224
www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.63.03.21
How to Cite:
Filimonova-Zlatohurska, Y., Poperechna, G., Nikolenko, K., Poliuha, V., & Shevel, I. (2023). Transformation of the cultural
development of the Ukrainian people in the context of military realities: philosophical reflections on dilemmas. Amazonia
Investiga, 12(63), 224-232. https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.63.03.21
Transformation of the cultural development of the Ukrainian people in
the context of military realities: philosophical reflections on dilemmas
Transformación del desarrollo cultural del pueblo ucraniano en el contexto de las
realidades militares: reflexiones filosóficas sobre los dilemas
Received: March 20, 2023 Accepted: April 25, 2023
Written by:
Yevheniia Filimonova-Zlatohurska1
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7588-8209
https://www.webofscience.com/wos/author/record/2878195
Galyna Poperechna2
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2191-9908
https://www.webofscience.com/wos/author/record/I-7302-2018
Kseniia Nikolenko3
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2091-7823
https://www.webofscience.com/wos/author/record/2391240
Viktoriia Poliuha4
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8778-2380
https://www.webofscience.com/wos/author/record/2250637
Inna Shevel5
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6387-2506
https://www.webofscience.com/wos/author/record/34260281
Abstract
For modern Ukraine, cultural transformations are
extremely relevant, because in the conditions of
confrontation with Russian aggression, it turned out
that the use of films, books, music and other cultural
aspects can become the tools of hybrid warfare. The
purpose of this article is to understand certain
aspects of the transformation of the culture of the
Ukrainian people in the context of wartime realities.
During the processing of this material, general
scientific methods and specialized research
methods were used. The results of the work
highlighted the topical issues: the alleged
institutional crisis of Ukrainian cultural institutions,
the destruction of cultural monuments by Russian
troops, the transformation of cultural values.
Russian aggression only accelerated the
development vector of Ukrainian culture in the 21st
1
Postgraduate Student at the Department of Directing and Choreography of the Faculty of Culture and Arts Ivan Franko National University,
Lviv, Ukraine.
2
PhD in Philosophy, Associate Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Faculty of History, Ternopil
Volodymyr Hnatiuk National Pedagogical University, Ternopil, Ukraine.
3
PhD in Philosophy, Associate Professor Department of Social Humanities and Legal Disciplines, Donetsk State University of Internal
Affairs, Kryvy Rih Educational and Scientific Institute, faculty №1, Kryvyy Rih, Ukraine.
4
Ph.D. in Philosophy, Associate Professor of Vocal and Choral, Choreographic and Fine Arts, Faculty of Primary Education and
Arts, Drohobych State Pedagogical Ivan Franko University, Drohobych, Ukraine.
5
PhD in Sociological Sciences, Associate Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of International Relations Faculty of PR,
Journalism and Cybersecurity, Kyiv National University of Culture and Arts, Kyiv, Ukraine.
Filimonova-Zlatohurska, Y., Poperechna, G., Nikolenko, K., Poliuha, V., Shevel, I. / Volume 12 - Issue 63: 224-232 /
March, 2023
Volume 12 - Issue 63
/ March 2023
225
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
century, which replaced the old Soviet paradigms
that functioned during the 1990s. From a gradual
attachment to Russian-Soviet landmarks, modern
Ukrainian culture has moved on to producing its
own primarily Ukrainian-language cultural product.
Note that this movement will only intensify in the
future, and from 2022 all attempts to impose
Russian paradigms of development in the cultural
sector will be possible only under the conditions of
Ukraine's capitulation, i.e., its defeat in the war.
Keywords: culture, Ukraine, society,
transformation, Russian-Ukrainian war.
