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Language as a political manipulation tool

Мова як засіб політичної маніпуляції

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Abstract

Unfortunately, human intelligence is increasingly becoming militant and destructive. A clear evidence is the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine, centuries of enslavement of the Ukrainian people, destruction of Ukrainian culture and language. In fact, the current tragic events of the latest hybrid war exposed ethnocide and linguicide against Ukrainians. The aim of the article is to analyse the use of language as a manipulation tool for the realization of fundamental political interests. Research methods: historical method, content analysis, statistical analysis. The results of the study show that the hegemonic policy of the current Russian government is characterized by the aggressive hybrid war against Ukraine, which actively involves various manipulation tools, in particular language, in order to justify the occupation, violent means of domination and methods of control over its former colonies, in order to

Анотація

На жаль, людський інтелект дедалі більше стає войовничим і деструктивним. Яскравим свідченням є повномасштабне вторгнення Росії в Україну, багатовікове поневолення українського народу, нищення української культури та мови. Фактично нинішні трагічні події останньої гібридної війни викрили етноцид і лінгвоцид українців. Метою статті є аналіз використання мови як інструменту маніпулювання для реалізації фундаментальних політичних інтересів. Методи дослідження: історичний метод, контент-аналіз, статистичний аналіз. Результати дослідження свідчать, що гегемоністська політика нинішнього російського уряду характеризується агресивною гібридною війною проти України, в якій активно залучаються різноманітні засоби маніпулювання, зокрема мовою, з метою

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appropriate all the resources of the enslaved countries and peoples, in order to maintain the status of a global leader and dominate the world. Further research may focus on analysing the manifestations of the use of language as a manipulation tool by pro-Russian parties in Ukraine and other countries.

Keywords: language, hybrid war, political manipulation, politics of hegemony, linguicide, language war, language conflicts.

Introduction

Language and information are currently one of the most powerful tools of influence on social, political and other processes (Korolyov & Grytsenko, 2022). A specific situation has developed in Ukraine: on the one hand, language and information media have become one of the leading tools of the aggressor in parallel with the invasion of the Russian Federation (RF) on the sovereign territory of the country (Makarets, 2019a). On the other hand, language itself is actually a weapon in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, because it is common for the Russian Federation to appeal with slogans such as “the united Russian people”, “fraternal nations”, “protection of Russians and Russian-speaking people” (often combined into one group in the aggressor’s information sources) etc. So, political forces not only use and inflate existing language conflicts to lobby for their own interests, but also artificially create language conflicts themselves all the time to achieve a certain goal (gaining the support of the majority of voters in certain regions of the country, inciting enmity, imposing their ideology, etc.), which is characteristic of the language policy of the Russian Federation in relation to Ukraine (Fedinec & Csernicskó, 2017).

In most countries, the use of languages other than the official one within their borders is not considered a danger and is often determined by the ethnic composition of the population, historical conditions, etc. It is not imposed by the colonialist policy of other countries. In the Ukrainian context, the relationship between the Ukrainian and Russian languages turned into a hostile confrontation, language war, which has been going on for more than a century (Chupryn & Perchyk, 2020; Csernicskó, 2017). Current language policy in Ukraine has been aimed at strengthening the role of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life. It is supported by the

виправдання окупації, насильницькі засоби домінування та методи контролю над своїми колишніми колоніями, щоб привласнити всі ресурси поневолених країн і народів, щоб зберегти статус глобального лідера та домінувати у світі. Подальші дослідження можуть бути зосереджені на аналізі проявів використання мови як інструменту маніпуляції проросійськими партіями в Україні та інших країнах.

Ключові слова: мова, гібридна війна, політична маніпуляція, політика гегемонії, лінгвоцид, мовна війна, мовні конфлікти.

current legislation, in particular, the Constitution of Ukraine, and is implemented in national interests, it comes from within the country (Hryshyna & Bigary, 2019; Azhniuk, 2019; Overchuk & Batiukh, 2021). All recent sociological surveys show that the absolute majority of Ukrainian citizens consider the Ukrainian language their native language and claim that it should be the only state language (Rating group, 2022a; Rating group, 2022b; Kulyk, 2022). At the same time, the policy of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine, in particular, in language issues is colonial in nature. The aggressor widely used the language as a manipulation tool — false views about the alleged “protection of Russians and Russian-speakers” are spread through political speeches, the media. Screened by them, Russian propaganda implemented its plans for the russification of the population of Ukraine.

