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DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.66.06.4
How to Cite:
Kravchenko, N., Prokopchuk, M., Bondarenko, E., Korniiko, I., & Moyseyenko, I. (2023). An ideational level of Ukrainian
counterpropaganda: the communicative-discursive dimension. Amazonia Investiga, 12(66), 38-47.
https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.66.06.4
An ideational level of Ukrainian counterpropaganda: the
communicative-discursive dimension
Ідеаційний рівень української контрпропаганди: комунікативно-дискурсивний
вимір
Received: May 4, 2023 Accepted: June 5, 2023
Written by:
Nataliia Kravchenko1
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4190-0924
Mariia Prokopchuk2
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8248-0479
Elvira Bondarenko3
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4962-188X
Iryna Korniiko4
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2372-7785
Iryna Moyseyenko5
https://orcid.org/0009-0009-5284-9376
Abstract
The article reveals Ukrainian counterpropaganda
ideational structures against Russian propaganda
during an active phase of the hybrid war.
The purpose of the research is to identify the
Ukrainian counterpropaganda tools to debunk
mythologemes and ideologemes of Russian
narrative. The article uses the narrative-
discursive analysis method to identify some
narrative models of conceptualizing the war as
variants of "Tales of the Just War" constructing
the schematic narrative templates; structural-
semantic modeling and the method of
reconstruction of manipulative meanings known
as the simulacrum. The main conclusions are that
counterpropaganda operates with discourse-
forming concepts, mythologemes and
ideologemes by means of de-mythologizing,
anti-mythologizing and revealing the
contradictions of Russian narrative integrated
with concepts-ideas of self-defense, messianism
and reunification.
Demythologization relies on some national
narratives, symbols, and archetypes from the
memory fields of the Ukrainians and aims at
counteracting Russian mythologemes in
1
Doctor of Science in Philology and Philosophy of Language Department, Kyiv National Linguistic University, Kyiv, Ukraine.
2
PhD, Associate Professor, Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University, Kyiv, Ukraine.
3
PhD, Associate Professor, Kyiv National Linguistic University, Kyiv, Ukraine.
4
PhD, Associate Professor, Kyiv National Linguistic University, Kyiv, Ukraine.
5
PhD, Associate Professor, Kyiv National Linguistic University, Kyiv, Ukraine.
Kravchenko, N., Prokopchuk, M., Bondarenko, E., Korniiko, I., Moyseyenko, I. / Volume 12 - Issue 66: 38-47 / June, 2023
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oppositions: a pseudo-nation and pseudo-state
vs. a full-fledged national identity and statehood;
a tool of the West vs. people of Western culture;
Russia as a liberator of the Ukrainians vs. a
liberation struggle of the Ukrainians against
Russian aggression.
Anti-mythologizing relies on current facts and
events that refute propagandist ideologemes,
restore a distorted "possible world" and the roles
reversed by Russian propaganda.
Key words: counterpropaganda, propaganda,
ideational structures, mythologeme, ideologeme,
topos.
Introduction
The symbolic politics of the Russian-Ukrainian
hybrid war bases on Russian propaganda
discourse (RPD) and Ukrainian counter-
propaganda discourse (UCPD), which differ in
their discourse-forming concepts, values, topoi,
ideologemes, mythologemes and other structures
of ideational meanings.
Symbolic cognitive predispositions of the
underlying discourse of counterpropaganda and
propaganda are organized into symbolic
complexes “semiotizing” the present and past –
with a reference to semiospheres of historical and
cultural memory as the “symbolic resource” of
ideational structures of Ukrainian
counterpropaganda to debunk Russian
propaganda mythologemes, ideologemes and
underlying narratives.
The scientific relevance of the article lies in its
approach to UCPD and RPD as semiotics
integrities, integrated by the nuclear ideational
structures that determine the tactical and strategic
programs of discourses and their verbal and
multimodal codes. In this vein, destroying by
counterpropaganda of the basic structures of the
ideational level of the enemy discourse, which
ensures its structural integrity, means the
destruction of the entire discourse of propaganda.
