it reveals
important aspects of the political, economic and
military history. These events had a significant
impact on the fates of the Byzantine Empire, the
Persian Empire, and the Chinese Khaganate. The
study of these events provides a more
comprehensive understanding of the complex
interrelationships and dynamics of Eastern
politics. The academic paper also attempts to
summarize the facts on the history of the “Herat
War” of 589 from the standpoint of geopolitical
analysis. This study involves analyzing historical
sources including chronicles and archaeological
data to reconstruct events and assess their
consequences. The interpretation and analysis of
documents and written sources of the time is also
an important aspect in order to understand the
motives and strategies of the parties involved in
the events.
Keywords: Eastern Roman Empire, foederati,
Battle of Herat, Turkic Khaganate, Ctesiphon
Peace Treaty.
Introduction
The events of 589 remain a mysterious episode
of world diplomatic history. In fact, in the
summer of 589, the first serious attempt to
liquidate the Persian statehood of the Sassanid
dynasty took place. The protagonists of this
attempt were the outstanding generals Yang-
Soukh-tegin and Bahram Chubin. The former,
being the youngest son of the Turkic yabgu Kara-
Churin-Turk, headed the Bukhara Khanate
1
PhD in Political Science, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Philosophy, Taras Shevchenko National
University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine. WoS Researcher ID: I-5778-2018
(Narshakhi, 1897). The second led Persian
contingents in a changeable campaign against the
Byzantines in the lands of Azerbaijan and Miedia
(Frendo, 1986). While holding the position of
spahbad, during the 580s Bahram Chubin
sluggishly opposed the Eastern Roman
(Byzantine) contingents of Mauritius, who
became emperor in 582. Having failed to show
the proper zeal for the attack, Bahram Chubin,
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however, was memorable to the incumbent
Persian emperor Ormizd Türkzadeh (579-590) as
a talented organizer of defenses (Ferdowsi,
1989). The Iranian-Byzantine War (572-591)
(Frendo, 1986), which lasted nineteen years,
allowed the Eastern Roman army to approach the
Iranian Plateau for the first time. In particular, the
hostilities were taking place in Midia in 580-585
(Frendo, 1986). Byzantines came to the shores of
the Caspian Sea, but adhering to the tactics of
scorched earth, failed to win the proper favor of
the local Zoroastrian population (Menander
Protector, 1985). However, the strategic control
over the Caspian Sea and the Derbent passage
allowed the successful commander and judicious
Emperor Mauritius (582-602) to strengthen the
ties of official Constantinople with Sabirs,
Khozars, Alans (Ossetians), Lazs and Iberians
(Georgians). The western horde of the Turkic
Khaganate, controlled by Yabg Kara-Churin-
Turk, which had previously been in conflict with
the Azov and Crimean cities of Byzantium (in
576-581) (Moravcsik, 1958), now also sought
good relations with Mauritius.
Literature review
Having examined the literature, it can be noted
that Khairedinova and Shalyga in 2017
investigated Crimean Goths from the country of
Dori from the middle of the III to VII century
AD. Asoev (2016) investigated the role of
Chinese sources when studying the political and
religious history of Takharistan. Ayubov (2017)
focused on the features of the evolution of
Sogdian-Turkic relations in the early Middle
Ages. Baratova (2004) studied the interaction of
Byzantium, Sogdiana and the Türks on Central
Asian coins. Braychevsky (2009) investigated
the interaction of the Khazars. In 2017, he also
examined the policies of the Muqan and Taspar
(i.e.) Hagans in the Turkic Empire (553-581
AD). Gumilev studied different aspects of the
history of the Turkic peoples and their wars in
1960, 1961 and 1962. In 2018. In 2016,
Dossimbaeva reconstructed the history of the
Turks in the context of sources on material and
spiritual culture. The chosen fragments from the
Anonymous Syriac Chronicle of 1234 AD were
translated by N. Pigulevsky; they are contained
in the collection “Byzantium and Iran at the Turn
of the VI and VII Centuries”. In 2018, Kalan
studied the medieval Great Silk Road as the main
trade route connecting Eastern Europe and Asia.
In 2001, Klashtorny analyzed Central Eurasia in
the early Middle Ages, etc.
Methodology
Introduction: The research outlined the historical
background and the emergence of a potential
reconciliation between the Turks in 588. The
work explains the key defeat of the Persians
against the Byzantine forces at Martyropolis in
588, which was the catalyst for improved
relations between Mauritius and Kara-Churin.
This explains the end of open civil strife in
Central Asia and the subsequent restoration of a
strong military and political alliance between
Kara-Churin and the Eastern Roman Empire.
Research Design: The research design for this
study includes a comprehensive approach to the
study of historical events related to the
reconciliation of the Turks and their alliance with
the Eastern Roman Empire. The main objective
is to analyze the factors that led to the
reconciliation between the Turks and the Eastern
Roman Empire, focusing on the events from 588
to 591. The study will provide a detailed analysis
of the political, military, and economic
circumstances prevailing in the region at the end
of the 6th century, including the dynamics of
relations between the Turks, the Eastern Roman
Empire and other regional powers.
Data Collection: In order to carry out the study, a
compilation of historical sources, both primary
and secondary, was conducted to comprehend the
events pertaining to the reconciliation of the
Turks and their alliance with the Eastern Roman
Empire. Research includes evaluating the
reliability of sources, cross-referencing
information, and examining archaeological
evidence to supplement textual records.
Data Analysis: This study uses historical, critical,
and comparative methods to interpret and
analyze documents and written sources.
Historical methods involve studying primary
sources such as historical documents, chronicles,
and inscriptions to reconstruct events and
understand their context. Critical methods are
used to assess the reliability, bias, and credibility
of these sources, providing a rigorous evaluation
of the evidence. Comparative methods allow you
to compare different sources, perspectives, and
interpretations to gain a deeper understanding of
events and their consequences. Applying these
approaches, the research aims to provide a
comprehensive and detailed analysis of the
studied historical events, highlighting their
significance and consequences.
Ethical considerations: During the study of
historical events depicted in the text, several
Melnyk, V. / Volume 13 - Issue 75: 89-105 / March, 2024
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ethical considerations arise. Given the
complexity of the political and military
maneuvers described, it is necessary to ensure the
accuracy of the analysis and refrain from
distorting the facts to fit certain narratives. In
addition, the study delves into the delicate
historical contexts surrounding diplomatic
negotiations, military campaigns, and power
struggles between different actors. Hence,
exercising caution and delicacy in addressing
such subjects ensured consideration for the
diverse perspectives and cultural nuances of the
given era. The text also discusses the
involvement of various ethnic and cultural
groups, such as Turks, Persians, Byzantines, and
Chinese. Cultural sensitivity was observed when
analyzing these interactions, and steps were
taken to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes
or prejudices.
Validity Considerations: The validity
considerations in this historical narrative entail
scrutinizing the reliability and authenticity of the
sources cited, ensuring consistency and
coherence within the accounts provided,
contextualizing events within their historical
context, employing robust analytical methods,
and assessing the plausibility of proposed causal
relationships. These elements are crucial for
establishing the accuracy and credibility of the
historical analysis presented.
Limitations and Strengths: In assessing the
reliability of this historical study, several
considerations emerge from the text. The
strength of this study is the wide use of various
sources, which provides a multifaceted study of
the Eastern Roman Empire of the 6th century.
However, there are certain limitations arising
from inherent biases present in the historical
records used, potential archival biases, and
differences in data quality. Reliance on translated
texts and interpretations creates the possibility of
distorting or misrepresenting the information
used in the research.
“Foederati” and “vassals”: steppe allies of
Byzantium and China
As early as 584, Mauritius signed a treaty with
the Slavic Avars to confirm the federate status of
the Avar Khaganate (558-805) (Melnyk, 2020c).