A vivid example is the situation with Crimea. Since Ukraine has gained independence, Russian and pro-Russian politicians have constantly talked about the Ukrainian authorities restricting the Russian language on the peninsula. Although until 2014, at the time of annexation, in Crimea, out of 600 schools, more than 500 schools were taught in Russian, 12 schools were taught in Crimean Tatar, and only 2 lyceums were taught in Ukrainian (Nekrecha & Khalilov, 2022). In fact, the events of 2014, when Russia occupied Crimea, Donbas, and part of Luhansk region under the slogans of protecting the Russian-speaking population, made many Ukrainians realize that the Russian language is the language of enslavement of Ukrainians not only from the 17th to the 20th centuries, but also now. The forms change, but the content remains: where the resistance of Ukrainians weakens, there sprouts “Russian peace” (Bezkorovaina, 2014).

Therefore, the common slogan “language is a weapon” in the context of a full-scale invasion acquires not only a figurative meaning. This is why the issue of the fight against manipulation by the Russian Federation, Russian propaganda, the issue of the preservation and life of the Ukrainian community and the Ukrainian language are particularly relevant.

The aim of the article is to analyse the use of language as a means of manipulation for the realization of fundamental political interests. The aim involved the fulfilment of the following research objectives:

- Investigate the historical prerequisites of oppression, persecution, bans on the Ukrainian language, and identify the peculiarities of the use of the language as a manipulation tool in the hybrid war;
- Determine the main directions of influence of the use of language as a tool of political manipulation by the Russian Federation;
- Identify the specifics of the current language situation in Ukraine.

Literature Review

The topic of this research correlates with current directions of studies of many Ukrainian and other researchers of the world. Increasing attention to the issue under research is explained primarily by the full-scale military invasion of Russia into Ukraine in 2022. However, the problem roots back to the distant past, because oppression, persecution, bans on the Ukrainian language have a long history.

The work of Mieliekiestsev and Temirova (2022) is one of the pillars for the author’s research. The researchers note that there are many examples of the so-called assimilation policy in Ukrainian history, which has been taking place since “great resettlement”. However, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Russian Empire exerted the most significant influence of language policy. Researchers note that while the expansion of the German and Polish languages was suspended, Russia continued linguistic, in particular during the times of the USSR.

The work took into account the finding of Dvirna (2022), who studies the origins and current state of the language conflict in Ukraine. Special attention in the study is paid to the period 2014-2022. The researcher outlined the main political events of this period, and described the key government decisions regarding the functioning

of the language of the titular nation and minority languages.

The increased interest of the world scientific community in these problems in 2022 evidences the importance of covering the features of a hybrid war, with a language war being its main component, and language being an effective tool of political manipulation. The work of Zeller (2022) is based on a survey conducted in Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Kherson regions. These regions are targets for invaders, which is explained by their beliefs about the perceived “kinship” of these territories with Russia. However, the survey, which covered the spheres of language policy, Ukrainian autonomy and identity, the geopolitical vector of Ukraine, established that the respondents tend to identify themselves with Ukraine and the Ukrainian language, while being sceptical of the Russian state. Barrington (2022) also conducted a survey of the population of Ukraine, which indicates some differences in the attitude of the population of different regions of Ukraine to language issues. The final statement of this article that the conflict with the Russian Federation plays an important role in making Ukraine “more Ukrainian”. The researcher notes that the future stability of Ukraine will depend on how firmly the national identity is established. Arel (2018) followed the same direction as the previous two studies. The researcher studies changes in the influence of identity factors in the political preferences of the population of Ukraine after 2014.

In the context of the research, it will be useful to take into account the works of researchers who studied language conflicts and language policies in other countries. This will help to expand the information background for a comparative study of manifestations of the use of language as a tool of political manipulation in other countries. Turgeon et al., (2021) examine aspects of the introduction of two official languages (English and French) in Canada, studying the proportion of people who oppose or, on the contrary, support bilingualism. The researchers take into account the influence of symbolic beliefs and self-interests on the favour of citizens. Mar-Molinero (2020) studied the role of language in the nation-building process in Spain (Spanish is official in the country, other languages have the status of official in certain regions). The researchers note the complexity of the relationship between language and politics, noting that linguistic minority groups can be subordinated and controlled by the central authority of the majority.