The purpose of the article is to identify
ideational tools of Ukrainian counterpropaganda
to debunk Russian propaganda underlying
symbolic policy structures.
The objectives of the study are to reveal
ideational structures of Russian propaganda
specifying its discourse-forming concepts,
mythologemes with symbols, national
archetypes, and values as their structural part,
and ideologemes as prescriptions to act; to
identify the tools of Ukrainian
counterpropaganda that operate at ideational
level and include de-mythologizing, referring to
national narratives, and anti-mythologizing
based on ongoing facts and events, while
specifying incoherence of Russian propaganda
mythologemes and ideologemes.
Theoretical framework
Both UCPD and RPD are aimed at consolidating
their societies during the war, setting a way to
interpret the present, symbolic past and future.
The paper bases on (a) discursive-semiotic and
structural-discursive approaches to political
communication (Chilton, 2004; Laclau &
Mouffe, 1985), (b) an approach to ideology as a
modern metalinguistic myth, the connotative
system of simulacra that displaces the denotative
level of reality (Barthes, 1973), (c) symbolic
politics of internal and interstate conflicts
(Kaufman, 2019).
For the article, an approach of critical discourse
analysis focused on the concepts of power,
history, and ideology is fundamental and it is
defined as the system of opinions and beliefs put
forward by a group in power (van Dijk, 2008;
Wodak, 2009). The research priorities of
discursive analysis intersect with the attempt
made in the article to define counterpropaganda
and propaganda ideology strategies aimed at
accepting a social order established by discourses
as “natural” by the target audience.
The article uses Michael Halliday’s theory as the
premise for critical linguistics to develope into an
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interdisciplinary study of institutional
communication. Halliday emphasizes the
relationship between the grammatical system and
social needs realized in the use of language. He
distinguishes three interrelated meta-functions of
language: (1) an ideational function that connects
linguistic structures with social structure,
reflecting and influencing it, (2) an interpersonal
function that determines the relationship between
the participants in communication, and (3) a text
function that ensures the semantic and formal
relations in texts, their coherence and cohesion
(Halliday, 2007).
The article assumes that an ideational function is
provided by such core structures as discourse-
forming concepts or concepts-ideas that
determine the way of signifying facts and events
in discursive semiosis creating the prescriptive
“possible worlds”. Concepts-ideas unify the
totality of discourses of both counterpropaganda
and propaganda having an explanatory force in
explaining to target audiences the discourse-
based possible worlds in the simplest and
understandable way.
In the same way, our understanding of discourse-
forming concepts is close to the concepts of
“privileged signifiers” or “nodal points” in the
structural-discourse analysis with their ability to
unify a given social field (Torfing, 1999,
p. 98-99) and “arrest the flow of differences”
determining the prescriptive way of designating
reality in discourses and through discourses. In
this perspective, discourse is conceptualized as
the “the semiotic concept” with the function of
“social values construction and maintenance”
(Kravchenko, Zhykharieva, 2020, p. 71), and the
“order of discourse” (Foucault, 1981, p. 48-78) –
as a semiotic integrity, in in which everything
that falls out of its sign space is perceived as alien
and, conversely, any anomalies consistent with
this space are accepted as satisfying the norms of
the truth.
The world-modelling function of discourses is
based on their constructing mythologemes and
ideologemes, which require that the modelled
reality to be perceived not as one possible world
but as the only true “natural” world. According
to R. Barthes’s understanding of myth, the
meaning (the first signified) generated by the
linguistic and multimodal code-signifier, in turn,
becomes a form (a signifier) for the new signified
– a concept that “alienates” and replaces the
initial denotative meaning. For example, the
meanings “forced deportation”, “forced
Russification” are losing in RPD their denotative
basis being replaced by the mythologeme
“reunification and protection”. The
mythologeme “liberation” is actualized as a
connotative meaning in all RPD nominations that
designate the conquest war and the invader's
actions. Along with the debunking of blatant
fakes and disinformation, UCPD reveals the
simulacra-based Russian mythologemes as the
empty signifiers aimed to legitimize the
absorption of one state by another.