Similar to Justinian the Great (527–565)
(Menander Protector, 1985), Mauritius
acknowledged the Avar Kagan as his legitimate
subject and committed to upholding the Avar
elite, who promised to support the Eastern
Roman Empire with their forces. The federative
treaty could indeed be considered a political
victory for Constantinople, if it were not for the
predatory approach of the Avar elite. On the one
hand, the Avars undertook to fight against the
enemies of the Empire, but, on the other hand, the
same Avars constantly terrorized the Roman
provinces neighboring Pannonia, fighting
predominantly Slavic hands (Heather, 2013). The
policy of robbery and plunder seemed to Avar
leaders the only way to keep the integrity of their
Khaganate. After all, the Slavs, Germans and
small Turkic-Mongolian cohorts, which were
part of the Avar chiefdom, could act as a single
entity only for the capture of spoils of war or for
the sake of receiving a ransom for non-
aggression (Sobestyansky, 1892).
The agreement of 584 stopped the large-scale
war of the Byzantine Danubian army with the
Slavo-Avars, but did not stop individual robbery
forays from Pannonia. The federate position of
the Slavo-Avars became a legal fiction that
allowed Kagan Bayan (558/562-602) to
withdraw allowances and precious gifts from the
imperial treasury. Despite the instability of
Byzantine relations with the Pannonian
Khaganate, the elite of the Western Turkic horde
considered any agreements between
Constantinople and the Avars as a manifestation
of duplicity and intrigue (Menander Protector,
1985: Fr. 45). The coordination of general
military actions against Persia was postponed by
Kara-Churin until the solution of the Avar issue
and until the end of the turmoil within the Turkic
possessions.
The civil war in the Turkic Khaganate covered
almost the entire reign of Kagan Baga-Yshbar
Khan (581-587) (Skaff, 2018: 390). In 584-587,
the strife between Baga-Yshbar and Apa Khan,
provoked by Sui China, broke out. Baga-Yshbara
Khan recognized the suzerainty of China in order
to defeat his personal enemy and for the sake of
preserving the integrity of the Khaganat. The
Turkic khagan had to pronounce corresponding
oaths of loyalty in 584, 586 and 587 (Skaff, 2018:
390). This ensured his victory over Apa Khan’s
rebels in the battle of Bukhara, but did not save
him from death in the Chinese steppes.
Following Baga-Ishbar, the suzerainty of the Sui
emperor Wen-Di (581-604) was also recognized
by the West Turkic yabgu Kara-Churin-Turk (in
586). Kara-Churin managed to rule in the West
Turkic horde as an all-powerful and independent
leader due to the recognized vassalage, not
relying on the statements of the main Altaic
stakes. In particular, the son of Kara-Churin
named Yang-Soukh-tegin received the position
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of the khan of Bukhara and the ruler of Paikend
(Narshakhi, 1897: 13).
The power of Kara-Churin extended from the
estuary of the Dnieper (modern Ukraine)
(Braychevsky, 2009; Tishin, 2020) to the Khotan
oasis (modern China) (Taail, 2007: 242-248).
All of Sogdiana belonged to Yabg, and the
richest Bukhara oasis became the inheritance of
his son (Skaff, 2002: 364-372). In Trans-Volga
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the tribes of
Byzantine foederati – Bulgars, Khozars,
Ostgoths, Alans, Georgians, Sabirs, etc. – were
subordinate to Yabg Kara-Churin. In the Caspian
region, the main military and political force of
Kara-Churin was composed of Oguzes, who
controlled the Volga delta and vast steppes of
modern Kazakhstan (Bartold, 1964). The
ethnically and religiously diverse population of
Khorezm and the whole of Central Asia served as
a tax base for the Kara-Churin government
(Klyashtorny, 2001: 92-93). The agreement of
Kara-Churin with Wen-Di in 586 formally meant
the recognition of the rule of the Chinese Sui
dynasty by the listed tribes. However, all the
Eastern European and Caucasian tribes had
federal treaties with the Eastern Roman Empire
by 586, which were repeatedly confirmed in
addition.
Sabirs, Crimean Ostgoths, Georgians, and Alans
are known to have often assisted Byzantium with
military contingents. The most vivid example is
the Iranian-Byzantine war of 572-591. The
tactical successes of Mauritius in 582-585 helped
him establish the closest cooperation with the
Christian North Caucasian peoples. Along with
the Armenian militia, Georgian units participated
in the Byzantine occupation of the lands of
Azerbaijan (Frendo, 1986: ІІІ. 17.4) (as the
territories belonging to the modern Republic of
Azerbaijan and the present-day Azerbaijani
provinces of the Islamic Republic of Iran). The
activities of the Iberian archon Guaram Bagratid
(572-602) were of great importance for
Mauritius. By declaring himself king of Georgia,
Guaram recognized the suzerainty of the Eastern
Roman Empire (Suny, 1994: 23-25). His rear
support helped Constantinople to carry out the
occupation of a large number of Iranian
territories in the early 580s.
According to the viewpoint of Gumilev, in 588
Guaram Bagratid turned out to be an
intermediary between Emperor Mauritius and
Yabgu Kara-Churin-Turk. A corresponding new
round of Turkic-Byzantine negotiations became
possible after the end of the Turkic civil war of
584-587.
The China-based orientation of Baga-Ishbar
Khan (581-587), the rapid death of
Cholla-Jabgu-Baga Khan (587-588) caused a
deep need to restore the balance in the Turkic
Khaganate. The function of reconciliation was
assumed by the new kagan Yun-Ulug (588-599).
Since his accession, Kagan has been actively
engaged in opposing the Sinophiles’ party, and
has supported any anti-China or alternative pro-
China position of the movement (Taail, 2004).
His main achievement was considered to be
formal reconciliation with the Western Turkic
horde and personally with Kara-Churin-Turk.
Negotiations between Yun-Ulug and Kara-
Churin lasted from 588 to 593 and culminated in
the official peace treaty of 593, according to
which Kara-Churin-Turk retained all the
privileges he had gained during many years of
political struggle. Kara-Churin remained the
leader of the Western Horde; he received all
benefits from Central Asian trade, and had
military and political independence. Yun-Ulug in
return was content with the formal title of Kagan
and directed his efforts to centralize power in the
Altai-Mongolian possessions of the Eastern
Türkic Horde.
The Turkic agreement of 593 is similar in many
ways to the Edict of Theodosius the Great, which
divided the Roman Empire in 395. De jure, the
Eastern and Western parts of the Roman Empire
remained a single state with two emperors. De
facto, the emperors tried to establish either an
independent political reality or a common
political space at the expense of each other's
interests. Only one part survived in the end – the
Eastern Roman Empire. Two hundred years later,
the Turks found themselves in a similar situation.
De jure, the Kagan and Jabgu witnessed the
availability of a unified Khaganate in 593. De
facto, the interests of Jabgu and Kagan more
often contradicted each other. However, the
agreement of 593 seemed to be the most
important ideological step in the public
consciousness of Turkic tribes and their vassals.
One way or another, the hope for reconciliation
of the Turks appeared in 588, when Yun-Ulug
came to power. The defeat of the Persians by the
Byzantine army at Martiropolis (588), in our
opinion, accelerated the rapprochement between
Mauritius and Kara-Churin. The end of the open
civil war in Central Asia, as well as another
aggravation in relations between the Byzantines
and their Slavic-Avarian foederati, encouraged
Kara-Churin to fully resume the military and
political alliance with the Eastern Roman
Empire. With the aforementioned mediation of
the Georgian archon Guaram Bagratid, the
planning of a general campaign against Persia
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took place. Given the Byzantine successes near
Martiropolis (588), Kara-Churin decided to open
a “second front” against Sasanian Iran
(Sorochan, 2016: 149). After the complete defeat
of Persia, the Turks and Byzantines planned to
meet and establish a common border
(Nöldeke-Tabari, 1879: 268). The Byzantines
were to be assisted by the North Caucasian
peoples and the Khazars dependent on the Turks
(Semenov, 2015: 285-286).
The Great Silk Road and the specifics of
Turkic Poly-Vassalage
As one can see, the Turkic Khaganate had no
signs of a centralized state by 588 (Sadri, 2002:
195-198). Although this did not prevent the
Turkic khagans, yabgas and khans under their
control from maintaining iron discipline and law
and order in the subordinate territories, the poly-
vassalage mode of political existence of the
khaganate corroded the Turkic politics from the
inside. The Türks reluctantly split into parties,
depending on the vectors of border trade that fed
them.