Introduction
Culture in the twenty-first century has acquired a
new meaning. The information society and
globalization have made it a kind of marker, as
strong as ethnicity or political preferences. On
this basis, engaging in cultural projects is a
contribution to the development of a
multicultural present. No nation or culture should
be forgotten in such an information world as long
as its culture is known in the world and as long
as there is an opportunity to represent it. Russian
aggression toward Ukraine back in 2014 (the
seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in
the Donbas) demonstrated a crushing
significance. The “many nationalities” declared
by the Russian authorities among the occupied
territories led in practice to the elevation of all
things Russian and an actual tacit ban on all
things Ukrainian. The slogans of
“denazification” promoted by Russia in 2022
were also intended to “abolish” everything
Ukrainian (Aladekomo, 2022). However, the
implementation of this “project” was only
partially successful. The Ukrainian side, on the
contrary, turned to supporting the local
intellectual product and since 2014 has launched
many initiatives to develop the cultural sphere.
Not all of them have been implemented, but after
2022 they will definitely become relevant
mechanisms for the restoration of the cultural
sphere.
The article aims to analyze the transformation of
the culture of the Ukrainian people in the context
of military realities and based on philosophical
comprehension of the dilemma. The task of the
work is to study the possible institutional crisis
of the development of the cultural sector, the
problem of the destruction of cultural
monuments. The relevance of this problem is
extremely high because considering such
problems will allow comprehending the Russian-
Ukrainian war in another dimension – as a
confrontation of two cultural matrices. The
realization of the research objective involves the
following research questions:
1. The problem of the existence of an
institutional crisis in the development of
Ukrainian culture.
2. The damage caused to Ukrainian culture in
general as a result of Russian aggression.
3. Transformations of cultural values in the
environment of modern Ukrainians.
4. Prospects for the development of Ukrainian
culture in the postwar period.
Materials and methods
The work uses both general scientific and special
historical methods of research. In particular,
analysis, synthesis, induction, and deduction are
used in the work. On the basis of the analysis, it
was possible to realize the first stage - to divide
the subject of research into smaller parts
(development of Ukrainian culture,
transformation of the attitude of the Ukrainian
people to cultural values, the problem of
destruction of cultural monuments of Ukraine
during the Russian-Ukrainian war). At the same
time, based on the synthesis it was possible to
rethink the previously highlighted parts and form
specific conclusions, which became the next part
of the work. In the work, the historic-
corporativistic method of research was also used.
Based on this method, the problem of theft of the
Ukrainian cultural values by Russians in the ХХ
and ХХI centuries was traced. The Russians have
been systematically exporting Ukrainian
historical values since the 1900s. They continue
to do this in the modern Russian-Ukrainian war.
Since 1917 the Russians regularly took
Ukrainian valuables out of the museums or other
valuable things. The article also uses the
axiomatic method of research, which involves
226
www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
ascending from the accepted theoretical
statements (axioms) to the formation of their own
specific conclusions. Consequently, the
axiomatic method is a way of creating a scientific
theory in which there are formed starting points
from which one's own judgments are formed by
logical paths. Using the hypothetico-deductive
method it was possible to create orders of
hypotheses, deductively connected with each
other, from which their own statements about
empirical facts are formed. The method of
abstraction has also been applied, involving the
transition from the abstract (general theory) to
the formation of concrete judgments. Because of
the method of concretization, it was possible to
study the problem of the destruction of Ukrainian
cultural monuments. Because of the systematic
method of research, it was possible to consider
the phenomenon of Ukrainian culture as a
complex system consisting of many interrelated
elements. In addition, special cultural studies’
methods were used in the study. In particular, the
morphological methods of culture are used,
based on which the structure and organizational
structure of culture is investigated. In the
organizational structure of the paradox of
culture: public, collective, personal,
informational, and the rest of the culture. The
work divides culture into several levels:
cumulative, every day, translational (described in
Table 1).
Table 1.
Functional levels of culture
Functional levels of culture
Cumulative level
level-Household
Broadcast level
Adapted from “The Culture and Development Manifesto” by Klitgaard (2020)
In addition, the work was built on the principles
of consistency, scientificity, and objectivity.