From the perspective of the discursive-historical
approach the article uses the concept of the topos
(Wodak, 2009) as a ready-made argument that
sets the audience in a favorite frame of mind
appealing to value predispositions. Critical
discourse analysts identifies such topoi as
Burdening, Reality, History, Authority, Threat,
Justice, Belonging, “Constructing a hero”, etc.
For example, updating the topos of danger should
lead the target audience to the conclusion that it
is necessary to eliminate the source of danger.
Understood in this sense, topoi are a structural
part of ideologemes as illocutionary calls to
action, in contrast to mythologemes, which
contain the underlying narratives in a collapsed
form.
One of the fundamental bedrock of the study is
the idea of the narrative-discursive nature of
collective memory as being which is capable of
modeling the present and future (Huyssen, 2003,
p. 6) and influencing the formation of national
identities (Olick, Vinitsky-Serussi & Levy, 2011,
p. 177) based on the text communities where
collective thoughts and actions are “rooted”
(Wertsch, 2008). Research of memory fields of
the Ukrainian and Russian mentalities shows
how much they vary from each other from the
point of view of the state developing and identity
considering the authentication of national
narratives, symbols and archetypes, is one of the
key means of destroying the myths of Russian
propaganda.
Methodology
The research material includes articles of the
Public Educational Project “LIKBEZ. Historical
Front” (Likbez, 2022), which contains the
popularization of the history of Ukraine,
fragments of academic historical discourse and
speeches by Russian politicians and ideologists.
The paper integrates narrative and discursive
analysis with semantic syntax explanatory tools.
Narrative analysis involves: (a) the transmission
of historical events in the form of a narrative
(Alker, 1996) based on the structure of the plot,
characters, motives for their behavior, and
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symbolic patterns of interaction; (b) the
construction of “schematic narrative templates”
(Wertsch, 2008) as abstract constructs that
establish a common form applicable to a set of
events. The second type of narrative analysis is
used to identify the de-mythologemes and
ideologemes of Ukrainian counterpropaganda,
which, unlike Russian narratives, have not been
studied in linguistics.
The stages of narrative analysis include: (1) the
selection of texts that contain elements of the
narrative structure: “agents”, “actions”, “goals”,
“situation” and “means”, which are focused
around recurrent motifs, allowing to identify the
roles with which Ukraine associates itself, the
value orientations of Ukrainian society in the
confrontation” with the Russian mythologemes,
(2) the arrangement of narrative structures in a
causal scheme to trace the relationship between
them and their coherence with the Ukrainian
grand narrative and (3) the identification of
schematic narrative patterns as macrostructures
of the collective memory of Ukrainians,
opposing Russian mythologemes and debunking
them.
The article uses the structural-semantic modeling
based on the classification of nuclear and
peripheral semantic roles. i.e. Agent – someone
who acts purposefully, “controls the situation”
(Tesniere, 1988, p. 405, Fillmore, 1977), Patient,
experiencing an action on the part of another
participant (Chafe, 1970, p. 121-123), Instrument
as an inanimate object, with the help of which
something is carried out (Chafe, 1970, p. 176)
and Beneficiary – as someone who loses or gains
something (Chafe, 1970, p. 176).
The article uses Barthes’s R. approach to the
analysis of manipulative meanings as a
simulacrum by reconstructing myths as the
secondary semiological system that replaces
facts or events with mythologemes and
ideologemes. They code symbolic messages that
provide the audience's need for a simple
explanation and belonging to a group. The
debunking of mythologems is aimed at
destroying the RPD as a space of explanatory
knowledge and discrediting the prototypical
symbols of the "savior of the world", "Moscow -
the third Rome", etc., used as text-codes that
preserve the semiospheres of history and
cultures, including them in the RPD symbolic
circle.