In this context, the significant fact is that the
Eastern European Turks and their vassals
enjoyed the Byzantine status of foederati
(Spivak, 2019: 129-130). Alans, Sabirs, Iberians,
Lazs, Khazars, Ostgoths, Bulgars enjoyed
Byzantine legal status long before the arrival of
the Turks beyond the Volga (in 567)
(Kovalevskaya, 1984: 134-136). The Turkic
tribes did not violate the established social
relations; they did not invade the sphere of
customary law; they did not destroy the existing
international relations. Consequently, the Eastern
Roman Empire had enough power in the Eastern
European steppe and the Caucasus, even in
conditions of double subordination of the
mentioned tribes – both to Constantinople and
the Turkic Khaganate. During the intra-Turkic
strife (570-580s) associated with the
intensification of Chinese expansion (Sadri,
2002: 197), the existence of a powerful barrier of
Iranian, Ugrian, Georgian, Germanic, and Turkic
nationalities possessing ancient and well-
established ties with the Eastern Roman Empire
saved the Byzantines from a full-scale invasion
of some Western Turkic tribes in the Balkans
(Omasheva & Tanabaeva, 2017: 353).
In turn, the Oghuz of Kara-Churin and the
Central Asian Turks were vassals of Sui China
since 586. During the battle of Bukhara (587),
this part of the Western Turkic horde fought
under Sui banners and acted in cooperation with
Chinese units. Previously, these same tribes,
including the oases of Sogdiana, also repeatedly
recognized the suzerainty of the Persian Sassanid
dynasty (Payne, 2013: 3-33). Actually, the
penetration of the Turks into Central Asia was
initially associated with the declaration of their
pro-Persian orientation. However, the Turks soon
realized that the Persians were solely competitors
in the administration and taxation of transit trade
(Çalayan, 2020).
When characterizing the Central Asian system of
poly-vassalage, one cannot ignore the West
Turkic recognition of Byzantine suzerainty (567)
(Menander Protector, 1985: Fr. 18). Although the
Eastern Roman Empire was perceived by these
Central Asian Turks more as a political ally, the
Eastern Romans themselves did not share the
status of their Khazar vassals and, for example,
of the Oghuzes. One should bear in mind the fact
that the Central Asian population, in addition to
the established formal vassal dependence on Sui
China, de jure recognized the presence of two
authorities – the West Turkic Yabgu and the East
Turkic Khagan (Plokhy, 2016: 72-73, 79). The
situation certainly influenced the consciousness
of ordinary warriors, merchants and farmers,
since there were at least three or four supreme
authorities for one person in different periods.
Whose power was just? This natural question
brought confusion into the social psychology of
the multi-ethnic population of the Central Asian
region.
The Eastern Turks of Altai were considered
Chinese vassals since 584. The situation there
looked somewhat more straightforward.
Powerful Chinese and Turkic parties were
formed. The first one saw the way out of the
crisis in the complete absorption of the steppe by
the Chinese. The second one, the most numerous,
was looking for opportunities to acquire full
sovereignty. The Chinese eventually managed to
sow discord within the Turkic party and rally the
Sinophiles around their protégés. After a series of
civil wars, there was no trace left of the numerous
admirers of Turkic independence. Thus, the
Turkic Khaganate collapsed in 584-603 not in the
most complex and poly-vassal Central Asia, but
precisely in the centralized Altai-Mongolian
nomads of the eastern Turks. The Khaganate was
ruined by the proximity of the Chinese to the
Altai stake and the desire of the ruling Ashin
dynasty to join the benefits of Chinese culture.
In contrast to the Altai, poly-vassal Central Asia
was brought together by the Great Silk Road
(Ayubov, 2017: 27-35). Khotan, Kashgar,
Bukhara, Paikend, Merv, Khorezm - these oases
served not just as rich trading cities with vast
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marketplaces (“bazaars”), but primarily as transit
and transshipment hubs (Kalan, 2018).
Sui China did not desire centralization and good
administration in the regions of Altai, Mongolia,
or Manchuria since stabilization of the
managerial elites of the Eastern Turks inevitably
led to elaborate and organized interventions of
the kagans in Chinese affairs, and threatened
Turkic occupation of the whole of Northern
China. That is precisely why Wen-Di devoted
almost his entire reign to the disintegration of the
eastern Turks, organizing various kinds of
rebellions and strife among them (Sadri, 2002).
The Chinese acted exactly the contrary in the
Central Asian possessions of the Western Turks.
In this region, which was not directly adjacent to
the densely populated areas of the Chinese
Empire, the emissaries of Wen-Di helped the
Turks to create an administrative apparatus and a
well-functioning law enforcement system (Skaff,
2018: 386-399). The reason was the strategic
importance of Central Asia for the Great Silk
Road (Asoev, 2016: 82-89). That was why the
Chinese supported the joint campaign of eastern
and western Turks against Apa Khan in 587; that
was why the Chinese did not prevent the
establishment of the khan Yang-Soukh-tegin’s
authority in Bukhara and Paikend.
The rapid development of Central Asia under
Turkic rule created amazing prospects for
Byzantine-Chinese economic cooperation. It is
well-known that Wen-Di (581-604) had an
outstanding political outlook and skillfully
assessed the coming prospects. The 580s, thanks
to his talent, broke Chinese fragmentation,
instilled in the Chinese population a belief in
their state, their messianic role. The Chinese
never came into conflict with the Persians (Li,
2018: 238-241); however, the opportunity to
destroy the mediator on the Great Silk Road
probably seemed tempting to the Chinese
government.
Persian blockade of trade as a common threat
to Byzantines and Chinese (hypothesis)
A real threat to the growing and centralized
Chinese economy in the 580s was the Persian
conquest of Sogdiana. Iran deteriorated
following the death of Khosrow Anushirvan
(531-579) (Myshin, 2014: 469), but Persia did
not give up its attempts to “regain” the lost
Central Asian territories (Payne, 2013). The
Turks were viewed by the Persians as invaders
and usurpers (Çalayan, 2020: 649-650).
Accordingly, the Persians sent spies to Sogdiana,
using the network of Nestorian Christian
communities for propaganda purposes. The
attempts of the Turks to establish a trade route
along the northern coast of the Caspian Sea up to
the Danube caused fear and irritation of the
Persians, which led to clashes on the southern
shore of the Caspian Sea and jeopardized the
whole system of transit of Chinese goods to
Byzantium. However, one should not forget:
Byzantine goods were also moving towards
China. Reciprocal trade brought enrichment to
the merchant classes of all Asian countries
(Baratova, 2004: 415-422). Another, much
longer Iranian-Byzantine conflict, which lasted
from 572 until 591, prevented direct supplies of
Chinese goods to Byzantium or Byzantine goods
to China, disrupting reciprocal trade. The sea
route and the voyage through India looked even
more dangerous. The North Caspian and Black
Sea route in the 570s-580s remained the last hope
of Sino-Byzantine trade and, by default, the main
means of enriching Sogdiana (Jäger, 1923:
81-231). However, the establishment of the new
land route was very slow. The Persians tried to
quarrel the Turks and Byzantines in every
possible way; they helped ignite the military
conflict around the Bosporus of Cimmeria in
576-581, and played the Slavo-Avars card
(Çalayan, 2020: 649). The Slavo-Avars would
not have attacked the Balkan provinces without
Persian incitement. This incitement increased
after 584 despite the confirmation of the Avar-
Byzantine federation agreement. The worst
situation was with the Slavic-Avar raids in the
Subnistrian region. The subordination of the
Antes to the Eastern Roman Empire, about which
Justinian the Great made such a high-flown
statement, was a pure formality, and the damage
from the ruin of merchant routes was very
substantial.
Balkan instability, Slavic-Avarian invasions, low
population along the “northern” branch of the
Silk Road – all these factors made the Turks,
Byzantines and Chinese dream of resuming a
direct route through the densely populated New
Persian Shahinshahr (Eranshahr).