Literature review
The work was based on the works of
contemporary researchers. In particular,
Klitgaard (2020) characterized the importance of
culture for the development of society. He
believes that culture is a particularly important
variable to promote various forms of
development (p. 123). In addition, he believes
that culture is a key aspect in the politics of
development and management (p. 124). Meade
& Shaw (2021) characterized the contemporary
challenges facing the development of culture and
the arts. At the same time, these experts
characterized the various ways in which societies
manage to collectively make sense of, redefine,
and transform the economic, cultural, personal,
political, social, or territorial conditions of their
lives by applying principles of culture and the
arts. Schubert (2022) explored the role of culture
in various management processes. From the
Ukrainian specialists let us highlight the work of
Sarnavska et al. (2021), where the problem of the
influence of the Third Information Revolution on
culture is considered through a philosophical
prism. Also valuable for this article are works
that examine the development of the Russian-
Ukrainian war and its impact on various social
spheres. Kuzio (2021) explored the phenomenon
of Russian nationalism and its impact on the
development of the Russian-Ukrainian
confrontation. Also, many foreign authors have
studied the Russian-Ukrainian war through a
social, economic, political, and historical prism.
This is explained by the relevance of this topic.
For example, Martz (2022) characterized the
crimes of the Russian army against Ukraine.
Ghilès (2022) investigated the war in Ukraine
and its impact on international politics. Manolea
(2021) characterized the conceptual bases for the
study of modern hybrid warfare. So, the literary
basis of this study is quite thorough, first,
considering the relevance of this topic. The
question of the development of Ukrainian culture
against the background of military realities
remains understudied. The topic of the
destruction of Ukrainian cultural monuments,
which was covered only in passing in the
Ukrainian mass media, remains unexplored.
Results
The Development of Ukrainian Culture: A
Modern Crisis of Institutions?
Culture includes not only the traditions of the
people or historical and literary monuments but
also the people who worked on the creation of a
cultural product (Kuzio, 2021). Custody of such
Volume 12 - Issue 63
/ March 2023
227
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
people fell into the hands of the Ministry of
Culture and Tourism of Ukraine and other
institutions (e.g., the Ukrainian Cultural
Foundation). The latter organization launched an
initiative in early April 2022 to support cultural
workers, artists, and media workers. At the same
time, the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation actively
joined the creation of the “Map of Cultural
Losses”. The purpose of this project is to record
all, or part of the Ukrainian cultural monuments
destroyed by the Russians. It is difficult to
answer in what way the damage will be
compensated because during military operations
the priority in financing is given to the military
sector (Kuzio, 2021; Filipova & Usheva, 2021).
Note that before 2014 and the beginning of
Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas, the
institutional development of Ukrainian cultural
projects was of secondary importance in the
policy of Ukrainian authorities (Kuzio, 2021). In
the field of culture, as a rule, budgetary funds
were saved. The creative industry lacked funds
and relevant institutions. The formation of the
Ukrainian Cultural Foundation began to play the
role of a kind of mediator in contacts between
artists of different levels and state funding.
Thanks to this, it was possible to accumulate
funds for relevant and important (including
entertainment) projects. Thus, the number of
Ukrainian films has increased several times. A
successful pitching campaign by the Ministry of
Culture and Tourism and the Ukrainian Cultural
Foundation allowed some films to reach
reasonable distribution results and even cover all
expenses. As a result, a portion of the money
spent on Ukrainian films was returned to the
budget and could then be used in culture. Some
productions also attracted extra-budgetary funds,
which made the process much cheaper.
Collaboration with the Foundation was also
organized by artists from other industries. We are
talking primarily about broad grant projects that
attracted talented creative young people to
compete fairly and work accordingly. In fact,
since 2018 there has been a fair distribution of
funding and the use of state grants has become an
effective element in the capitalization of culture
along with its development.