Singh and Dhussa (2020) explore the challenges of multilingualism in India. In addition to the two official languages — English and Hindi — the country has 22 languages recognized in the country's Constitution, as well as many microlinguistic minority languages. The researchers explain this with the process of state system in India, where there were many independent regional and subcontinental states, as well as the gap between the languages of the elite (Sanskrit, Persian, English) and the languages of the people, which persists to this day. Makarets (2019a) examines the language regimes of certain European countries where several official languages have been introduced (Ireland, Finland, Belgium). The researcher makes a comparison between these countries and Ukrainian realities, providing reasoned evidence

as to why the approval of two official languages in Ukraine is unfounded and harms national interests. Chupryn and Perchyk (2020) focus on the comparison of experience in the field of language policy of Israel and Ukraine. Researchers note that Hebrew, or the Israeli language, existed for a long time in fact only in written form, but the language was revived thanks to a strong ideological basis. Rawat (2022) outlines the causes of the civil war in Sri Lanka. When studying the conflict, the researcher finds that the politicization of the issue of the official language has become the most significant manifestation of the conflict, because the language has a decisive influence on the support and preservation of national identity.

Methods and Materials




Figure 1. Stages of research with the distribution of relevant objectives Research design (created by the author)

Ukraine was chosen as an example for studying the use of language as a political manipulation tool. Its history and present vividly demonstrates the causes and consequences of such manipulations by the enemy. The study proposes a three-element approach to revealing the problem (Figure 1). In accordance with the determined constituent elements of the research, its process is divided into appropriate stages. The first stage involved a content analysis of some main theses of the Russian leader V. Putin. Separate language means and techniques, which the politician resorts to when using language as a manipulation tool, are defined. The historical method was used to explain the current directions of the language policy of the Russian Federation at the same stage. A shortened list of events in the history of linguistic directed by individual “superpowers” against Ukrainians is presented.

At the second stage of the research, a separate period in the history of independent Ukraine — the V. Yanukovich's presidency — is described. The historical method was used to describe the events of the Revolution of Dignity, which were of paramount importance for the consolidation of the national idea.

The third stage provided for the analysis of the results of three surveys of Ukrainians on language issues. The first and second surveys were conducted by the Rating sociological group in March and August 17-18, 2022 for the population of Ukraine over the age of 18 using the CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) method. The sample included 1,000 respondents. From this survey, the trend of answers to the question “Which language (Ukrainian or Russian) is your native language?” and “How, in your opinion, should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine?” was

analysed. The third survey was commissioned by political scientist V. Kulyk to Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, and conducted in December 2022 using the CATI method for 2,005 respondents who lived in Ukraine during this period (in the territories controlled by the Ukrainian authorities until February 24, 2022). From this survey, answers to questions about the use of the Ukrainian and/or Russian language in the everyday life of Ukrainians in 2017 and 2022 were analysed.

Results

The historical context of language manipulation in Ukraine

Describing the current Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, it is appropriate to note that a powerful information war and language aggression began long before the occupation of Crimea and part of the territory of Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Russia has actively used language manipulation since the declaration of Ukraine's independence. The spheres of this manipulation were spread in political campaigns, speeches, mass media, and social networks. The language has become an important manipulation tool for many Russian politicians and statesmen. The current leader of the aggressor state, V. Putin, demonstrates special virtuosity. The politician skillfully uses emotionally charged words and phrases in his message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (April 25, 2005), calling the collapse of the USSR "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century" and "a drama for the Russian people." The Russian leader constantly resorts to distorting information. In particular, during a press conference with E. Macron, the president of France, in May 2017, he calls Yaroslav the Wise "our prince", although he ruled in Kyiv a century before the founding of Moscow. Putin often uses such a tool as creating images and stereotypes, one of the most common of which is that "Ukrainians and Russians are a single nation that was divided artificially."

Other means of rhetoric, manipulative statements, propaganda articles, etc. are widely used in the Russian mass media, social networks and other information channels, but the use of language means is only part of the problem. Its roots in the attempt to destroy the Ukrainian-speaking community and the Ukrainian language as the "home of existence" of the people. The modern hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine, which is accompanied by mass killings of the

population, devastation, burning of Ukrainian land gives every reason to claim another round of ethnocide, linguicide, which has a long history. In particular, back in 1627, the Teaching Gospel of Kyrylo Tranquilion Stavrovetskyi was condemned in Moscow. Tsar Mikhail Fedorovych and Patriarch Filaret ordered to burn all copies of the collection of sermons printed in Ukraine, and all other works of Stavrovetskyi were banned. Peter I also left his mark in the history of linguicide, forbidding the printing of books in Ukrainian by his decree of 1720.