We believe that this situation, especially at the
peak of Wen-Di’s military glory (588-589),
could not but give rise to the idea of coordinating
military efforts with Persia’s enemies to
eliminate or transform it, aimed at resuming
China’s full-fledged economic relations with
Europe and the Middle East. Byzantium, in turn,
constantly declared its openness to negotiations
with any opponents of the Sassanid dynasty -
from Ethiopian Aksumites to eastern Turks.
Hypothetically, we assume that Byzantine
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diplomats may have held meetings or
consultations with representatives of Sui China.
The public recognition by Yang-Soukh-tegin of
his vassal allegiance to China is in favor of such
an assumption. Needless to say, Wen-Di had an
extensive network of intelligence and informants
in all khan or princely stakes that recognized
their subordination to the Chinese Empire. In
addition to intelligence agents, Chang’an
diplomats were sent to all Chinese vassals. For
example, the ambassador Zhang-sun-sheng, who
for many years fulfilled the duties of the imperial
observer in the headquarters of the Eastern
Turkic khagans (580s-590s), was one of them.
Bukhara, with its strategic importance, after the
overall Turkic-Chinese victory over Apa Khan in
587, possessed both a Chinese community within
the city and Chinese diplomats in the bet of
Yang-Soukh-tegin, whose rule of Bukhara,
Paikend, and the surrounding oases began
immediately after the brutal assassination of Apa
Khan (Narshakhi, 1897: 13).
It is possible that hypothetical contacts between
Eastern Roman and Chinese emissaries took
place in the Bukhara oasis. Given the further
development of events, such contacts or
negotiations could have touched upon the need to
reestablish the traditional routes of the Great Silk
Road (Jäger, 1923). It was intended to exploit the
West Turkic horde to thwart the Persians, who
not only raised taxes and customs duties but also
hindered the transportation of Chinese products
through Turkic lands.
The Turks had the opportunity to attack the
Persians either in conjunction with the
Byzantines or in the Khorasan direction close to
Bukhara and Khorezm. In the first case, the entire
western horde would have crossed to the North
Caucasus. In the second case, the Turks would
have concentrated for a campaign in Sogdiana.
The advantages of the second option are evident
since the Persians could quickly figure out the
movements of the Turkic cavalry to the west and
be the first to strike the Turks in the rear – to
capture Sogdiana, depriving the Western Horde
of all economic power and many strategic
advantages at once. The attack from the
Caucasus, therefore, was supposed to be carried
out by the Poly-vassal Khazars).
The political interests of Wen-Di and Mauritius
were united, among other things, in the
mentioned poly-vassalage of the Turks. The two
Turkic hordes recognized the suzerainty of
China, but most of the tribes of the western horde
were in the zone of Eastern Roman influence,
enjoying the regime of the right of foedus
(Melnyk, 2020b: 147-148). The West Turkic
Horde, de jure subordinated to the Suis,
Byzantines and the Altai Kagan, seemed to
contemporaries a good place for establishing
cultural, economic and diplomatic contacts
(Baratova, 2004: 415-422; Babayarov &
Kubatin, 2013: 47-58). Central Asia in this sense
turned out to be a valuable melting pot for both
the Chinese and the Eastern Romans. The loss of
Central Asia by the Turks in favor of Iran
threatened terrible losses to rapidly developing
China and Byzantium, eager to recover from the
crisis. Accordingly, the offensive of the Turks in
the Khorasan direction was planned to
counterbalance the Caucasian front of the
Khazars, as well as the performance of the main
Byzantine army in the Mesopotamian Theater of
military operations (Ferdowsi, 1989: 250).
In case our assumption about the possibility of
Byzantine-Suian diplomatic contacts is true, the
authorized persons could well have agreed both
on war with Persia and the division of the poly-
vassal Turkic Khaganate into conditional
Chinese and Byzantine zones of influence. First
of all, the diplomatic discourse would have
concerned economic influence - organization of
control over safe transportation of products.
Many later Persian authors also hint at the
existence of an agreement between the Eastern
Romans and Western Turks on the full division
of Sassanid Eranshahr (Ferdowsi, 1989: 250).
Persian sources quite rightly note that the nature
of planning and the scale of the military
operation in 589 testify in favor of the existence
of a plan for the destruction of Iranian statehood
(Pourshariati, 2008). The notorious message of
Yang-Soukh-tegin Khan to Shahinshah Ormizd
Turkzadeh (579-590) directly indicates,
according to the classic of Iranian literature at-
Tabari, the desire of the Western Turks to seize
Ctesiphon (Nöldeke-Tabari, 1879: 268).
The joint military campaign of the Turks and
Byzantines (589)
Stepping back from hypothetical reflections, it is
possible to conclude that the course of hostilities
in 589 confirmed the desire of Byzantines and
Turks to establish a common border along the
supposed partition line of Persia (Gumilev,
1961). In addition, the main interested parties and
obviously the initiators of the war were the
Eastern Roman Empire and Sui China since the
Chinese path to “free” trade with Europe and the
Middle East lay solely through the destruction or
fragmentation of Iran.
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The year 589 seemed to the rulers of the above
countries favorable for a general performance. In
the preceding 588, the Byzantines had defeated
the Persians, the western Turks had stopped
fighting with the eastern ones and the Chinese
successfully suppressed the resistance of
separatists in the south and eastern Turks in the
north. Persia, led by Ormizd Türkzadeh, went on
the defensive along the entire perimeter of its
borders (Pourshariati, 2008: 126). The chronicler
at-Tabari wrote about the situation as follows:
“the enemies surrounded Persia like the
bowstring ends of a bow” (Nöldeke-Tabari,
1879: 270).
The hostilities began in the spring of 589
(Ferdowsi, 1989: 249-250). Byzantine troops
captured and destroyed the fortress of Okba on
the central section of the front. They were
supported from the south by Arab federates under
the command of Abbas the Crooked and Amr the
Blue-Eyed, whose units captured many Persian
caravans and plundered much of present-day Iraq
(Nöldeke-Tabari, 1879: 270). The Khazar
invasion through the Daryal Gorge helped the
Byzantines from the north (Ferdowsi, 1989:
250). On May 5, 589 the Khazars entered
Atropatena and devastated the strategic region of
the southern coast of the Caspian Sea in May-
July.
Iranian units managed to clear the northwestern
regions from the Khazars in July; however, a new
army consisting of Byzantine federates
(Ossetians, Dzurdzuks, Didoians) entered Iran
through the Caucasus Gate. These units were
subordinate to the centurions of Guaram Bagratid
(571-602). Apart from the Federates themselves,
the new corps apparently included a large
number of Georgian volunteers (Brosset, 1849).
It should be noted that Archon Guaram Bagratid
received the court rank of kouropalat from
Mauritius in gratitude for organizing diplomatic
negotiations between Constantinople and
Kara-Churin-Turk and for preparing the South
Caspian campaign (Semenov, 2015: 280). The
Georgians showed themselves to be experienced
and skillful fighters and performed the functions
of control over the federates of the North
Caucasus. At this point, Guaram claimed to cede
large areas of the North and East Caucasus to
Georgia. Probably, in case of armed success, the
Byzantines would have given Atropatena to the
Bagratid dynasty (Brosset, 1849: 220-221).
However, a prolonged war (since 572) and recent
Khazar plundering destroyed the economy of the
Caspian lands (Menander Protector, 1985:
Fr. 61). The Foederati and Georgians managed to
gain a foothold in the new territories, but there
were complications with food and defense
communications. According to the Armenian
historian Sebeos, in order to support Bagratid, the
Byzantines had to send a third military
contingent to eastern Transcaucasia – a
detachment of cavalry led by General Romanus
(Sebeos, 2007: 33).
On the “personality factor” in history: the
ascendance of Spahbad Bahram Chubin
The successes of Roman and Guaram coincided
in time with the opening of the second front by
the western Turks (Ferdowsi, 1989: 250). The
invasion of the Iranian province of Khorasan
from the area of Turkic Bukhara began in the first
days of August 589. At the same time, Ormizd
Türkzade (579-590) convened a general council
of Persian marzpans (viceroys, governors and
officials of the vizir’s divan) in the capital
Ctesiphon. According to Ferdowsi, this council
changed the strained relations between the
shahinshah and the nobility (Ferdowsi, 1989:
247-252). Ormizd Türkzade had to ask for the
help of retired officials and generals of the era of
Khosrow Anushirvan (531-579). The
patrimonial aristocracy oriented Ormizd towards
reconciliation with Zoroastrian Mobeds (priests).
