Volume 12 - Issue 64
/ April 2023
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http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.64.04.23
How to Cite:
Ozhohan , A., Derevianko, S., Karchevska, O., Pavlova, L., & Pashyna, N. (2023). Language as a political manipulation
tool. Amazonia Investiga, 12(64), 237-248. https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.64.04.23
Language as a political manipulation tool
Мова як засіб політичної маніпуляції
Received: April 3, 2023 Accepted: May 28, 2023
Written by:
Andrii Ozhohan1
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1433-723X
ID Web of Science: HLY-3041-2023
Serhii Derevianko2
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3848-7072
ID Web of Science: ADJ-7959-2022
Olena Karchevska3
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8046-5208
ID Web of Science: AEB-0562-2022
Liudmyla Pavlova4
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2318-2639
ID Web of Science: ABH-8994-2022
Nataliya Pashyna5
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2061-4216
ID Web of Science: BBD-6197-2021
Abstract
Unfortunately, human intelligence is
increasingly becoming militant and destructive.
A clear evidence is the full-scale invasion of
Russia into Ukraine, centuries of enslavement of
the Ukrainian people, destruction of Ukrainian
culture and language. In fact, the current tragic
events of the latest hybrid war exposed ethnocide
and linguicide against Ukrainians. The aim of the
article is to analyse the use of language as a
manipulation tool for the realization of
fundamental political interests. Research
methods: historical method, content analysis,
statistical analysis. The results of the study show
that the hegemonic policy of the current Russian
government is characterized by the aggressive
hybrid war against Ukraine, which actively
involves various manipulation tools, in particular
language, in order to justify the occupation,
violent means of domination and methods of
control over its former colonies, in order to
1
PhD in Philology, Associate Professor at the Department of Literary Science, Faculty of Philology, National University “Kyiv-
Mohyla Academy”, Kyiv, Ukraine.
2
Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor af the Department of Political Institutions and Processes, Faculty of History, Politology and
International Relations, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine.
3
PhD in Political Sciences, Associate Professor, Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of International Relations,
Volodymyr Dahl East Ukrainian National University, Kyiv, Ukraine.
4
PhD in Political Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of
International Relations, Volodymyr Dahl East Ukrainian National University, Kyiv, Ukraine.
5
Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of History,
Mariupol State University, Kyiv, Ukraine.
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appropriate all the resources of the enslaved
countries and peoples, in order to maintain the
status of a global leader and dominate the world.
Further research may focus on analysing the
manifestations of the use of language as a
manipulation tool by pro-Russian parties in
Ukraine and other countries.
Keywords: language, hybrid war, political
manipulation, politics of hegemony, linguicide,
language war, language conflicts.
Introduction
Language and information are currently one the
most powerful tools of influence on social,
political and other processes (Korolyov &
Grytsenko, 2022). A specific situation has
developed in Ukraine: on the one hand, language
and information media have become one of the
leading tools of the aggressor in parallel with the
invasion of the Russian Federation (RF) on the
sovereign territory of the country (Makarets,
2019a). On the other hand, language itself is
actually a weapon in the context of the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict, because it is common for the
Russian Federation to appeal with slogans such
as “the united Russian people”, “fraternal
nations”, “protection of Russians and Russian-
speaking people” (often combined into one group
in the aggressor’s information sources) etc. So,
political forces not only use and inflate existing
language conflicts to lobby for their own
interests, but also artificially create language
conflicts themselves all the time to achieve a
certain goal (gaining the support of the majority
of voters in certain regions of the country,
inciting enmity, imposing their ideology, etc.),
which is characteristic of the language policy of
the Russian Federation in relation to Ukraine
(Fedinec & Csernicskó, 2017).
In most countries, the use of languages other than
the official one within their borders is not
considered a danger and is often determined by
the ethnic composition of the population,
historical conditions, etc. It is not imposed by the
colonialist policy of other countries. In the
Ukrainian context, the relationship between the
Ukrainian and Russian languages turned into a
hostile confrontation, language war, which has
been going on for more than a century (Chupryn
& Perchyk, 2020; Csernicskó, 2017). Current
language policy in Ukraine has been aimed at
strengthening the role of the Ukrainian language
in all spheres of social life. It is supported by the
current legislation, in particular, the Constitution
of Ukraine, and is implemented in national
interests, it comes from within the country
(Hryshyna & Bigary, 2019; Azhniuk, 2019;
Overchuk & Batiukh, 2021). All recent
sociological surveys show that the absolute
majority of Ukrainian citizens consider the
Ukrainian language their native language and
claim that it should be the only state language
(Rating group, 2022a; Rating group, 2022b;
Kulyk, 2022). At the same time, the policy of the
Russian Federation towards Ukraine, in
particular, in language issues is colonial in
nature. The aggressor widely used the language
as a manipulation tool — false views about the
alleged “protection of Russians and Russian-
speakers” are spread through political speeches,
the media. Screened by them, Russian
propaganda implemented its plans for the
russification of the population of Ukraine.