Peter II, the grandson of Peter I, in 1729 ordered to rewrite all state decrees and orders from Ukrainian into Russian. The reign of Catherine II was very destructive for Ukrainians. In the 80's of the 18th century, this empress initiated the publication of Comparative Dictionary of All Languages and Idioms (*Linguarum totius orbis vocabularia comparativa*) (first edition 1787-1789) in St. Petersburg, where the Ukrainian language is characterized as Russian distorted by Polish. It is significant that modern Russian authorities and politicians actively use this interpretation of the Ukrainian language. This proves that in Russia, imperial thinking remains unchanged and the essence of Russian hegemonic policy remains unchanged despite the passage of time and the change of historical circumstances, state government. This is confirmed by a number of different resolutions, orders, and circulars issued in Russia during the 19th and 20th centuries aimed at dematerializing Ukrainians as a separate political, cultural, and linguistic community. In particular, it should be noted that the Statute of the Primary School was adopted in 1864, according to which education was to be conducted only in Russian. In the 19th century, in addition to the traditionally mentioned Valuev circular of 1863, the Ems Decree of 1876, the Decree of Alexander III was issued in 1888 prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian language in official institutions and baptising children with Ukrainian names. Russia has been pursuing a powerful ethnocide and linguicide policy throughout the 20th century (the Holodomor (famine) of 1932-1933, mass repressions, etc.).

The said events are a small part of a large-scale campaign to destroy the Ukrainian language imposed by Russia. The Ukrainian language was oppressed by other states. In particular, in 1696, the courts and institutions of Right Bank Ukraine approved the use of the Polish language. In 1789, the Education Commission of the Polish Sejm ordered to close all Ukrainian schools. In 1859, Austria-Hungary tried to replace the Cyrillic

Ukrainian alphabet with Latin. The year 1869 was marked by the introduction of the Polish language (Eastern Galicia) as the official language of education and administration. In Romania, the ministerial order to allow a few hours of the Ukrainian language per week was cancelled in schools where the majority of students were Ukrainians in 1933. In 1934, Ukrainian teachers who insisted on the return of the Ukrainian language were dismissed. It should be noted that even in past centuries these actions were accompanied by language manipulation, because the governments of other countries had to explain their actions somehow. In the last example, the desire of Ukrainian teachers to return to the teaching of Ukrainian was interpreted by the government as a “hostile attitude towards the state and the Romanian people.”

This list includes only some prohibitions and oppressions, because it is virtually impossible to fully cover the history of genocide and linguicide of Ukrainians in one study. However, even today, Ukrainians are forced to fight for the right to live freely in their state, on their land.

The role of language policy in the coming to power of a pro-Russian president

During the time of independent Ukraine the Russian Federation made another attempt to Russianize Ukraine. 13 years after gaining independence, pro-Russian politician V. Yanukovich became one of the candidates in the presidential elections of Ukraine. In his election campaign, he used promise to raise the status of the Russian language on Ukrainian territory as the main means of achieving voter support in certain regions of Ukraine. According to the preliminary results, V. Yanukovich won, which was followed by a series of protests by Ukrainians - the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko V. won in the second round of the elections that year. And V. Yanukovich won the 2010 elections. One of the points of V. Yanukovich's election campaign was “Two languages - one country.” In this paragraph, the presidential candidate noted theses regarding “the real establishment of European standards of democracy in Ukraine”, “granting the Russian language the status of a second state language” and “the implementation of a balanced state language policy that adequately responds to the linguistic needs of society.” So, there were signs of language manipulation in the pre-election campaign of the future president: the appeal to “European standards of democracy” contradicted the actual course of V. Yanukovich directed

towards the Russian Federation. Besides, European standards of democracy do not provide for the transformation of one state into a colony of another. During the presidency of V. Yanukovich, scandalous law regarding language policy came into force, which significantly expanded the possibilities of using regional languages, if the number of speakers of such languages is not less than 10% of the population of a certain region (in some cases even less than 10%).