Results and Discussion
The analysis of data enables to identify three core
discourse-forming concepts of RPD: self-defense
/ self-preservation, messianism and reunification
as well as ideational units of Ukrainian
counterpropaganda to counteract and debunk
them.
The concept-idea of self-defense / self-
preservation is based on the mythologemes such
as “the NATO and West proxy-aggression”,
“betrayal by Ukraine”, “robbery by Ukraine of
Russian territories”, “Ukraine is a puppet in the
hands of the West”, “Russia is at war not with
Ukraine, but with NATO”, “tool of the West”,
“change of the civilizational code of Russia by
Western propaganda”. These mythologemes are
constantly verbalized by Putin, Russian
politicians, and ideologists to substantiate the
ideologemes “we were forced to war”, “war is the
defense of the fatherland”, as exemplified below:
1) We were simply left with no other
opportunity to protect Russia, our people
(Putin, 2022).
2) I repeat: this is a forced measure, because
they could create such risks for us that it is
not clear how our country would exist
(Putin, 2022).
3) We constantly faced either cynical deceit
and lies or attempts to pressure and
blackmail: Those who claim world
domination, publicly, with impunity and, I
emphasize, without any reason, declare us,
Russia, their enemy (Putin, 2022).
From a viewpoint of lexical choices
mythologemes that underly the concepts-ideas of
self-defense / self-preservation are encoded by
nominations with the semes “hopelessness” in
(1) and (2), “protect” in (1), “forced” in (2),
“trampled national pride”, “deceit”, “pressure”,
“blackmail”, “impunity” in (3) actualizing the
topos of “threat” and its associated ideologemes
of “defense of the fatherland” and “we were
forced to war”, implicating prescriptive actions.
The syntactic models represent the Russian
versions of the interpretation of “reality”, in
which two or three participants are involved: (a)
Ukraine as an explicit or implied agent of action
(source of threat), Russia as the patient targeted
by the threat emanating from agent, (b) the West
as an explicit or implied agent of threatful
actions, Ukraine as a patient who is “influenced”
by agent, and Russia as a beneficiary
experiencing the harmful consequences of an
action.
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Syntactic models iconically reproduce the
manipulative reversal of roles, i.e., the Victim –
Persecutor, Victim – Aggressor, Victim of
blackmail – Blackmailer in the narrative plot
from “Tale of a just war” with a set of actants:
Ukrainian is Villain and Russia is Victim and
NATO / Western World – Resident Evil that
controls Villain (Kravchenko, 2022).
The concept-idea “Russia is Messiah” with “all-
human vocation” to save the world is based on
mythologemes rooted in the fields of Russian
memory ascending to the mythologemes of
“Holy Rus”, “Russia as a wandering kingdom”
and “Moscow is the third Rome” put forward in
the 16th century by the elder Philotheus. With the
transformation of the messianic image of Russia
in various historical periods, including Moscow
Rus’ – Petersburg (imperial) Russia – Soviet
Russia (USSR) – Putin’s Russia, these
mythologemes have been preserved in all fields
of Russian memory. Messianic ideas are
manifested in the image of Liberation Russia in
wars against Osman Empire on the Balkans in
19th century and in the First World War
transforming over time into revolutionary and
Soviet Russia, with the exclusive “calling” of the
Russian people to the salvation of mankind.
In war 2022 the messianic mythologemes are
imposed by Russian propaganda in narrative plot
lines such as (a) “Liberation of Russian-speaking
and pro-Russian Ukrainians”, based, in turn, on
sub-narratives of “the rebirth of Nazis and
fascists posing a threat to the ethnically Russian
part of Ukraine’s population”, “Ukraine has
taken a course towards forced assimilation, the
formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state”,
“liberation of the world from fascism, revived in
Ukraine” and “freeing the world from destroying
Western values” exemplified by the examples
below.