A vivid example is the situation with Crimea.
Since Ukraine has gained independence, Russian
and pro-Russian politicians have constantly
talked about the Ukrainian authorities restricting
the Russian language on the peninsula. Although
until 2014, at the time of annexation, in Crimea,
out of 600 schools, more than 500 schools were
taught in Russian, 12 schools were taught in
Crimean Tatar, and only 2 lyceums were taught
in Ukrainian (Nekrecha & Khalilov, 2022). In
fact, the events of 2014, when Russia occupied
Crimea, Donbas, and part of Luhansk region
under the slogans of protecting the Russian-
speaking population, made many Ukrainians
realize that the Russian language is the language
of enslavement of Ukrainians not only from the
17th to the 20th centuries, but also now. The
forms change, but the content remains: where the
resistance of Ukrainians weakens, there sprouts
"Russian peace" (Bezkorovaina, 2014).
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Therefore, the common slogan “language is a
weapon” in the context of a full-scale invasion
acquires not only a figurative meaning. This is
why the issue of the fight against manipulation
by the Russian Federation, Russian propaganda,
the issue of the preservation and life of the
Ukrainian community and the Ukrainian
language are particularly relevant.
The aim of the article is to analyse the use of
language as a means of manipulation for the
realization of fundamental political interests. The
aim involved the fulfilment of the following
research objectives:
− Investigate the historical prerequisites of
oppression, persecution, bans on the
Ukrainian language, and identify the
peculiarities of the use of the language as a
manipulation tool in the hybrid war;
− Determine the main directions of influence
of the use of language as a tool of political
manipulation by the Russian Federation;
− Identify the specifics of the current language
situation in Ukraine.
Literature Review
The topic of this research correlates with current
directions of studies of many Ukrainian and other
researchers of the world. Increasing attention to
the issue under research is explained primarily by
the full-scale military invasion of Russia into
Ukraine in 2022. However, the problem roots
back to the distant past, because oppression,
persecution, bans on the Ukrainian language
have a long history.
The work of Mieliekiestsev and Temirova (2022)
is one of the pillars for the author’s research. The
researchers note that there are many examples of
the so-called assimilation policy in Ukrainian
history, which has been taking place since “great
resettlement”. However, the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth, the Habsburg Monarchy and the
Russian Empire exerted the most significant
influence of language policy. Researchers note
that while the expansion of the German and
Polish languages was suspended, Russia
continued linguicide, in particular during the
times of the USSR.
The work took into account the finding of Dvirna
(2022), who studies the origins and current state
of the language conflict in Ukraine. Special
attention in the study is paid to the period 2014-
2022. The researcher outlined the main political
events of this period, and described the key
government decisions regarding the functioning
of the language of the titular nation and minority
languages.
The increased interest of the world scientific
community in these problems in 2022 evidences
the importance of covering the features of a
hybrid war, with a language war being its main
component, and language being an effective tool
of political manipulation. The work of Zeller
(2022) is based on a survey conducted in
Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Kherson regions. These
regions are targets for invaders, which is
explained by their beliefs about the perceived
“kinship” of these territories with Russia.
However, the survey, which covered the spheres
of language policy, Ukrainian autonomy and
identity, the geopolitical vector of Ukraine,
established that the respondents tend to identify
themselves with Ukraine and the Ukrainian
language, while being sceptical of the Russian
state. Barrington (2022) also conducted a survey
of the population of Ukraine, which indicates
some differences in the attitude of the population
of different regions of Ukraine to language
issues. The final statement of this article that the
conflict with the Russian Federation plays an
important role in making Ukraine “more
Ukrainian”. The researcher notes that the future
stability of Ukraine will depend on how firmly
the national identity is established. Arel (2018)
followed the same direction as the previous two
studies. The researcher studies changes in the
influence of identity factors in the political
preferences of the population of Ukraine after
2014.