At the same time, after 2019 there was a certain
scaling down of the Foundation's activities and
its resources were redirected to other spheres of
state administration. After the beginning of
Russia's open military aggression in February
2022, all grant activities were curtailed and the
work of cultural institutions was suspended
(Ghilès, 2022). Undoubtedly, the invasion and
the barbaric policies of the Russians were a test
for Ukraine's economy and society. Artists have
been active on the pro-Ukrainian side, not so
many have left the state (primarily for charity
concerts, exhibitions, etc.). The lack of
institutional organization indeed makes itself felt
- ministerial workers cannot cope with this
challenge (Sarnavska et al., 2021). We believe
that the post-war resumption of the Ukrainian
Cultural Fund will be an important tool for the
restoration of cultural projects and the work of
the relevant institutions. At the same time, extra-
budgetary (patronage of arts) support for the
restoration of cultural monuments will be an
important element. Unfortunately, the budget of
Ukraine will no longer be able to cover the costs
of this article. Obviously, if the war becomes
protracted, the military defense needs will
require more and more expenses. Thus, the
contemporary Ukrainian art scene has the
institutional capacity to overcome the crisis, but
the lack of funding will remain an important
problem that will require additional discussion
and solution.
Military Realities of the Russian-Ukrainian
War: The Problem of Destruction of
Ukrainian Cultural Monuments
The Russian-Ukrainian war has demonstrated
that Ukraine's cultural-historical monuments are
also experiencing great destruction (Ghilès,
2022). The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture
estimates from February 2022 (the beginning of
the full-scale invasion) that by early June 2022,
Russian troops had committed over 400 war
crimes against Ukrainian cultural heritage. Such
crimes continue to be carried out by the Russians.
Why are the Russians doing this? The main
purpose of their crimes - no Ukrainian cultural
monuments (indeed, no Ukrainian history) - no
Ukrainian memory and national identity. Note
that when a people's memory disappears, the
results can be catastrophic for that people (Meade
& Shaw, 2021). Russian troops have destroyed
several types of Ukrainian heritage since the
beginning of the large-scale invasion. The first
type includes cultural sites that may not legally
have monument status, but they are important
historical buildings. The second directly includes
monuments, which have the status of a
monument. Also affected by the war are various
kinds of cultural institutions, educational
buildings it is said about art schools, buildings of
universities. Note that the most ancient are the
monuments of archaeology, and they are also
very much affected by the war (Aladekomo,
2022). Indeed, during the war, archaeological
monuments are destroyed not only as a result of
shelling and bombing but also because military
228
www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
units are engaged in creating trenches,
arrangement of positions. For this reason, the
archaeological layer can be destroyed, so the
monuments will suffer. Unfortunately, this type
of destruction is still difficult to see because it
occurs purely on the front lines, that is, in hot
spots, so it is almost impossible to conduct
scientific surveys at such sites. Note that the
website of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine
posts up-to-date information about the affected
monuments, which are easily identifiable.
Archaeological monuments are almost not
included here, but Ukrainian scientists together
with the military begin to monitor and survey
those monuments that are located in the de-
occupied territories. Russian missiles destroyed
the building of the museum of Ukrainian
philosopher HryhoriiSkovoroda, which was
located in the Kharkiv region. This building was
created in the 18th century, where the
philosopher lived the last years of his life, and
where he was buried nearby.
Experts note that as of the beginning of June,
there were 407 cultural sites affected by the
Russian troops (Aladekomo, 2022). First, we are
talking about those objects that it was possible to
document. Many such objects are not included
because of the development of the Russian-
Ukrainian war. The real figure is much larger,
however, by how much is now unknown. In
addition, Russia is exporting Ukrainian
valuables, which is essentially a theft of
Ukrainian cultural heritage. For example, many
items of state museum funds from the museums
of Melitopol and Mariupol were exported to the
DNR (Donetsk People's Republic). At the same
time, the occupation authorities in the DNR
introduce their own approaches and procedures
in the management of cultural values. Note that
this practice (hijacking Ukrainian values) is not
new to Russians (Klitgaard, 2020). It existed
throughout the twentieth century. Since 1917.
Russia systematically removed Ukrainian
valuables from museums and precious metals
from churches. At the present time, they can be
found in Russian museums in the Hermitage. It
should be noted that the Ukrainian Cultural
Foundation organized a project called “Map of
Cultural losses”, where you can see where
exactly Ukrainian historical monuments are
taken out.
Despite this, since February 24, Ukraine has still
managed to secure a large number of valuables.
The Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated how
Ukrainians' attitudes toward their own historical
cultural monuments have changed. Yes, since the
beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion,
ordinary citizens of Ukraine have joined every
resource to save cultural values. So, when people
participate in the processes of saving culture, it
means that for society cultural objects as carriers
of history are important (Sarnavska et al., 2021).
The Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated that
for the Ukrainian people the social value began
to manifest itself in a very different way, first, it
is observed in the attitude of people to cultural
values (Stryjek&Konieczna-Sałamatin, 2021).
Transformation of cultural values of modern
Ukrainians
New times have set new benchmarks in the
cultural development of Ukrainians. The old
Soviet heritage, associated with the dominance of
the Russian language, since the beginning of the
XXI century. began to lose old positions - the
absolute dominance of the Russian-language
product in the information and cultural spaces no
longer existed. At the same time, the military
actions that began in Ukraine after 2014 opened
other role models. In particular, the volunteer
movement became widespread - individual
citizens or organizations, if they could not
engage in free assistance to the army on their
own, financially supported those who could
provide such assistance. Even today, experts
agree that without volunteer support, the
Ukrainian armed forces could not withstand the
onslaught of pro-Russian collaborators and
Russian regular forces who unofficially
participated in the conflict in 2014. Trust in
volunteers and a general belief in the possibility
of unselfish assistance has changed those around
us. Old developmental paradigms associated
with distrust of strangers took a hard hit
(Danziger, 2012). Also, thanks to the volunteer
movement many Ukrainians felt not as residents
of individual cities or villages, or regions, but as
citizens of one country. This powerful unification
process, long hindered by pro-Russian politicians
who speculated on linguistic, historical, and
other issues, became an important element of
cultural development (Schubert, 2022).
The outbreak of hostilities in 2014 led to an
explosion of Ukrainian-language content. It was
not only traditional media but also the Internet
(Kuzio, 2021). A large part of the old “pro-
Russian audience” was taken over by bloggers of
the new Ukrainian format, who due to their own
creativity were able to compete with promoted
Russian columnists. However, in 2014, the main
content remained Russian language.
It should be noted that an important role was
played by the appeal of Ukrainians to their
Volume 12 - Issue 63
/ March 2023
229
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
history and the emergence of new information
channels that focused on old Russian historical
and cultural myths, debunked them, and
presented the Ukrainian vision of events
(Parshyn & Mereniuk, 2022). Such educational
work was culturally useful because it pointed to
the multidirectional development of Ukrainian
culture, not just its Moscow-centricity
(Mereniuk, 2021; Martyniuk et al., 2022).
At the same time, the military theme did not
become dominant in the cultural field. Although
support for the Ukrainian army was
unconditional, since 2014. Ukraine continued to
live its cultural life (Mereniuk, 2021). The same
situation is repeated in 2022. There are few
books, musical compositions, or other works of
art devoted to militaristic culture. It should be
noted, however, that the reference to military
themes in 2022 is much more pronounced, which
can be explained by the scale of the Russian-
Ukrainian war.
Prospects for the development of Ukrainian
culture in the postwar period
Let us define the peculiarity of the development
of Ukrainian culture since 1991. Forecasts of
Russian and many other foreign experts about the
explosion of “nationalism” in Ukraine
immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union did
not come true (Danziger, 2012). Tolerant
attitudes toward the Russian language, literature,
and, consequently, Russian and Russian-
speaking culture in general, did not change
throughout the 1990s. Since Soviet times,
Russian, as the official language of
“international” communication within the former
communist state, has prevailed over all others.
The free and democratic development of cultural
processes during the first decade of Ukrainian
independence did not break this trend: television,
music, cinema, literature, and other spheres of
intellectual life and entertainment were
controlled either directly by Russians or Russian-
speaking artists or performers. Note that this state
of affairs did not reflect the ethnic composition
of the population (Morska & Davydova, 2021).
According to the only census conducted in 2001.
Almost 48.5 million people lived in the country,
of which 77.8% were Ukrainians, 17.3% -
Russians, 4.9% - other nationalities. It should be
noted that the number of Ukrainians in
comparison to the last Soviet census of 1989
increased by 5%, while the number of Russians
decreased by 4.8%. At the same time, 67.5% of
citizens called Ukrainian their native language,
and 29.6% called Russian their native language.