4) It was necessary to immediately stop this
nightmare – the genocide against the
millions of people living there, who rely
only on Russia, hope only on us (Putin,
2022).
5) Because it is we who are obliged to show the
world the bestial essence of Ukrainianism,
so that neither it, nor anything like it, will
ever be reborn again; it is not enough to hoist
your flag over the conditional Reichstag. It
is not enough even to arrange the Nuremberg
Trials for the Goebbels or Zelensky. The war
will not end until we eradicate the very idea
of Ukrainianness (Roy, 2022).
6) The mission of modern Russia in the
conditions of what is happening in the West,
and this is an obvious rage, is to preserve
moral values (Mozhaisk, 2022).
Messianic mythologemes are encoded by
nominations at the poles of the value scale
“good” associated with the actions of Liberator,
and “evil” associated with the actions of Villain
from whom Victims should be freed.
The “good”-associated positively connotated
nominations hope, rely, implicate the Victim’s
aspirations to be liberated. The Liberator’s
actions to meet these aspirations are designated
by verbs to hoist your flag over the conditional
Reichstag, to arrange the Nuremberg Trials,
eradicate the very idea of Ukrainianness, to
preserve moral values. “Evil” involves in its
semantic scope the ideological nomination
“genocide” and pathos-based words nightmare,
an obvious rage, the bestial essence of
Ukrainianism, with the re-articulation of
responsibility for criminal acts as an obligation to
"one's own group".
“Liberating” mythologemes actualize the topoi
of Burdening, Threat, and Belonging, with the
reversal of the roles of “defender-aggressor”.
These mythologemes underlie the ideologeme
“protection and liberation”, manifested by the
illocutionary force of direct or implicit
commissive speech acts calling for action: It was
necessary to immediately stop this nightmare,
clean from the Nazis, eradicate the very idea of
Ukrainianness.
All the narratives underlying the messianism-
based mythologemes, can be schematized into
the narrative plots from the “Tale of just war”:
Ukrainian authorities are Villain – Ukraine is
Victim / Hostage – Russia is Hero and Liberator;
NATO / USA / the Western World are Villain –
Ukraine is Villain's accomplice – The World is
Hostage – Russia is Hero-Liberator.
An important part of the Ukrainian counter-
propaganda discourse is the actualization and
generation of ideational structures that counteract
the destructive informational field of the enemy.
The article identifies three main mechanisms for
exposing and debunking Russian ideologemes,
including (a) emphasizing the incoherence of the
Russian propaganda narrative in its basic
ideological structures, (b) de-mythologizing,
referring to national narratives, iconic figure,
archetypes, and symbols of Ukrainian identity,
based on the fields of memory of the Ukrainian
people, and (c) anti-mythologizing focused on
real facts and events that refute propaganda
ideologemes.
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In the symbolic politics of conflict, Russian
mythologemes tend to merge and overlap their
semantic volumes, which leads to conflict
between ideological structures. The
mythologemes “fraternal peoples” and “cultural
allies”, derived from the concept-idea of
reunification counteract with mythologemes
“invention of Ukraine” and “Ukrainians as a
pseudo-nation”, associated with the same
concept-idea (reunification is necessary because
Ukrainians are unable to govern themselves).
The mythologemes “fraternal peoples” is also
discordant with the “Ukronazi” articulated in the
ideologemes “deukranianization-denazification”
in the narrative about the liberation of the world
from fascism, with the prescriptive attitude
towards the elimination of Ukrainian statehood,
which manifests itself in the illocutionary force
of the implicit directive as in (7).
7) Apparently, the name “Ukraine” cannot be
kept as a title of any fully denazified state
entity on the territory liberated from the
Nazi regime (Sergeytsev, 2022).