In the context of the research, it will be useful to
take into account the works of researchers who
studied language conflicts and language policies
in other countries. This will help to expand the
information background for a comparative study
of manifestations of the use of language as a tool
of political manipulation in other countries.
Turgeon et al., (2021) examine aspects of the
introduction of two official languages (English
and French) in Canada, studying the proportion
of people who oppose or, on the contrary, support
bilingualism. The researchers take into account
the influence of symbolic beliefs and self-
interests on the favour of citizens. Mar-Molinero
(2020) studied the role of language in the nation-
building process in Spain (Spanish is official in
the country, other languages have the status of
official in certain regions). The researchers note
the complexity of the relationship between
language and politics, noting that linguistic
minority groups can be subordinated and
controlled by the central authority of the
majority.
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Singh and Dhussa (2020) explore the challenges
of multilingualism in India. In addition to the two
official languages — English and Hindi — the
country has 22 languages recognized in the
country’s Constitution, as well as many
microlinguistic minority languages. The
researchers explain this with the process of state
system in India, where there were many
independent regional and subcontinental states,
as well as the gap between the languages of the
elite (Sanskrit, Persian, English) and the
languages of the people, which persists to this
day. Makarets (2019a) examines the language
regimes of certain European countries where
several official languages have been introduced
(Ireland, Finland, Belgium). The researcher
makes a comparison between these countries and
Ukrainian realities, providing reasoned evidence
as to why the approval of two official languages
in Ukraine is unfounded and harms national
interests. Chupryn and Perchyk (2020) focus on
the comparison of experience in the field of
language policy of Israel and Ukraine.
Researchers note that Hebrew, or the Israeli
language, existed for a long time in fact only in
written form, but the language was revived
thanks to a strong ideological basis. Rawat
(2022) outlines the causes of the civil war in Sri
Lanka. When studying the conflict, the
researcher finds that the politicization of the issue
of the official language has become the most
significant manifestation of the conflict, because
the language has a decisive influence on the
support and preservation of national identity.
Methods and Materials
Figure 1. Stages of research with the distribution of relevant objectives
Research design (created by the author)
Ukraine was chosen as an example for studying
the use of language as a political manipulation
tool. Its history and present vividly demonstrates
the causes and consequences of such
manipulations by the enemy. The study proposes
a three-element approach to revealing the
problem (Figure 1). In accordance with the
determined constituent elements of the research,
its process is divided into appropriate stages. The
first stage involved a content analysis of some
main theses of the Russian leader V. Putin.
Separate language means and techniques, which
the politician resorts to when using language as a
manipulation tool, are defined. The historical
method was used to explain the current directions
of the language policy of the Russian Federation
at the same stage. A shortened list of events in
the history of linguicide directed by individual
“superpowers” against Ukrainians is presented.
At the second stage of the research, a separate
period in the history of independent Ukraine —
the V. Yanukovych’s presidency — is described.
The historical method was used to describe the
events of the Revolution of Dignity, which were
of paramount importance for the consolidation of
the national idea.
The third stage provided for the analysis of the
results of three surveys of Ukrainians on
language issues. The first and second surveys
were conducted by the Rating sociological group
in March and August 17-18, 2022 for the
population of Ukraine over the age of 18 using
the CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone
Interviewing) method. The sample included
1,000 respondents. From this survey, the trend of
answers to the question “Which language
(Ukrainian or Russian) is your native language?”
and “How, in your opinion, should the Ukrainian
and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine?” was
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analysed. The third survey was commissioned by
political scientist V. Kulyk to Kyiv International
Institute of Sociology, and conducted in
December 2022 using the CATI method for
2,005 respondents who lived in Ukraine during
this period (in the territories controlled by the
Ukrainian authorities until February 24, 2022).
From this survey, answers to questions about the
use of the Ukrainian and/or Russian language in
the everyday life of Ukrainians in 2017 and 2022
were analysed.
Results
The historical context of language manipulation
in Ukraine
Describing the current Russian-Ukrainian
confrontation, it is appropriate to note that a
powerful information war and language
aggression began long before the occupation of
Crimea and part of the territory of Eastern
Ukraine in 2014 and the full-scale invasion on
February 24, 2022. Russia has actively used
language manipulation since the declaration of
Ukraine’s independence. The spheres of this
manipulation were spread in political campaigns,
speeches, mass media, and social networks. The
language has become an important manipulation
tool for many Russian politicians and statesmen.