One of the Mobeds even spoke at the council
(Ferdowsi, VI 1989: 251). The Mobeds now had
the word, and at the same time the hope of
restoring Zoroastrian influence. Their position
came down to an immediate war against the
Western Turkic horde. Ferdowsi wrote as
follows: “If the Turk from Jeyhun (Amu Darya -
V.M.), threatening with war, has come, we must
not delay a moment” (Ferdowsi, 1989: 251). The
invasion of the Turks posed a threat to the entire
Iranian statehood, since the forces concentrated
by Yang-Soukh-tegin far exceeded the
Byzantines in numbers, freshness and fighting
spirit. The Yang-Soukh Türks did not, in contrast
to the eastern Romans, wage a protracted war.
They did not demand peace from the authorities,
but only victory. In addition, Yang-Soukh
gathered a large force of archers from the entire
Western Turkic horde. Opposition to the Turkic
armies forced the Persians to use other methods
of military tactics and strategy than they had been
accustomed to during the many years of conflicts
with Constantinople. Khazars, Arabs and
Byzantines, according to the Mobed lobby, did
not pose such a strategic danger (Ferdowsi, 1989:
250, 252). On the one hand, according to the
Mobeds’ position, the Byzantines were
exhausted from years of war and were happily
awaiting any peaceful initiative. Accordingly, “it
would be urgent to make peace with Byzantium
by ceding the disputed areas” (Ferdowsi, 1989:
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252). On the other hand, the Arabs, as Ormizd’s
advisers noticed, would not be able to resist the
gold and would betray their Byzantine allies. On
the third hand, the Khazars and Caucasian
federates themselves would flee if their kin
(Western Turks) were defeated on the eastern
front (Nöldeke-Tabari, 1879: 269-270). When
Ormizd asked the audience who was capable of
leading the resistance to Yang-Sawh-tegin in the
eastern direction, he received a direct proposal to
appoint Spahbad Bahram Chubin (Ferdowsi,
1989: 254).
As early as 572, Chubin participated in the siege
of Byzantine Dara (Pourshariati. 2008: 125); then
he commanded the occupation forces of
Eranshahr in Armenia (Kulakovsky, 1996: 350).
Khosrow Anushirvan considered Chubin as a
successful commander. However, chronicles
have not brought to our knowledge any
information about any outstanding victories of
Bahram Chubin. Chubin’s leadership in the
Midian section in the initial times of Mauritius’
reign led the front to disaster and favored the
victories of Byzantine arms. It is quite likely that
Chubin, whom Iranian sources call “the old
warrior”, represented the interests of the
disgruntled aristocracy. The transfer of a combat-
ready army into his hands could act as a factor of
further intimidation of the intransigent Sassanid
Shahinshah. However, Ormizd’s fright was
enough and he did not hesitate to give the post of
commander-in-chief into the hands of a disloyal
commander at the crisis moment. The presence
of the Mobeds at the council, the call to service
of the “old” Bahram Chubin, the nature of
communication between the Shahinshah and his
entourage – all this suggests that the ruler of
Persia tried to make peace with the hostile tribal
nobility.
As a result of the general council, Ormizd
Türkzade ordered to give Bahram Chubin all the
lists of the military divan (general staff) in order
that the newly appointed commander could
choose the units he would command (Ferdowsi,
1989: 258). Such a move was also
uncharacteristic of Ormizd’s early style of ruling.
However, Chubin refused to use “cadre” units of
the Persian army. He stated that the army was to
be composed exclusively of men between 40 and
50 years of age with experience in warfare
(Ferdowsi, 1989: 259). Having selected a
detachment of 12,000 men, Chubin requested
from the divan also oil installations for “throwing
fire”.
The ages from 40 to 50 years evidence that
Bahram Chubin bet on mounted archers:
It is easy to explain why Bahram preferred the
elderly to the young. Archers were the dominant
force at the time, as was already mentioned, and
it took at least 20 years to become proficient
shooters. Shooting, not hand-to-hand combat,
decided the fate of the battle. Persian archers
reached the pinnacle of skill by the VI century
and drew the bowstring not to the chest, but to
the ear. The arrow flew for 700 meters and, being
equipped with a well-tempered tip, pierced
through the shell (Gumilev, 1961).
Gumilev is echoed by contemporary American
historian Lyuttvak, who describes in detail the
IV-VII centuries as the era of archery battles.
Since Hunnic times, the compound bow with a
reverse bend, striking the enemy in incredibly
distant places, was considered the “god of war”.
An advantage in the number of trained mounted
archers always meant the availability of an
advantage in initial battle planning (Melnyk
2018: 9-13). The only problem was, as Gumilev
correctly pointed out, that good archers were
both old and battle-hardened fighters. Hence,
Chubin’s move was not escapist.
After all, this possibility should not be dismissed:
the army recruited by Bahram Chubin could at
any time march against Shahinshah Ormizd
(Ferdowsi, 1989: 263). However, to begin with,
Chubin and the Marzpans who supported him
needed only a victory over the Western Turks.
Any internal political discussions and quarrels
were meaningless without this victory. In this
case, the interests of the Shahinshah coincided
with the interests of the hostile nobility.
Contemporaries understood very well the
complex of political, economic and military
goals pursued by the interventionists (Tolstov,
1938: 3-39).
The Battle of Herat (August 589)
The Persian army could not, in contrast to the
Turks, completely redeploy to Khorasan. The
western front and the need to guard the huge
perimeter of the border hindered it. In parallel
with the invasion of the Byzantines in the west
and the Turks in the east, a Kushan rebellion
started along the southeastern border of
Eranshahr (in the Indian regions of Khorasan).
The Kushans, close in spirit and culture to the
Indians, tried to escape from the Shahinshah’s
tutelage (Sebeos, 2007: 70). Since “trouble never
comes alone”, the official Ctesiphon could not
use even frontier “Indian” contingents against the
Turks. All hopes rested solely on Bahram
Chubin’s modest veteran corps of 12,000
warriors.
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At-Tabari estimates the invading West Turkic
army at 300 thousand men and about 200 war
elephants (Nöldeke-Tabari, 1879: 269).
Ferdowsi, writing later, assures that the army
consisted of over 400,000 men and 1,200
elephants (Ferdowsi, 1989: 250). At-Tabari is
probably right, given that the Western Turks
attacked Persia not to plunder but to destroy it.
At-Tabari gives data about sending a message to
Ormizd Türkzade by Yang-Soukh-tegin. The
special envoy brought the following words to the
Shahinshah:
Fix bridges over streams and rivers so that I could
enter your country using them, and build bridges
over the rivers that do not have them. Do the
same with the rivers and streams through which
my road leads from your country to the Rumians
(Romans - V. M.) since I intend to pass to them
through your country (Nöldeke-Tabari, 1879:
268).
Gumilev believed that “the text of the ultimatum
shows both the true purpose of the campaign and
the coordination of actions of the Western Turks
and Greeks”. We fully agree with the opinion of
Gumilev (Gumilev, 1961) and who supported
him, honoring their talents as interpreters. Prior
to Gumilev, none of the researchers, despite the
abundance of indications by Ferdowsi and at-
Tabari, dared to interpret Yang-Soukh-tegin’s
appeal (Ferdowsi, 1989: 250) as a desire, first of
all, to conquer Persia. Scholars assessed this
action as another “barbarian” raid, and the
descriptions of later Persian historians were
considered “typical exaggerations” (Chavannes,
1900: 242-243; Semenov, 2015: 284-286). It
seems to us that such a viewpoint is outdated, and
the available data allow us to determine the goals
and intentions of the Western Turks. Firstly,
Yang-Soukh-tegin wanted to destroy the reserves
of the Sasanian army, not involved in repulsing
Byzantine attacks, and, secondly, the Turks were
eager to reach the line of contact with the
Byzantines (Ferdowsi, 1989: 250). In case of
success of the campaign, Persia would quite
reasonably cease to exist (at least in its Sassanid
format – from the Caspian Sea to the Persian
Gulf). Such success could only be guaranteed by
the large number of invading troops.