The inconsistency of RPD is revealed at the level
of the polyhierarchical connection between the
discourse-forming concepts and their underlying
mythologemes. While mono-hierarchical
relations represent the subordination of
mythologemes to one discourse-forming
concept, polyhierarchical structure is the
subordination of one mythologeme to several
parallel concepts-ideas. Thus, the “liberation”-
based Russian mythologemes are simultaneously
derived from the mythologeme "liberation from
Nazi power", is subordinated simultaneously to
the concepts-ideas "messianism" and
"reunification", collides with other
mythologemes subordinated to such concepts,
namely "cultural ally" and "fraternal people". As
a result, the ideologemes “deukranization-
denazification” associated with the mythologem
“liberation” form incoherent meanings
“liberation of Ukraine from Ukrainians”, that is,
from “fascists”, who, moreover, are “our
brothers”.
The incoherence of propaganda is also
manifested in the reformulation of "old"
mythologemes from historical fields of memory
into signifiers with new content, with a
narrowing of their conceptual scope up to its
"nullification". For example, the mythologeme of
the “fraternal people” unfolds at the beginning of
the war into a new strategic narrative “Russia is
Big Brother, who must discipline Younger
Brother for his own good” and narrows its
conceptual framework at first to the Russian-
speaking population, which boils down to one of
the strategies for legitimizing the military
actions. Today, the reformulation of the
mythologeme continues with a tendency to limit
the “inner group” only to those Ukrainians who
support Russia in its military aggression, that is
those who renounce their national identity and
statehood, thereby no longer presenting the
Ukrainian people even as a “little brother”. It is
exemplified by (8), where "one's own group" is
constructed with the maximum narrowing of the
significative scope of the mythologemes
"fraternal people" and "cultural ally". This is
evidenced by the filling of the lexeme minority
with semantic content due to the fourfold
repetition of the nomination pro-Russian and its
hyponymic correlation with the hypernym pro-
Soviet. The syntactical-semantic model in (8)
delineates two participants: Russia as an agent of
action, which “controls the situation”, and pro-
Russian Ukrainians as a patient controlled by the
agent, which is reproduced by a passive structure
that is implicitly enhanced by the sirconstant of
the mode of action under our control. At the
same time, the patient is positioned as an
instrument with the help of which the agent
performs his actions that is explicitly designated
by the semantic role “goal”: to gather in this
movement the pro-Russian forces of Ukraine
under our control.
8) But they are in the minority. (…) Most pro-
Soviet people are also pro-Russian people.
(…). This is the electorate of the pro-Russian
party. (…). The minimum task is to gather in
this movement the pro-Russian forces of
Ukraine under our control (Perevozkina,
2022).
Ukrainian counterpropaganda not only
emphasizes the inconsistency of the Russian
propaganda narrative in its main ideological
structures, but also destroys Russian
mythologems by demythologizing them - by
attracting the fields of memory of the Ukrainian
people.
The analysis of the texts of the popularized
history on the portal “Likbez”, in conjunction
with the chosen academic historical studies on
the memory fields of the Ukrainians, made it
possible to identify plots with a similar basic
motive, which are fixing points of collective
memory. The article identifies 24 main narratives
and 16 plot elements, combined into four
schematic models based on similar main motives
of Ukrainian narratives and their underlying de-
mythologemes, as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1.
De-mythologizing tools of the Ukrainian counterpropaganda.
Mythologemes of Russian
propaganda
De-mythologemes of Ukrainian counterpropaganda
Pseudo-nation and pseudostate
Full-fledged nationality and continuity of statehood
(a) “An ancient Russian nation” as the
common ancestor of the East Slavic
peoples,
(b) “Invention of Ukraine”,
(c) “Significance for Ukraine” of
Russian centralized state from its
creation in the 18th century.