The current leader of the aggressor state,
V. Putin, demonstrates special virtuosity. The
politician skillfully uses emotionally charged
words and phrases in his message to the Federal
Assembly of the Russian Federation (April 25,
2005), calling the collapse of the USSR “the
greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”
and “a drama for the Russian people.” The
Russian leader constantly resorts to distorting
information. In particular, during a press
conference with E. Macron, the president of
France, in May 2017, he calls Yaroslav the Wise
“our prince”, although he ruled in Kyiv a century
before the founding of Moscow. Putin often uses
such a tool as creating images and stereotypes,
one of the most common of which is that
“Ukrainians and Russians are a single nation that
was divided artificially.”
Other means of rhetoric, manipulative
statements, propaganda articles, etc. are widely
used in the Russian mass media, social networks
and other information channels, but the use of
language means is only part of the problem. Its
roots in the attempt to destroy the Ukrainian-
speaking community and the Ukrainian language
as the “home of existence” of the people. The
modern hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine,
which is accompanied by mass killings of the
population, devastation, burning of Ukrainian
land gives every reason to claim another round of
ethnocide, lingucide, which has a long history. In
particular, back in 1627, the Teaching Gospel of
Kyrylo Tranqulion Stavrovetskyi was
condemned in Moscow. Tsar Mikhail
Fedorovych and Patriarch Filaret ordered to burn
all copies of the collection of sermons printed in
Ukraine, and all other works of Stavrovetskyi
were banned. Peter I also left his mark in the
history of linguicide, forbidding the printing of
books in Ukrainian by his decree of 1720.
Peter II, the grandson of Peter I, in 1729 ordered
to rewrite all state decrees and orders from
Ukrainian into Russian. The reign of Catherine II
was very destructive for Ukrainians. In the 80’s
of the 18th century, this empress initiated the
publication of Comparative Dictionary of All
Languages and Idioms (Linguarum totius orbis
vocabularia comparativa) (first edition 1787-
1789) in St. Petersburg, where the Ukrainian
language is characterized as Russian distorted by
Polish. It is significant that modern Russian
authorities and politicians actively use this
interpretation of the Ukrainian language. This
proves that in Russia, imperial thinking remains
unchanged and the essence of Russian
hegemonic policy remains unchanged despite the
passage of time and the change of historical
circumstances, state government. This is
confirmed by a number of different resolutions,
orders, and circulars issued in Russia during the
19th and 20th centuries aimed at dematerializing
Ukrainians as a separate political, cultural, and
linguistic community. In particular, it should be
noted that the Statute of the Primary School was
adopted in 1864, according to which education
was to be conducted only in Russian. In the 19th
century, in addition to the traditionally
mentioned Valuev circular of 1863, the Ems
Decree of 1876, the Decree of Alexander III was
issued in 1888 prohibiting the use of the
Ukrainian language in official institutions and
baptising children with Ukrainian names. Russia
has been pursuing a powerful ethnocide and
linguicide policy throughout the 20th century
(the Holodomor (famine) of 1932-1933, mass
repressions, etc.).
The said events are a small part of a large-scale
campaign to destroy the Ukrainian language
imposed by Russia. The Ukrainian language was
oppressed by other states. In particular, in 1696,
the courts and institutions of Right Bank Ukraine
approved the use of the Polish language. In 1789,
the Education Commission of the Polish Seym
ordered to close all Ukrainian schools. In 1859,
Austria-Hungary tried to replace the Cyrillic
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Ukrainian alphabet with Latin. The year 1869
was marked by the introduction of the Polish
language (Eastern Galicia) as the official
language of education and administration. In
Romania, the ministerial order to allow a few
hours of the Ukrainian language per week was
cancelled in schools where the majority of
students were Ukrainians in 1933. In 1934,
Ukrainian teachers who insisted on the return of
the Ukrainian language were dismissed. It should
be noted that even in past centuries these actions
were accompanied by language manipulation,
because the governments of other countries had
to explain their actions somehow. In the last
example, the desire of Ukrainian teachers to
return to the teaching of Ukrainian was
interpreted by the government as a “hostile
attitude towards the state and the Romanian
people.”
This list includes only some prohibitions and
oppressions, because it is virtually impossible to
fully cover the history of genocide and linguicide
of Ukrainians in one study. However, even today,
Ukrainians are forced to fight for the right to live
freely in their state, on their land.