A characteristic feature was the fact that in the
East of Ukraine and Crimea there were relatively
fewer ethnic Ukrainians who spoke mostly
Russian.
A noticeable tendency was when the number of
Russian-speaking cultural product was
noticeably greater than its demand in Ukrainian
society. The beginning of the 21st century was
marked by a gradual change of trends, the
introduction of administrative decisions on
obligatory dubbing of films in Ukrainian (and not
in Russian), a celebration of national Ukrainian
heroes, rehabilitation of victims of totalitarian
regimes, etc. However, there were no cardinal
changes in the cultural sense - the privileged
attitude towards everything Russian continued to
exist. A certain revision of this paradigm took
place in 2014 when after the revolution of dignity
Russian troops occupied Crimea and began to
support the collaborators in Donbas. Scaring the
local population with the specter of “Ukrainian
nationalism” and even “Nazism,” the Kremlin
authoritarian regime used propaganda to impose
its view of events not only on Ukrainians but also
on democratic observers in the West.
After 2014, it became clear that culture could be
used as a weapon in a hybrid confrontation. The
formation of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation
and increased attention to the Ukrainianization of
culture led to positive developments. The
emergence of a large number of Ukrainian films,
literary works, music, etc. entailed that Ukrainian
culture was becoming Ukrainian language. The
markers regarding the independent development
of Ukraine since at least the times of Kievan Rus'
(Middle Ages) were clearly defined (Parshyn &
Mereniuk, 2022). Obviously, the mentioned
events of 2014 accelerated an already obvious
tendency - the gradual “Ukrainianization” of
Ukrainian culture. Despite considerable Russian
influence, the modern generation of artists
belonged to the modern cultural circle, so they
were not going to recognize the old authorities,
especially since Russian media and cultural
policy was aimed at reviving and honoring the
old Soviet (imperial), rather than at forming
something new. Not surprisingly, after February
2022, many Russian cultural and educational
figures publicly supported it. Ukrainian cultural
figures came out on the pro-Ukrainian side. Only
a small fraction on both sides used the slogan
“culture outside politics” (above all, quite a few
Russians appealed to it). For this reason, we
believe that the beginning of open armed
aggression of Russia against Ukraine will be of
fateful importance for the further development of
Ukrainian culture. The gradual turning to own
history and own roots, specific Ukrainian cultural
230
www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
circle, and modern markers of the development
of democratic societies will give new guidelines
for the development of Ukrainian-language
culture (Dahalan & Ahmad, 2018). It has become
evident that belonging to the old paradigms of
post-Soviet and pro-Russian development is
outmoded. We also predict similar development
trends for the entire post-Soviet region, which the
Russian leadership for a long time considered its
own. This opinion is confirmed by the
transformation of the Ukrainian people's attitude
towards the Ukrainian language. Based on the
analysis of sociological research it was found out
that the level of support for the Ukrainian
language as a single state language after the
large-scale Russian invasion reached the
maximum level for all time of Independence of
Ukraine - 83% of Ukrainians believe that the
only state language should be Ukrainian (Figure.
1).
Figure 1. The level of support by Ukrainians for the Ukrainian language as a single state language
Adaptive from Rating. “The sixth national poll: the language issue in Ukraine” (March 19th, 2022). (Group
rating, 2022)
At the same time, over the past decade, there has
been a steady increase in the number of those
who consider Ukrainian their native language.
For example, in 2012 - 57%, respectively in 2022
-76%. We believe that vivid changes in language
self-identification took place between 2013-
2016. One of the main reasons were such events
as the reaction of society to the language
experiments of the authorities in 2013, the events
of the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014), and
Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Later,
positive dynamics in the process of self-
identification took place based on the
transformation of attitudes towards the Ukrainian
language in the center, east, and south of
Ukraine. These transformations are reflected in
Table 2.
Table 2.