Consequently, the contingent of 300,000 people
is not a fiction, but a calculation of all the
resources used by the Turks (cavalry, auxiliary
infantry forces, service of war elephants,
technical personnel and rear service; we consider
possible participation of some Sui and Eastern
Turkic units that remained in Bukhara and
Paikend since the campaign against Apa Khan
(Narshakhi, 1897: 12-13).
The intervention of the contingents of Yang-
Sawh-tegin turned the nearly seventy thousand
Iranian troops concentrated in the northeastern
part of the country into a rout. A few battles were
enough for the Turks to break the resistance of
Iranian outposts and seize several strategic roads
along the trade route. A free passage to Khorasan
(to the west) and Tokharistan (to the east) opened
before Yang-Sawh-tegin. His forces divided,
slowly moving forward. The vanguard of the
army moved into Khorasan, where the leading
troops planned to capture the fortified cities of
Herat and Balkh (Nöldeke-Tabari, 1879: 269).
In response to the daring letter of Yang-Soukh-
tegin, Ormizd Türkzade sent to the Bukhara
Khan his envoy named Khurrad Burzin. This
intelligence agent was obliged to make every
effort to detach the khan with a small force from
the main army and lure him into a trap prepared
by Bahram Chubin in one of the Khorasan
gorges. Probably, Khurrad Burzin tried not only
to stall the time by fictitious negotiations on
peace, but also tried to pretend to be a personal
enemy of the Shahinshah. Relatively quickly he
won the trust of the Bukhara Khan and even
moved freely in the Turkic military camp. In the
end, having successfully accomplished the
mission assigned to him, Khurrad Burzin escaped
unhindered (Ferdowsi, 1989: 264-265).
Yang-Soukh-tegin, guided by the advice of the
“defector” Burzin, took only a 20,000-strong
detachment of cavalry with him and moved
directly to Herat along the course of the Gerirud
River. It seems likely that Yang-Soukh-tegin
wanted to capture the powerful Herat fortress as
soon as possible, setting up his headquarters
there and waiting for the main forces. When he
reached Herat, Bahram Chubin’s corps was
already standing in the way of the Turks, while a
narrow mountain gorge loomed behind. The
place for the battle seemed extremely
unfavorable and Bukhara khan made another
attempt to negotiate with the potential “enemy”
of the Shahinshah (Ferdowsi, 1989: 266-268).
Yang-Soukh sent messengers to Chubin with an
offer of the title of Iranian ruler and, which is
characteristic for understanding the essence of
the Turkic invasion, “a second place beside
himself” (Ferdowsi, 1989: 270).
According to Ferdowsi, not all Persian
commanders supported Chubin’s ultimate
decision to enter the battle (Ferdowsi, 1989: 272-
273). The very same Hurrad Burzin, who was a
personal spy of Ormizd Türkzadeh, encouraged
Chubin to accept the tempting offers of the
Bukhara khan (Nöldeke-Tabari, 1879: 271). It
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may very well be that Bahram Chubin himself
had for some time been contemplating
cooperation with Yang-Sawh-tegin against
Ormizd. However, the Turkic occupation would
undoubtedly deprive Chubin of the support of
aristocratic circles, while the favorable
geographical position of the Persian army gave it
a chance to destroy the main command of the
Turks and thus frustrate all the plans of the
invading horde. In the latter case, Chubin
counted on the nationwide recognition and
respect of the aristocracy. As can be seen from
the following, the old commander was not
mistaken.
At the end of August 589, the Battle of Herat took
place (Gumilev, 1961). Pressed into a narrow
gorge, the Turks fought very fiercely, forcing the
first ranks of the invading Persians to flee
(Ferdowsi, 1989: 275). For this case, Bahram
Chubin prepared barrier detachments that met the
fugitives from the side of Herat. However, the
tactical retreat undertaken by Chubin
encountered an elevated terrain that did not allow
an organized and close-order retreat (Gumilev,
1961). The attack of the Turks was repulsed by
the coordinated actions of Iranian archers who
were shooting at the elephants (Ferdowsi, 1989:
276). The pride of the West Turkic army, the
fighting elephants, trampled the formation of the
Turks. Due to the resulting confusion, Bahram
Chubin undertook a counterattack and, according
to sources, personally shot Yang-Soukh-tegin
with a bow (Ferdowsi, 1989: 277). The death of
the Khan sowed terror among the Turkic ranks.
Warriors began to flee to the gorge, where there
was a fatal crush, reinforced by no less deadly
fire of Iranian archers. Thus, out of the 20,000-
strong detachment of Yang-Soukh-tegin, only a
tenth of them managed to get back through the
gorge (Ferdowsi, 1989: 277). At-Tabari would
later write about it: “Persia was saved by Bahram
Chubin’s shot” (Nöldeke-Tabari, 1879: 271).
The tactical mistake of Yang-Soukh-tegin, who
trusted Persian defectors, had strategic
consequences. The main armies of the Western
Turks were scattered in the sands of Khorasan
and the valleys of Tokharistan. The numerical
and technological advantage of the Turks was
overshadowed by the problem of lack of
leadership. Considerable forces, according to
Persian chroniclers, were subordinated to Yang-
Soukh’s son Il-tegin-Buyuruk (the Chinese
called him “Nili Khan” (Narshakhi, 1897: 14),
and the Persians wrote “Parmuda”) (Ferdowsi,
1989: 280-281). We assume that not all the
khan’s troops supported the new leader.
Apparently, part of the Turkic army was engaged
in salvaging the looted riches. Jewels, captives
and weapons captured during the initial flight of
the 70,000-strong Persian contingent should have
been transported to Sogdiana under Turkic
control. In addition, large forces of Turks
remained in mountainous Tokharistan, where
they initially hoped to unite with the Kushites,
but, in the end, simply plundered the settlements
they encountered along the way.
The Battle of Herat (August 589)
In September 589, the hostilities broke out with
new fierceness. Part of the Turks fled, and Il-
tegin-Buyuruk tried to organize guerrilla warfare
on the left bank of the Amu Darya. We attribute
Bahram Chubin’s offensive to the coming of the
southeastern Sasanian troops. This army crushed
the weakly organized defense of Il-tegin-
Buyuruk by crossing the Amu Darya. Most of the
loyal companions abandoned their khan and only
the most loyal vigilantes encamped together with
Il-tegin near Paikend (a place located 30 km from
Bukhara).
The new battle is described in Ferdowsi’s
“Shahnameh” (Ferdowsi, 1989: 283-285). It took
place at night and forced Khan to start the
defense of the fortress of Avaz. Chubin’s
Persians, using standard siege techniques,
deprived the defenders of water and cut off the
ways for the arrival of reinforcements. After
several rounds of negotiations, the Avaz garrison
surrendered in exchange for keeping the khan’s
soldiers alive (Ferdowsi, 1989: 286-295). Il-
tegin-Buyuruk paid for the lives of his vigilantes
by voluntary captivity and official surrender in
the presence of Ormizd Türkzade. The
interesting fact is that Ormizd, the son of a Turkic
woman accepted Il-tegin as a relative; he
arranged official celebrations in his honor and
granted the Bukhara khan the status of an
honorary prisoner (Ferdowsi, 1989: 295). Up to
593, the son of Yang-Soukh stayed in Ctesiphon
as a pledge of non-aggression of the Western
Turks under the command of Kara-Churin. The
life of Kara-Churin’s grandson was valued very
dearly and he was regarded as a real contender
for the position of Kagan. In 593, he returned to
the nomads of his grandfather and even managed
to be the Western Turkic khagan in 603-604
(Telitsyn, 2020: 217-218).