The role of language policy in the coming to
power of a pro-Russian president
During the time of independent Ukraine the
Russian Federation made another attempt to
Russianize Ukraine. 13 years after gaining
independence, pro-Russian politician
V. Yanukovych became one of the candidates in
the presidential elections of Ukraine. In his
election campaign, he used promise to raise the
status of the Russian language on Ukrainian
territory as the main means of achieving voter
support in certain regions of Ukraine. According
to the preliminary results, V. Yanukovych won,
which was followed by a series of protests by
Ukrainians - the Orange Revolution.
Yushchenko V. won in the second round of the
elections that year. And V. Yanukovych won the
2010 elections. One of the points of
V. Yanukovych’s election campaign was “Two
languages - one country.” In this paragraph, the
presidential candidate noted theses regarding
“the real establishment of European standards of
democracy in Ukraine”, “granting the Russian
language the status of a second state language”
and “the implementation of a balanced state
language policy that adequately responds to the
linguistic needs of society.” So, there were signs
of language manipulation in the pre-election
campaign of the future president: the appeal to
“European standards of democracy” contradicted
the actual course of V. Yanukovych directed
towards the Russian Federation. Besides,
European standards of democracy do not provide
for the transformation of one state into a colony
of another. During the presidency of
V. Yanukovych, scandalous law regarding
language policy came into force, which
significantly expanded the possibilities of using
regional languages, if the number of speakers of
such languages is not less than 10% of the
population of a certain region (in some cases
even less than 10%).
Yanukovych’s rule led to another revolution —
the Revolution of Dignity. The dispersal of a
peaceful protest against the departure of the
country’s government from the course of
European integration established by law was the
impetus for the Revolution of Dignity. The main
reasons for the protests were also the reluctance
of Ukrainians to put up with the excessive
concentration of power around V. Yanukovych
and his supporters, as well as with the
transformation of Ukraine into a Russian colony.
Protesters were shot during the Revolution of
Dignity. Yanukovych fled from Kyiv. The most
important consequence of the Revolution of
Dignity was getting out of the Russia’s influence.
The latter responded, among other things, with an
increased informational aggression. On February
20, on the day of the death of the largest number
of Maidan protesters, the Russian Federation
launched a special operation to seize Crimea,
which later turned into an armed aggression of
the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
Propaganda and language manipulations of the
Russian government had a certain influence in
Ukraine even after the removal of
V. Yanukovych. In this context, the activity of
the pro-Russian party — Opposition Platform —
For Life should be noted. Its programs literarily
reproduced verbatim the propaganda theses
stated in the Russian mass media. Among other
things, these messages spread enmity, gender
stereotypes and various manipulations, being
permeated with Euroscepticism and
Russophilism. The largest number of
commissioned media materials in February 2022
were beneficial to Opposition Platform — For
Life party (Detector Media, 2022). The party was
banned only in June 2022, after a full-scale
invasion.
Trends in language issues in Ukraine
The Russian armed aggression against Ukraine
has the following main components:
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− the invasion of Crimea at the end of
February 2014;
− the war in the east of Ukraine, which began
in April 2014 with the creation of the so-
called Donetsk People’s Republic and
Luhansk People’s Republic;
− a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on
February 24, 2022.
All these stages were accompanied by an
information war and the active propaganda by
Russian politicians and mass media. In this war,
language continues to be one of the main means
of manipulation, but the more the aggressor tries
to disrupt the national unity of Ukrainians, the
more the national consciousness of Ukrainians
grows. This is evidenced by numerous surveys
on language issues in Ukraine.
The survey conducted by the Rating sociological
group in March 2022 shows the following results
based on the answers to the key questions: “What
is your native language?” and “How should the
Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in
Ukraine?” (Figures 2 and 3).