(1) “Ukraine, not Muscovy, is a direct successor of Kyivan Rus”
(Hrushevskyi, 1995),
(2) the model of “flowing history” according to the Kyiv-Galich-
Lithuania scheme, (3) genetic rights of the Ostrozhsky princes (the late 16th century), to
“Russian lands” with the population of Galicia, Volhynia, Kiev region
and Podolia, (4) the continuity of forms and trends in the life of Ukrainian society in
the 16th–17th centuries with Kievan Rus,
(5) the “state idea” of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi of creating an independent
state from Przemysl to the Moscow border, that is, within the borders of
Kievan Rus, (6) the sovereign path of the Ukrainian People's Republic (1917-1921),
its international recognition as a separate state.
Serfs / tools of the West
the Ukrainians are people of Western culture with kinship with Europe
(7) a special role of the Varangians in the history of Kievan Rus, (8) the Ukrainian state building on European principles of federalism,
from Volodymyr Monomakh to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, (9) an active participation of the medieval Ukraine-Rus in political life
of Europe, (10) parallels in historiography between the Cossacks and the European
crusaders, (11) the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, (12) Ukraine as a cultural border between the East and West
rearticulated into ideologeme “Ukraine is a barrier between the world
and Russia's imperial aggression”, (13) kinship with an entire democratic world in the war of 2022, with a
pro-European vector of development.
Fraternal people, reunification
Formation of the Ukrainian nation is rooted in primordial ethno-
cultural symbols, myths, values, and traditions; the formation of
Ukrainian identity in the fight against Russia-oppressor
(a) “One language – one culture – one
faith – one Church”, (b) “gathering of Russian lands”,
(c) “the expansion as a mission in
expanding the boundaries of the
Russian Orthodox kingdom”,
(d) “the primordial desire of Ukrainians
to reunite with the fraternal Russian
people”,
(e) “Ukrainians and Russians have
always fought together”,
(f) “Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism”.
(14) Proto-Ukrainian archetypes transformed into symbols of national
identity (mother-Ukraine, feministic foundations of Ukrainian culture
ideology, etc. ruler with a loyal-a Russian archetype of the father vs. ),(Binbin, Kravchenko, Matvieieva, 2022 (15) a distinction between the names “Rus” and “Russia”, (16) Russian oppression of the Ukrainian language, culture, Ukrainian
identity itself,
(18) the “chosen injuries” narrative of repressiveness of the Soviet
regime (the Red Terror, the Holodomor of 1932-1933, hunger in 1946-
1947, repressions, deportations, shot revival, russification, persecution
of religions).
Russia as a defender and liberator of
Ukrainians, a guarantor of the existence
of Ukraine
Liberation Ukrainian movements of Ukrainians against Russia / the
USSR
(a) “Protection” of the “cultural allies”, (b) without an alliance with Russia / the
USSR, Ukrainians and Ukraine would
have been destroyed by external
aggressors, be it the Commonwealth
and the Ottoman Empire or the First and
Second World Wars.
(19) The Cossacks liberation struggle, (20) defending and fighting for independent statehood led by Symon
Petlura, (21) the liberation movement led by Netor Makhno and Ataman Zeleny,
the peasants’ movements against the collectivization in 1930, (22) the Ukrainian Insurgent Army for independent Ukraine 1942-50,
resistance of Ukrainians to the Soviet regime in the movement of the
sixties and the Ukrainian dissident movement, (23) the Revolution of Dignity, (24) irresistibility, and selflessness of the Ukrainian people in the 2022
war, based on the centuries-old experience of a liberation struggle.
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Ukrainian narratives are characterized by their
consistency. All narrative patterns are connected
by causal schemes that embody one main motive
– the liberation struggle of Ukrainians for their
national identity and statehood that is
exemplified by Ukrainian media in (9).
9) We aim to show the endurance of the
struggle for statehood and military
traditions, as well as the connection of
generations that embodied and embody this
struggle (Sokolova, Hai-Nizhnyk, 2022).
In addition to de-mythologemes, Ukrainian
counterpropaganda uses anti-mythologems, by
relying on facts and events, debunking
propagandistic mythologemes as signifiers with
distorted meanings with the restoration of
reversed roles.
