moments of legal norm in their contradictory
unity. In this case, the legal norm is a process of
necessity, in which hypothesis, disposition, and
sanction appear as moments of this process,
therefore, as necessary moments of the norm, and
not as random, externally fixed elements of the
"structure" of the latter. Consideration of the
norm of law as a process of necessity, firstly,
does not deny the traditional understanding of the
hypothesis of the norm as a condition; secondly,
it clearly implies the interpretation of the
disposition as a subject of a legal norm, which is
the relation of the subject's right with the
corresponding legal obligation (as a "proper" and
"essential" relationship together); thirdly, the
sanction of a legal norm is unambiguously
interpreted - as a specific activity, the content of
which is determined by the need to make the
subject of the norm (disposition) valid under the
conditions defined by the hypothesis of the norm
(Yushchyk, 2013). The sanction in this sense is
not limited to the application of measures of
responsibility for the violation of rights and
obligations, as is usually believed, but includes
all activities of the subjects of legal relations,
which ensure the unity of "proper" and
"essential" in the norm, that is, the proper
implementation of legal relations, - from
legislative measures and the creation of
regulatory conditions for such implementation to
the execution of court decisions.
At the same time, a legal norm (as a partial case
of a norm in general) exists only in the abstract,
concretized in the form of legal acts (Yushchyk,
2013). The latter, in fact, make up a set of
management decisions, which fill the content of
each separate legal norm (hypothesis, disposition
and sanction of the norm) at the general, special
and individual levels. The content of legal acts is
management information directly related to the
normative definition of legal facts, rights and
obligations of subjects of legal relations, as well
as acts of activity that ensure the proper
implementation of rights and obligations by
subjects of legal relations, which is defined as
legal information. Legal information is such
management social information that is embodied
in specific management decisions - legal norms;
the latter are a process of necessity and expressed
in legal acts. Therefore, legal information
determines the content of the legal norm, which
is formalized in legal acts. In particular, Miranda
& Miranda (2017) examine such sources of legal
information as legislation, jurisprudence and
doctrine, as well as highlighting the speed with
which they renew themselves, making the
information, still recent, outdated.
A legal norm arises from the rules of
communication between subjects (matter of law)
as a law of their behavior, and is sanctioned by a
powerful authority as a positive law. That is, a
legal norm is the unity of the self-management
activity of individuals and the sanctioning
activity of a powerful subject (the unity of the
objective and subjective in the norm). This
determines the dual nature of the law-making
process in which the content and form of the law
is determined. Acquiring the normative form of
hypothesis and disposition by the rule of
communication takes place through law-making
activity, that is, the sanctioning activity of the
authority subject and the lawful activity of the
subjects of communication. The hypothesis and
disposition of the norm are "permeated" by this
activity as a sanction, and these three moments
form the norm as a necessary reality. That is why
the method of implementing a legal norm is
activity, that is, voluntary acts of communication
subjects, and voluntary acts of a powerful
subject, that is, all together as legal acts (Triada,
2022).
Public authorities make their management
decisions in the form of legal acts. Traditionally,
in jurisprudence, a legal act is defined as an
official legally binding written document
containing the will (decision) of an authorized
subject within its competence, and aimed at
regulating social relations. The concept of a legal
act is a generic concept; among legal (juridical)
acts, depending on the specific features (on the
basis of normativity), normative legal acts, acts
of application of legal norms (law enforcement,
individual, non-normative) and acts of
interpretation of legal norms (interpretive) are
distinguished (Derhilova, 2016; Holovchenko,
2014). At the same time, the dialectical theory of
law justifies the falsity of the statement that legal
acts differ according to the criterion of their
normative nature. All legal acts have a single
normative nature, which, however, is expressed
in them in different ways: in some acts, the norm
is embodied as something common, as a
mandatory rule (normative, "normative-legal"
acts), and in others - as a separate, single, through
which this universal is revealed (normorealizing,
"individual-legal" acts) (Yushchyk, 2013).
Political rights and their guarantees are defined
by laws as normative legal acts of the highest
legal force. In particular, in accordance with
Clause 1, Part 1, Article 92 of the Constitution of
Ukraine, rights and freedoms of man and citizen,
guarantees of these rights and freedoms; the main
responsibilities of a citizen are determined
exclusively by the laws of Ukraine. According to