Yanukovich's rule led to another revolution — the Revolution of Dignity. The dispersal of a peaceful protest against the departure of the country's government from the course of European integration established by law was the impetus for the Revolution of Dignity. The main reasons for the protests were also the reluctance of Ukrainians to put up with the excessive concentration of power around V. Yanukovich and his supporters, as well as with the transformation of Ukraine into a Russian colony. Protesters were shot during the Revolution of Dignity. Yanukovich fled from Kyiv. The most important consequence of the Revolution of Dignity was getting out of the Russia's influence. The latter responded, among other things, with an increased informational aggression. On February 20, on the day of the death of the largest number of Maidan protesters, the Russian Federation launched a special operation to seize Crimea, which later turned into an armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

Propaganda and language manipulations of the Russian government had a certain influence in Ukraine even after the removal of V. Yanukovich. In this context, the activity of the pro-Russian party — Opposition Platform — For Life should be noted. Its programs literally reproduced verbatim the propaganda theses stated in the Russian mass media. Among other things, these messages spread enmity, gender stereotypes and various manipulations, being permeated with Euroscepticism and Russophilism. The largest number of commissioned media materials in February 2022 were beneficial to Opposition Platform — For Life party (Detector Media, 2022). The party was banned only in June 2022, after a full-scale invasion.

Trends in language issues in Ukraine

The Russian armed aggression against Ukraine has the following main components:

- the invasion of Crimea at the end of February 2014;
- the war in the east of Ukraine, which began in April 2014 with the creation of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic;
- a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

All these stages were accompanied by an information war and the active propaganda by Russian politicians and mass media. In this war,

language continues to be one of the main means of manipulation, but the more the aggressor tries to disrupt the national unity of Ukrainians, the more the national consciousness of Ukrainians grows. This is evidenced by numerous surveys on language issues in Ukraine.

The survey conducted by the Rating sociological group in March 2022 shows the following results based on the answers to the key questions: "What is your native language?" and "How should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine?" (Figures 2 and 3).




Figure 2. Dynamics of answers to questions about the native language to Ukrainians (Ukrainian or Russian) (Rating group, 2022a)



Figure 3. Dynamics and structure of answers to questions about how, in the opinion of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian and Russian languages should coexist in the country (Rating group, 2022a)

As Figures 2 and 3 show, there is a steadily increasing share of citizens who consider the Ukrainian language to be their native language and claim that it should be the only state language. Some interdependencies can be identified when comparing the results of the survey with the conducted historical excursus into the political events in Ukraine after 2014. The year of 2015 — after the Revolution of Dignity — was the only period when a slight (1%) increase in the share of respondents who considered Russian their native language. After

2015, there is a significant decrease in the share of the population that considers the Russian language their native. With the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine sociologists note the “tectonic shifts” (Evhen Holovakha) in the public consciousness of Ukrainians caused by the war. According to the results of a survey conducted by the Rating sociological group on August 17-18, 2022, 76% of Ukrainian citizens consider the Ukrainian language their native language, and 86% note that it should be the only state language.




Figure 4. How should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine (Rating group, 2022b)




Figure 5. How should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine — distribution by region, age, language spoken at home (Rating group, 2022b)

Another important issue in the context of the influence of the information war and language policy of the Russian Federation is what language Ukrainians communicate in everyday

life. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the results of the corresponding survey commissioned by the Ukrainian political scientist V. Kulyk to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.




Figure 6. The language of Ukrainians in everyday life in 2017 (Kulyk, 2022)




Figure 7. The language which Ukrainians use in everyday life in 2022 (Kulyk, 2022)

Figures 6 and 7 show a significant change in the ratio of the shares of Ukrainians who communicate in Ukrainian or Russian in various spheres of life. There has been a significant increase in the number of people who communicate only and mainly in Ukrainian, as well as equally in both languages over the past five years. So, the conducted analysis gives grounds to note a significantly strengthened role of the Ukrainian language for the majority of Ukrainians.

Discussion

The use of language issues in the aggressor's policy is aimed at spreading the influence of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. However, the events that have taken place in Ukraine since 2014 affected the reduction of the influence of the Russian Federation.