The Byzantine troops of the commander
Romanus, who were constraining Atropathena
and Midia, became another target of Ormizd
(Frendo, 1986: III. 6.8). Having captured such a
valuable prisoner as Il-tegin-Buyuruk, Ormizd
did not hesitate and, having secured peace
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guarantees from the West Turkic yabgu,
transferred Bahram Chubin’s corps directly to
the Transcaucasian front. Beforehand, the
Persians bribed Arabian archons (sheikhs) and
spread rumors about the defeat of the Khaganate
among the Caucasians. The flight of the
Foederati led Roman’s Greco-Georgian units
into encirclement. However, General Roman’s
withdrawal from the encirclement brought both
troops face to face. Despite the betrayal of the
Foederati (Brosset, 1849: 221), the Byzantines
granted the Persians a general battle on the Arax
River. Bahram Chubin already lost this battle
after falling into a skillfully prepared trap. The
complete defeat of his units seems to be a good
compensation to the Turkic allies for the defeat
of Yang-Soukh-tegin.
Bahram Chubin’s mutiny levels the Persian
gains
The Eastern Romans were unable to completely
nullify the Heratian victory of the Persians
because of Il-tegin-Buyuruk’s captivity.
However, the monstrous defeat of Bahram
Chubin’s “veterans” put Iran in a difficult
domestic political situation. Emboldened by the
murder of Yang-Soukh-tegin and capture of Il-
tegin-Buyuruk, Ormizd Türkzade ordered to
transfer Chubin’s army to Transcaucasia as soon
as possible. Consequently, Bahram Chubin did
not send the due share of the booty captured in
the Bukhara oasis to the Shahinshah (Ferdowsi,
1989: 296-297). In addition to financial
disadvantage, Ormizd understood the aristocratic
intentions to use “his” Bahram Chubin to
suppress the autocratic regime of the Shahinshah.
To put it simply, the patrimonial nobility really
hated Ormizd for his autonomy and brutal
repressive measures against treasury thieves
(Pourshariati, 2008: 118-119). The Turkic origin
of the Shahinshah (on his mother’s side) only
strengthened the anger accumulated over the
years.
Being in a hopeless situation, when the Western
Turks attacked Khorasan, Ormizd made a
temporary alliance with the hostile nobility.
However, the defeat of Bahram Chubin gave the
Shahinshah a chance to get rid of a potential rival.
“The King of Kings” declared Chubin guilty of
defeat, sent the warlord an order to strip him of
his title of commander-in-chief, accompanied by
a spinning wheel and women’s clothes (Frendo,
1986: III. 7.13-19). The ambassadors wanted to
take Chubin to Ctesiphon, but the warlord flatly
refused to obey the Shahinshah. Around October-
November 589, Bahram Chubin wrote a letter to
Ormizd with personal insults and declaration of
war (Ferdowsi, 1989: 313). Chubin praised “the
old Shah Khosrow” and scolded “the new Shah,
who was the daughter rather than the son of
Anushirvan” (Frendo, 1986: III. 8.3).
The mature general Bahram Chubin turned out to
be a well-calculated politician. He gathered his
troops and gave them a speech in which he
accused Ormizd of collusion with the enemies of
Persia, of his greed and desire to take away all
the riches looted by the soldiers in previous
campaigns. The soldiers were particularly
affected by Chubin’s false assurances about the
existence of Ormizd’s order to deprive the army
of the state salary. The rebellion covered the
entire western front line (Ferdowsi, 1989: 302-
305). This allowed the Byzantines to regroup and
gather new forces. After the fall withdrawal,
Constantinople lost the Mysian and Atropatene
territories, turning out to be along the frontier line
approved as early as the Peace Treaty of 562
(signed by Justinian and Khosrow Anushirvan
(Bajoni, 2018: 353-371)). By the beginning of
the winter of 589/590, there was an apparent
“draw” between Ormizd, on the one hand, and
Mauritius/Kara-Churin-Turk, on the other hand.
One of the Turkic heirs to the throne was in
Persian captivity, and the Byzantine armies were
exhausted in the fierce battles of 589.
Constantinople lost the opportunity to use the
Turkic invasion to destroy Persia, which forced
the emperor to intensify economic diplomacy in
the North Caspian direction. However, his wait-
and-see attitude regarding Bahram Chubin’s
rebellion bore unexpected political fruit (Frendo,
1986: III. 8.12).
While Bahram Chubin was gathering troops in
the west of the country, in Ctesiphon, aristocratic
conspirators released one of the Shahinshah’s
relatives, Bindoi, from prison. Bindoi organized
a rebellion in the capital and stormed the
Shahinshah’s palace on February 6, 590. The
“King of Kings” was brutally tortured and killed,
and all his relatives were executed at the same
time (Ferdowsi, 1989: 320-321). Only one of
Ormizd’s sons, who was also the nephew of the
rebel Bindoi – Khosrow II Parviz (Shahinshah in
590-628) – survived (Pourshariati, 2008: 130-
131). Bindoy-Khosrow’s government resumed
negotiations with the other rebels (Bahram
Chubin’s group), offering Chubin the post of
vizir. In turn, Bahram Chubin opposed the new
government and publicly declared his intention
to overthrow the entire Sassanid dynasty that had
ruled Persia since 224 (Ferdowsi, 1989:
335-336).
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The alliance of Khosrow II Parviz with the
Byzantine Emperor Mauritius
In the spring of 590, Bahram Chubin’s army
defeated the armies of Bindoi and Khosrow II
Parviz on the Great Zab River (modern Iraq)
(Frendo, 1986: IV. 9.3). On March 9, 590,
Chubin crowned himself the “King of Kings”,
proclaiming the era of the Mihran dynasty
(Ferdowsi, 1989: 359-360). The main Ktesiphon
prisoner, Il-tegin-Buyuruk, was also at his
disposal. It is characteristic that not a single hair
fell from the head of the Turkic “tsarevitch” in
this case, too.
Having withdrawn with a group of thirty soldiers,
the Shahinshah fled to the Eastern Roman border
fortress of Kirkesia (Ferdowsi, 1989: 367-368).
There is an assumption that already at that time
Khosrow II Parviz accepted Christianity (Frendo,
1986: IV. 10.1-4) of the Monophysite persuasion
and had predominantly Monophysite Armenians
in his entourage. Probably, it was Armenians
who advised the Shahinshah to ask Emperor
Mauritius for help. The correspondence of
Khosrow II with Mauritius testifies that the
Iranian Shahinshah was really in a desperate
situation (Ferdowsi, 1989: 371-382). He
promised the Eastern Roman Empire to “forever”
renounce all of Transcaucasia and claims to
Armenia, and not to interfere with Byzantine
frontier fortresses in Mesopotamia and Syria
(Ferdowsi, 1989: 380-382). Khosrow wrote to
Mauritius about his readiness to conclude “peace
on any terms”, noting that if the emperor found
his offers not generous enough, the emperor
himself could “add in his wisdom the missing”.
Most interestingly, the usurper Chubin also
conducted parallel negotiations with Mauritius,
sending the emperor an offer to “cede all
Mesopotamia as far as the Tigris”. It is possible
that Chubin promised Atropatene as well;
however, Mauritius, after months of deliberation,
decided not to detach excessive territories from
Iran (Frendo, 1986: IV. 14.9). Byzantium’s own
coffers left much to be desired and new lands
with hostile populations, after the costly
campaign of 589, could become a burden.
Constantinople placed its final bet on Khosrow
and on a policy of weakening Iran as a whole.
By March 591, Khosrow II Parviz received from
Constantinople 1400 kg of gold and a corps of
cavalry under the command of the Armenian
general Narses. Ferdowsi also points to the fact
of marriage of Khosrow and Mauritius’ daughter
Maria (Ferdowsi, 1989: 381, 389) (Byzantine
sources do not mention this fact). In response,
having entered the territory of Eranshahr,
Khosrow immediately handed over to Mauritius
the symbolic keys to the fortress of Dara, without
putting forward any diplomatic conditions. Most
of the border towns, populated predominantly by
Nestorian Christians, welcomed Khosrow as a
liberator, since the military dictatorship of the
“Mihran era” led to even greater repression than
the reign of Ormizd Türkzadeh.