Self-identification of Ukrainians based on the analysis of attitudes towards the Ukrainian language from
2013 – 2022
identification of Ukrainians based on changes in attitudes toward the Ukrainian language-The process of self
2013
Russian authorities-language experiments of the then proSociety's reaction to the
2014 -2013
The Revolution of Dignity, which popularized the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian folklore (as
well as modern), dragged the Ukrainian cultural product on a peculiar trend
2014
Russia's aggression against Ukraine and occupation of Crimea and certain regions of Donetsk
and Luhansk regions. Introduction of quotas on the use of the Russian language in broadcast
in western Ukraine, television, radio stations, the press, etc. In some places, particularly
speaking population. -condemnation of the Russian
2022
scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Transformation of attitudes toward the -full -February 24 ea of a Ukrainian language in the center, east, and south of Ukraine. Mass support for the id
Ukrainian. -single state language
Compiled based on the author's analysis
We believe that a return to the old state of cultural
development is possible only in the event of a
military defeat for Ukraine or a diplomatic defeat
for the Ukrainian government, which may lead to
a change in the status of Russian culture in
Ukraine. However, even this possibility would be
only a temporary prerequisite on the way to a
new military conflict.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
West Center South East
Volume 12 - Issue 63
/ March 2023
231
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
Discussion
For further discussion we offer the thesis: the
Russian language is a hybrid weapon of the
Russian Federation. The vast majority of
Ukrainians who used the Russian language in
their everyday lives did not want a war to break
out and did not want the Kremlin regime to resort
to protecting their “interests”. However, their
conservatism and unwillingness to step out of
their own “comfort zone” still gave a formal
reason for such a “burnout” by the Russians. In
fact, there are no Russian-speaking Ukrainians,
but Russians are Russified. Russian is not a
native language for Ukrainians, and all attempts
to create a “Ukrainian Russian language” (like
there is Australian English, American English,
etc.) have failed. After 2022 the imitation of
Russian samples and the use of the achievements
of Russian culture of the Soviet variety will have
no moral justification. Already now, many
Ukrainian scholars consciously refuse to
cooperate with the Russians and, if possible, try
not to cite them in their publications. A similar
“oblivion” will surely await other spheres. It is
difficult to determine the consequences of these
processes, but they will become an indispensable
part of the next policy.
We believe that the conducted research has
demonstrated the main direction of the
development of Ukrainian culture for the coming
years. Undoubtedly, the specified problems
remain debatable, because it is impossible to take
into account the influence of many factors on the
course of the war and its consequences.
Conclusions
Thus, Ukrainian culture during the independent
development of Ukraine has undergone profound
transformations:
1. From the privileged importance of the
Russian language and culture, Ukrainians in
the beginning of the XXI century began to
move to the creation of their own Ukrainian-
language cultural product.
2. The attitude of Ukrainians to their own
national values has changed, and the
Ukrainian language has begun to assume a
leading role. There have been changes in the
Internet environment, Ukrainian music,
cinema, literature, etc. According to
Ukrainian officials, Russian culture in
Ukraine has become an element of hybrid
warfare, so the introduction of quotas on the
use of the Russian language has accelerated
the transition of quite a few artists to the
Ukrainian-language medium. Gradually, the
situation when the ethnic majority of
Ukrainians in Ukraine were adherents of
Russian or Russian-speaking culture began
to change more actively. Note that in 2022
and beyond, this movement will only
intensify and embrace the majority of artists
and cultural figures who will finally turn
their backs on Russian culture (as a tool used
by the official Kremlin).
3. The attitude of Ukrainians to their own
history and culture has changed: The
Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated how
the attitude of Ukrainians to their own
historical and cultural monuments has
changed. Thus, since the beginning of the
full-scale invasion of Russia, ordinary
citizens of Ukraine have been using all their
resources to save cultural values.
4. There are tangible changes in the scientific
environment. Even now, many Ukrainian
scientists deliberately refuse to cooperate
with the Russians and, if possible, try not to
cite them in their publications. We believe
that this process will have positive
consequences, especially for the
development of Ukrainian humanitarian
science, since the old concepts of
understanding Ukrainian culture developed
in a pro-Russian direction. Liberation from
the “old authorities” will make it possible to
rethink the scientific and cultural tradition of
Ukraine.