Figure 2. Dynamics of answers to questions about the native language to Ukrainians (Ukrainian or Russian)
(Rating group, 2022a)
Figure 3. Dynamics and structure of answers to questions about how, in the opinion of Ukrainians, the
Ukrainian and Russian languages should coexist in the country (Rating group, 2022a)
57 62 67 66 68 71 71 73 74 77 76
42 37 32 33 31 28 27 26 24 21 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
07.2012 10.2013 07.2014 06.2015 09.2016 09.2017 09.2018 02.2019 09.2020 08.2021 03.2022
Ukrainian Russian
47 50 50 58 61 61 61 61 62 66 66 66 66 66 66 65 83
23 29 27 22 19 20 21 17 16 14 11 12 13 10 11 12
8
422524435423322 2
2
27 19 21 15 18 15 14 19 16 16 21 19 19 22 22 22 7
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Along with Ukrainian, the Russian language should become the state language throughout Ukraine
Difficult to answer
Ukrainian is the state language, Russian is the official language in some regions
Ukrainian is the only state language
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As Figures 2 and 3 show, there is a steadily
increasing share of citizens who consider the
Ukrainian language to be their native language
and claim that it should be the only state
language. Some interdependencies can be
identified when comparing the results of the
survey with the conducted historical excursus
into the political events in Ukraine after 2014.
The year of 2015 — after the Revolution of
Dignity — was the only period when a slight
(1%) increase in the share of respondents who
considered Russian their native language. After
2015, there is a significant decrease in the share
of the population that considers the Russian
language their native. With the beginning of the
full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine
sociologists note the “tectonic shifts” (Evhen
Holovakha) in the public consciousness of
Ukrainians caused by the war. According to the
results of a survey conducted by the Rating
sociological group on August 17-18, 2022, 76%
of Ukrainian citizens consider the Ukrainian
language their native language, and 86% note
that it should be the only state language.
Figure 4. How should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine (Rating group, 2022b)
Figure 5. How should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine — distribution by region,
age, language spoken at home (Rating group, 2022b)
86
10 31Ukrainian is the only state
language
Ukrainian is the state
language, Russian is the
official language in some
regions
Along with Ukrainian, the
Russian language should
become the state language
throughout Ukraine
Difficult to answer
90
89
83
76
95
85
81
92
83
74
6
8
11
19
3
9
14
6
11
18
3
1
5
3
2
4
3
1
5
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
8
020 40 60 80 100 120
Center
West
South
East
18-35
36-50
51+
Ukrainian
Both Ukrainian and Russian
Russian
Ukrainian is the only state language
Ukrainian is the state language, Russian is the official language in some regions
Along with Ukrainian, the Russian language should become the state language throughout Ukraine
Difficult to answer
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Another important issue in the context of the
influence of the information war and language
policy of the Russian Federation is what
language Ukrainians communicate in everyday
life. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the results of the
corresponding survey commissioned by the
Ukrainian political scientist V. Kulyk to the Kyiv
International Institute of Sociology.
Figure 6. The language of Ukrainians in everyday life in 2017 (Kulyk, 2022)
Figure 7. The language which Ukrainians use in everyday life in 2022 (Kulyk, 2022)
34 15 25 14 12
37
14
24
12 13
26
17
33
16 8
11
12
46
18 13
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Only in Ukrainian Mostly in Ukrainian Equally in both
languages Mostly in Russian Only in Russian
2017
Speak in everyday life Speak at home with their family
Speak at work or study Use on the Internet
41
17 24 96
50
12
19
78
50
18
19
74
26
26
38
42
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Only in Ukrainian Mostly in Ukrainian Equally in both
languages Mostly in Russian Only in Russian
2022
Speak in everyday life Speak at home with their family
Speak at work or study Use on the Internet
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Figures 6 and 7 show a significant change in the
ratio of the shares of Ukrainians who
communicate in Ukrainian or Russian in various
spheres of life. There has been a significant
increase in the number of people who
communicate only and mainly in Ukrainian, as
well as equally in both languages over the past
five years. So, the conducted analysis gives
grounds to note a significantly strengthened role
of the Ukrainian language for the majority of
Ukrainians.
Discussion
The use of language issues in the aggressor’s
policy is aimed at spreading the influence of the
Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine.
However, the events that have taken place in
Ukraine since 2014 affected the reduction of the
influence of the Russian Federation.