Thus, the mythologemes “concern for the
population of the occupied territories” and
“genocide against the Russian-speaking
population” derived from mythologeme of
“defense and liberation” are debunked by anti-
mythologeme of “genocide” of Ukrainians in
such semantic components as “forced
deportation”, “restriction of movement", “forced
mobilization”, “Ukrainians as “cannon fodder”
and “human shield”, “forced russification”,
“repressions” as exemplified in (10), (11), (12)
and (13).
10) It's not even mobilization, it's just slavery.
People are literally being sent to slaughter;
From the very beginning, residents of
ORDLO - even those with Russian passports
- were used as cannon fodder (Hudkova,
Chernovol, 2022).
11) The occupiers do not allow the civilian
population to cross the demarcation line and
leave the occupied territories of the
Zaporizhia and Kherson regions
(Polishchuk, 2023).
12) This “picking up” of men is the consequence
of the genocidal nature of this war. (Shulgat,
2022).
13) A complete ban on everything Ukrainian.
Threats to teachers and parents – filtering
camps and deprivation of parental rights. A
“brainwashing” lesson, during which young
Ukrainians will be told about the “greatness
of Russia” and the “baseness” of its
historical enemies – Ukrainians and the
West (LB.ua, 2022).
The anti-mythologeme “genocide” debunking
the mythologeme of “protection and concern” is
encoded by the words that explicitly (genocidal)
or implicitly (filtration camps, slavery, cannon
fodder, “brainwashing”) actualize the seme
“genocide”, by verbs and verbal phrases to
designate the enemy actions (sent to slaughter,
"picking up" of men, completely russify,
threaten) and their consequences (a complete ban
on everything Ukrainian, deprivation of parental
rights) – actualizing the topoi of Reality and
Inhumanity, and restoring roles inverted by
propaganda: “Defender – Victim” into
“Genocider – Victim”.
The syntactic models involve such semantic roles
as Agent of Genocide (Russia), Patient (the
Ukrainians in the occupied territories),
Predicates (the inhuman actions of the agent), as
well as goals varying in terms of violence, from
destruction to assimilation.
The mythologeme Ukraine as a “Nazi state” is
debunked by anti-mythologemes “Russia is a
fascist state”, with tactics of shifting the RPD
accusations onto the accuser. An effective
counter-propaganda tool for implementing these
strategies is the involvement of international
expert opinion as in (14), which in rhetoric is
called Testimony – a method of persuasion with
an “appeal to authority”. International expert
opinion, voiced from an impartial side, opposes
Russian mythologemes and restores inverted
roles.
14) The report of The New Lines Institute and
Raoul Wallenberg Centre reasonably
concludes that Russia bears State
responsibility for breaches of Article II and
Article III (c) of the Genocide Convention to
which it is bound (New Lines Institute,
2022).
Conclusions
Ukrainian counterpropaganda operates at the
level of discourse-forming concepts,
mythologemes and ideologemes debunking them
by de-mythologizing, based on the national
narratives, archetypes, and symbols of Ukrainian
identity from the memory fields of the Ukrainian
people; anti-mythologizing based on real facts
and events that refute propaganda ideologemes;
and revealing incoherence of the Russian
narrative in its basic ideational structures
integrated by concepts-ideas of self-defense /
self-preservation, messianism and reunification.
De-mythologization is aimed at counteracting
and destroying the basic mythologemes of
Russian propaganda in the opposition: a false
nation and a false state vs. a full-fledged
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nationality and continuity of statehood, serfs /
tools of the West vs. people of the Western
culture and origin, Fraternal people and
reunification vs. ethno-cultural differences in
symbols, myths, values and traditions; Russia as
Defender and Liberator of Ukrainians vs.
Liberation struggles of the Ukrainians against
Russia. Anti-mythologization restores the
distorted world of parallel reality with the
correction of inverted roles.
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