We also predict similar development trends for
the entire post-Soviet region, which the Russian
leadership considered “its”for a long time.
Bibliographic references
Aladekomo, A. (2022). Russian Aggression
against Ukraine, Sovereignty and
International Law. SSRN Electronic Journal,
1-38. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4064020
Dahalan, S. C., & Ahmad, A. R. (2018). Aims of
History Education in Developed Countries: A
Systematic Literature Review. International
Journal of Academic Research in Business
and Social
Sciences, 8(12). https://doi.org/10.6007/ijarb
ss/v8-i12/5625
Danziger, K. (2012). Does memory have a
history? In Marking the Mind (pp. 1–23).
Cambridge University
Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo978051181
0626.001
Filipova, M., & Usheva, M. (2021). Social and
labor relations of the digital age: to the
question of future education
232
www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
development. Futurity Education, 1(2),
14-22.
https://doi.org/10.57125/FED/2022.10.11.15
Ghilès, F. (2022). War in Ukraine and the gas
crisis force a rethink of EU foreign
policy. Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 268, 1-
5. https://doi.org/10.24241/notesint.2022/26
8/en
Group rating (2022). The sixth national poll: The
language issue in Ukraine (March 19th,
2022). Retrieved March 30, 2023, from
https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/la
nguage_issue_in_ukraine_march_19th_2022
.html
Klitgaard, R. (2020). The Culture and
Development Manifesto. Oxford University
Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/97801975
17734.001.0001
Kuzio, T. (2021). Russian nationalism and
Ukraine. In Russian Nationalism and the
Russian-Ukrainian War (pp. 99–128).
Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003191438-4
Manolea, A. (2021). The transpersonal war –
Constituent of the hybrid war. Land Forces
Academy Review, 26(4), 372-
376. https://doi.org/10.2478/raft-2021-0048
Martyniuk, M., Kyrylenko, K., Krymets, L.,
Makhometa, T., & Madi, H. (2022). The
relationship of the philosophy of education
and the history of philosophy: A forecast of
educational trends 2022-2024. Wisdom, 4(3),
83-91.
https://doi.org/10.24234/wisdom.v4i3.835
Martz, C. (2022). Russian warcrimes against
Ukraine: The breach of international
humanitarian law by the Russian
Federation. SSRN Electronic Journal,
276. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4106901
Meade, R. R., & Shaw, M. (2021). Arts, culture
and community development: In Arts,
Culture and Community Development
(pp. 1–20). Policy Press.
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1rnpj8m.7
Mereniuk, K. (2021). “Tournaments” and
“games” in Rus’: tradition or single
mentions? Problems of the history of wars
and martial arts, 3, 57-69.
https://acortar.link/bmkK4j
Morska, N., & O. Davydova, N. (2021).
Philosophy and the future of human rights:
peculiarities of the relationship between
recent science and technology. Futurity
Economics & Law, 1(3), 16–25.
https://doi.org/10.57125/FEL.2021.09.25.02
Parshyn, I., & Mereniuk, K., (2022) The Muslims
in Medieval Lviv: linguistic, historical
contexts. Journal of Narrative and Language
Studies, 10(19), 138–149. Retrieved from:
https://nalans.com/index.php/nalans/article/v
iew/498
Sarnavska, O., Yakovyshyna, T., Kachmar, O.,
Sherman, M., Shadiuk, T., & Koberska, T.
(2021). The Influence of the Culture of the
Third Information Revolution on the
Formation of Personality in the M. Serres
Philosophical Discourse. Postmodern
Openings, 12(1), 241-253.
https://doi.org/10.18662/po/12.1/257
Schubert, V. (2022). Leadership and
organisational culture indevelopment:
Challenging exceptionalism. London:
Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367822996
Stryjek, T., & Konieczna-Sałamatin, J. (2021).
The politics of memory in Poland and
Ukraine: From reconciliation to de-
conciliation. Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003017349