Mieliekiestsev and Temirova (2022), studying
the history of oppression of the Ukrainian
language (in particular, in the 19th century), note
that the tsarist policy aimed at destroying the
Ukrainian language and culture could not lead to
outcomes other than failure to accept
assimilation. According to the results of the
study, a similar situation is observed in modern
Ukraine. Continuation of the previous thesis is
the opinion of Dvirna (2022), who exposes the
falsity of the Soviet thesis about bilingualism in
Ukraine and its alleged “harmony”, which is
actually a falsification of historical truth. We
fully agree with this statement based on the
analysis of the historical stages of the
suppression of the Ukrainian language carried
out in this article. Makarets (2019b) also
confirmed the impracticality and inadmissibility
of introducing bilingualism in Ukraine. The
researcher focuses on the aspects of language
policy in multilingual countries, the experience
of which is often referred to by supporters of
bilingualism in Ukraine. The higher level of
prestige of the assimilating language, as well as
the reduced share of speakers of the national
language for various reasons lead to “self-
assimilation” even after the country gains
independence. Such a situation occurred in
Ireland, where everyone knows English, and only
40% of the population know Irish. The situation
is different in Finland: Swedish was the official
language during the Swedish expansion, but the
growth of the Finnish-speaking rural population
and its migration to cities contributed to the
spread of the Finnish language. Today, both
Finnish and Swedish have official status, but
Swedish is spoken by only about 5,5% of the
population. The experience of Belgium, which
has three official languages, shows that such a
language policy did not contribute to the
elimination of social conflicts.
Barrington (2022) emphasizes the importance of
the language issue, noting that language is an
important part of who the people of Ukraine
consider themselves to be. Zeller (2022) rightly
notes that the views of those Ukrainians who
advocated bilingualism should change after the
terrible actions of the Russian army on the
territory of Ukraine, because “bombs fall mainly
on Russian-speaking people in Ukraine and
Russians by nationality.” Studying changes in the
mood of the population of Ukraine after 2014,
Arel (2018) notes that the events of this period
made “Ukraine became more Ukrainian.” These
views are confirmed by the analysis of survey
results discussed in this article.
It is appropriate to cite foreign experience
regarding language conflicts in the context of this
study. Turgeon et al., (2021) indicate language
conflicts in Canada, determining the existence of
a gap between the support of the recognition of
minority languages as official by citizens and
their opposition to particular measures required
for the implementation of this principle. So, the
recognition of two official languages does not
fully contribute to the solution of existing
language problems. Mar-Molinero (2020)
identifies the language problems in Spain, where
languages other than the official Spanish have
regional status, and also notes that language is an
essential marker in the nation-building process.
So, language conflicts can also occur in countries
where other languages have been introduced as
regional languages.
Singh and Dhussa (2020) note, that
multilingualism in India mitigated by
bilingualism is unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future. This situation is rather
positive, even if it causes certain difficulties and
misunderstandings, because it shows the
willingness of citizens to preserve their identity.
Rawat (2022) studies ethnic conflict in Sri
Lanka. The researcher established that the
politicization of the language issue turned out to
be the most powerful manifestation of the
Sinhalese-Tamil conflict.
Finally, it is appropriate to cite the example of
Israel, where the power of the national idea
actually revived the Israeli language (Chupryn &
Perchyk, 2020). Hebrew was almost a dead
language for a long time. It began to revive only
at the end of the 19th century. This was facilitated
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/ April 2023
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by the considerable efforts of a small group of
enthusiasts to create teaching aids, school
programs, and periodicals in the Israeli language.
This process was accompanied by opposition
from powerful groups, but the language was
revived within half a century. Israel’s experience
confirms the need to consolidate the national
idea, in particular, in the minds of Ukrainians
themselves, and also indicates the need to pay
more attention to raising the prestige of the
language.
Conclusions
The analysis carried out in the study proves that
language can be a powerful manipulation tool,
which is used by various government agencies
and political forces to achieve certain goals. The
use of language for these purposes can have
serious geopolitical consequences: the spread of
enmity, a threat to democratic values, cultural
achievements and the integrity of the country.
The Russian ethnocide and genocide policy
against Ukrainians has a long history. The
current Russian government continues to
consider Ukraine as its colony and seeks to
implement its imperial plans through various
methods and means, not least through the use of
language as a manipulation tool. However,
Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine raised the
civic and national consciousness of the Ukrainian
community, which is fighting for the right to live
in its free country. According to the survey
results, more than 90% of Ukrainians are proud
of their citizenship. According to sociologists,
this is the highest indicator throughout
sociological monitoring. More than 90% of
respondents believe in victory in this war. The
role of the Ukrainian language strengthens in
Ukraine. It tends to completely or partially refuse
to communicate in Russian, which contradicts
the aggressor’s “imperial” intentions.
In order to further strengthen the national idea
and the role of the Ukrainian language, it is
necessary to improve the information literacy of
the population, to develop critical thinking and to
support independent mass media.
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