Mieliekiestsev and Temirova (2022), studying the history of oppression of the Ukrainian language (in particular, in the 19th century), note that the tsarist policy aimed at destroying the Ukrainian language and culture could not lead to outcomes other than failure to accept assimilation. According to the results of the study, a similar situation is observed in modern Ukraine. Continuation of the previous thesis is the opinion of Dvirna (2022), who exposes the falsity of the Soviet thesis about bilingualism in Ukraine and its alleged "harmony", which is actually a falsification of historical truth. We fully agree with this statement based on the analysis of the historical stages of the suppression of the Ukrainian language carried out in this article. Makarets (2019b) also confirmed the impracticality and inadmissibility of introducing bilingualism in Ukraine. The researcher focuses on the aspects of language policy in multilingual countries, the experience of which is often referred to by supporters of bilingualism in Ukraine. The higher level of prestige of the assimilating language, as well as the reduced share of speakers of the national language for various reasons lead to "self-assimilation" even after the country gains independence. Such a situation occurred in Ireland, where everyone knows English, and only 40% of the population know Irish. The situation is different in Finland: Swedish was the official language during the Swedish expansion, but the growth of the Finnish-speaking rural population and its migration to cities contributed to the spread of the Finnish language. Today, both Finnish and Swedish have official status, but Swedish is spoken by only about 5,5% of the population. The experience of Belgium, which

has three official languages, shows that such a language policy did not contribute to the elimination of social conflicts.

Barrington (2022) emphasizes the importance of the language issue, noting that language is an important part of who the people of Ukraine consider themselves to be. Zeller (2022) rightly notes that the views of those Ukrainians who advocated bilingualism should change after the terrible actions of the Russian army on the territory of Ukraine, because "bombs fall mainly on Russian-speaking people in Ukraine and Russians by nationality." Studying changes in the mood of the population of Ukraine after 2014, Arel (2018) notes that the events of this period made "Ukraine became more Ukrainian." These views are confirmed by the analysis of survey results discussed in this article.

It is appropriate to cite foreign experience regarding language conflicts in the context of this study. Turgeon et al., (2021) indicate language conflicts in Canada, determining the existence of a gap between the support of the recognition of minority languages as official by citizens and their opposition to particular measures required for the implementation of this principle. So, the recognition of two official languages does not fully contribute to the solution of existing language problems. Mar-Molinero (2020) identifies the language problems in Spain, where languages other than the official Spanish have regional status, and also notes that language is an essential marker in the nation-building process. So, language conflicts can also occur in countries where other languages have been introduced as regional languages.

Singh and Dhussa (2020) note, that multilingualism in India mitigated by bilingualism is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. This situation is rather positive, even if it causes certain difficulties and misunderstandings, because it shows the willingness of citizens to preserve their identity.

Rawat (2022) studies ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The researcher established that the politicization of the language issue turned out to be the most powerful manifestation of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict.

Finally, it is appropriate to cite the example of Israel, where the power of the national idea actually revived the Israeli language (Chupryn & Perchyk, 2020). Hebrew was almost a dead language for a long time. It began to revive only at the end of the 19th century. This was facilitated

by the considerable efforts of a small group of enthusiasts to create teaching aids, school programs, and periodicals in the Israeli language. This process was accompanied by opposition from powerful groups, but the language was revived within half a century. Israel's experience confirms the need to consolidate the national idea, in particular, in the minds of Ukrainians themselves, and also indicates the need to pay more attention to raising the prestige of the language.

Conclusions

The analysis carried out in the study proves that language can be a powerful manipulation tool, which is used by various government agencies and political forces to achieve certain goals. The use of language for these purposes can have serious geopolitical consequences: the spread of enmity, a threat to democratic values, cultural achievements and the integrity of the country.

The Russian ethnocide and genocide policy against Ukrainians has a long history. The current Russian government continues to consider Ukraine as its colony and seeks to implement its imperial plans through various methods and means, not least through the use of language as a manipulation tool. However, Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine raised the civic and national consciousness of the Ukrainian community, which is fighting for the right to live in its free country. According to the survey results, more than 90% of Ukrainians are proud of their citizenship. According to sociologists, this is the highest indicator throughout sociological monitoring. More than 90% of respondents believe in victory in this war. The role of the Ukrainian language strengthens in Ukraine. It tends to completely or partially refuse to communicate in Russian, which contradicts the aggressor's "imperial" intentions.

In order to further strengthen the national idea and the role of the Ukrainian language, it is necessary to improve the information literacy of the population, to develop critical thinking and to support independent mass media.

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