By the summer of 591, Byzantine troops led by
the Iranian Shahinshah captured the Persian
capital Ctesiphon and took control of the capital
region. The local inhabitants of the Christian
faith (for example, in Khosrow’s city of Antioch
Christians made up the overwhelming majority
of the population) welcomed the Byzantines as
liberators, hoping for the “final” fall of Persian
power. Soon, the Byzantine-Iranian contingents
of Khosrow II Parviz united with the fresh troops
of the Byzantine commander John Mistakon not
far from the capital. Further, the 60,000-strong
army of Khosrow, Narses, and John gave battle
to Bahram Chubin’s 40,000-strong corps,
destroying the enemy and forcing the usurper to
flee to the Far East (Ferdowsi, 1989: 408-410,
418-441).
The triumphant return of Narses, John, and
Khosrow to Ctesiphon was accompanied by the
signing of the Ctesiphon Peace Treaty of 591.
The essence and significance of the Ctesiphon
Peace Treaty of 591
The war, which de jure had lasted since 572, was
declared officially over. Almost the whole of
Armenia was recognized as Byzantine; Persia
gave up Dara and Martiropolis forever, and the
official Ctesiphon was now to finance the
protection of the Derbent Passage on its own.
Persia was obliged to pay Mauritius a large
monetary reward. However, the main condition
of the Ctesiphon Peace was that Iran regained
freedom of movement along the Great Silk Road.
East Roman merchants were exempted from
customs duties, received state benefits and the
opportunity to move freely, under armed guard,
to Sogdiana. In order to protect Khosrow from
possible plots, Mauritius even sent him a
personal guard of one thousand soldiers. In
addition to getting married to a Constantinople
princess, Khosrow even recognized Emperor
Mauritius as his legal father. The procedure of
Khosrow Parviz’s adoption by Mauritius took
place (Theophanes, 1839: 588-589). The
Byzantine general Narses said to the Shahinshah
after the treaty was signed, “You should
remember, this day, Khosrow! The Romans are
giving you victory”. The modern historian
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Peter Heather writes about this event,
“significant acquisitions in the Caucasus gave the
Romans strategic control over the far ends of the
passes through the Zagros Mountains that led
directly into the economic center of the Persian
Empire between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers;
it was a knife thrust over the Persians’ most
vulnerable spot” (Heather, 2013: 249).
Discussion
In any case, the Ctesiphon Peace Treaty of 591
was directed not so much at the territorial
expansion of Byzantium into Persia, but at the
intensification of trade with Central Asia and the
Far East. The Persians fell into a position of
dependence on the eastern Romans. Shahinshah
Khosrow II Parviz was now de jure regarded as a
son of Mauritius; he was his son-in-law, and was
guarded in his palace by Greek soldiers.
Many Byzantine chroniclers, as noted above,
considered Khosrow a Christian (Frendo, 1986:
IV. 10.1-4). In any case, in addition to Mary,
Khosrow was definitely married to the Armenian
Monophysite Shirin. Her influence on state
affairs led to the consolidation of the position of
the Nestorians and Monophysites. The Ctesiphon
patriarchate was given a privileged position at the
court of Khosrow II Parviz. The Shahinshah
donated a lot of money for monasteries and
churches to Christians of various denominations
(Frendo, 1986: V. 14.2-11). Economic relief was
also granted to the orthodox Chalcedonian
Christians who shared control over the South
Caspian trade routes with the Nestorians and
Monophysites.
On the one hand, Persia was regaining its ancient
status as an intermediary between the Far East
and the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the
ruling Sassanid dynasty made Persia politically
dependent on Constantinople. Consequently, the
Ctesiphon Peace recorded the victory of the
Eastern Roman Empire and, at the same time,
was beneficial to Sui China. Although the
Ctesiphon Treaty, called by Heather a “Versailles
moment” (Heather, 2013: 249-250), did
contribute to the birth of revanchist sentiments
among the Persians, its significance for the
period 591-602 can hardly be overestimated. An
entire decade of peace on the eastern frontier of
Byzantium (the western frontier of Eranshahr)
took place for the first time in the seventy-year
period.
The extent and significance of the victory of the
Eastern Roman Empire in the war of 572-591 is
evidenced by the embassy of the Merovingian
king Hildebert II (570-596) to Constantinople
(Theophanes, 1839: 591). The Franks, who had
previously been very sluggish in helping the
Byzantines, intensified their campaigns against
the Lombards in Italy. Consequently, the
Ctesiphon victory helped Mauritius to focus his
attention on relations with the Slavo-Avars in the
Balkans and with the Franks in northern Italy
(Theophanes, 1839: 593). Up until 602, the
Eastern Roman Empire undertook successful
military and diplomatic operations on all
European fronts. The Franks at this time were an
effective instrument of Byzantine policy,
continuing the tradition (Melnyk, 2020a: 228-
244) established a century earlier.
“Shahinshah” of the “Mihran dynasty”, Bahram
Chubin, after a military defeat, abandoned his
relatives and fled to Altai, where he surrendered
to the Eastern Turkic kagan Yun-Ulug. Ferdowsi
reports that Bahram Chubin was killed by Persian
spies in approximately 592 (Ferdowsi, 1989:
437). From our standpoint, such an assassination
in the Eastern Turkic possessions could have
been accomplished with Chinese help. Firstly,
the Sui dynasty did not want a renewal of the civil
war in Iran. Bahram Chubin, on the other hand,
actively urged Yun-Ulug to help him with troops.
Secondly, only the Sinophile party could go
against Yun-Ulug’s will. After all, the Kagan
made Bahram Chubin a particularly close official
and personal advisor.
Conclusions
The Herat War of 589 was extremely profitable
for China since Chinese silks and porcelain
became profitable in Western exports only when
they were exchanged for Byzantine jewelry and
metals. The defeat of the Western Turks seemed
to them an unfortunate fact, but the Ctesiphon
Treaty in 591 stabilized the Silk Road two years
later, bringing the Chinese a victory almost
tantamount to consolidating Eastern Roman
hegemony in the Mediterranean. It should be
noted that exclusively international trade
relations helped the Sui dynasty eliminate the
great famine that broke out in 594 and the large-
scale peasant uprising of the southern provinces
that followed it.
By the way, while Yang-Soh-tegin was leading
his army into the trap of Bahram Chubin, it was
in 589 that Wen-Di destroyed the South Chinese
ruler Hou Zhu of the Chen dynasty, extending the
borders of the empire to the limits of modern
Vietnam. Wenyu-Di managed to oppose the
reconciliation between Kara-Churin and Yong-
Ulug in 588-590, though with difficulty. In the
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eastern Turkic direction, the ambassador of the
Sui dynasty Zhang-sun-sheng found a pro-
Chinese pretender to the post of Kagan – Zhangar
from the ruling Ashin family (Gumilev, 1961).
The war of 589 to some extent distracted the
Western Turks from internal issues of the Turkic
Khaganate, but after the terrible defeat of his son,
Kara-Churin-Turk went on rapprochement with
the Eastern kinsmen. In 593, the Turks were
reconciled. From that moment, Wen-Di began to
play the card of the traitor Zhangar. The civil war
in the steppe broke out with new force. Yun-Ulug
died at the hands of Chinese spies in the last
months of 599 (Gumilev, 1961). Kara-Churin-
Turk proclaimed himself the Khagan (599-603),
but the Chinese invasion urned this powerful
political figure of the second half of the VI
century into the last Kagan of the united Turkic
Khaganate (Gumilev, 1961). Fleeing from the
Chinese, Kara-Churin died, like most of his
relatives from the Ashin family. Zhangar
considered himself the Kagan of the Eastern
Turks, but the Khagan of the Western Turks
turned out to be Il-tegin-Buyuruk - the very
Ktesiphon prisoner who survived the coups of
590-591 and was released to Sogdiana by
Shahinshah Khosrov II Parviz.
After the Ctesiphon Peace of Byzantium and
Persia (591) and the Altai Truce of the Turkic
Khaganate (593), the world political situation
began to move slowly towards the conflagration
of a great war that engulfed most of the VII
century. Heather correctly called the Ctesiphon
Peace a “Versailles moment” since the loss that
resulted from the initial victory seemed to be a
terrible humiliation for Sassanid Iran. In the Far
East, West Asia and the Mediterranean, various
forces were preparing for revenge against the
successes of the Eastern Roman Empire and Sui
China. In the end, these forces began a great
widespread war in 602-604, which Gumilev
called “the World War of the VII century”
(Gumilev, 1961).
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