

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.63.03.21>

How to Cite:

Filimonova-Zlatohorska, Y., Poperechna, G., Nikolenko, K., Poliuha, V., & Shevel, I. (2023). Transformation of the cultural development of the Ukrainian people in the context of military realities: philosophical reflections on dilemmas. *Amazonia Investiga*, 12(63), 224-232. <https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.63.03.21>

Transformation of the cultural development of the Ukrainian people in the context of military realities: philosophical reflections on dilemmas

Transformación del desarrollo cultural del pueblo ucraniano en el contexto de las realidades militares: reflexiones filosóficas sobre los dilemas

Received: March 20, 2023

Accepted: April 25, 2023

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Abstract

For modern Ukraine, cultural transformations are extremely relevant, because in the conditions of confrontation with Russian aggression, it turned out that the use of films, books, music and other cultural aspects can become the tools of hybrid warfare. The purpose of this article is to understand certain aspects of the transformation of the culture of the Ukrainian people in the context of wartime realities. During the processing of this material, general scientific methods and specialized research methods were used. The results of the work highlighted the topical issues: the alleged institutional crisis of Ukrainian cultural institutions, the destruction of cultural monuments by Russian troops, the transformation of cultural values. Russian aggression only accelerated the development vector of Ukrainian culture in the 21st

Resumen

Para la Ucrania moderna, las transformaciones culturales son extremadamente relevantes, porque en las condiciones del enfrentamiento con la agresión rusa, resultó que el uso de películas, libros, música y otros aspectos culturales pueden convertirse en herramientas de la guerra híbrida. El propósito de este artículo es comprender ciertos aspectos de la transformación de la cultura del pueblo ucraniano en el contexto de las realidades bélicas. Durante el tratamiento de este material se utilizaron métodos científicos generales y métodos de investigación especializados. Los resultados del trabajo pusieron de relieve los temas de actualidad: la supuesta crisis institucional de las instituciones culturales ucranianas, la destrucción de monumentos culturales por las tropas rusas, la transformación de los valores culturales. La agresión rusa no hizo sino acelerar el

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century, which replaced the old Soviet paradigms that functioned during the 1990s. From a gradual attachment to Russian-Soviet landmarks, modern Ukrainian culture has moved on to producing its own primarily Ukrainian-language cultural product. Note that this movement will only intensify in the future, and from 2022 all attempts to impose Russian paradigms of development in the cultural sector will be possible only under the conditions of Ukraine's capitulation, i.e., its defeat in the war.

Keywords: culture, Ukraine, society, transformation, Russian-Ukrainian war.

Introduction

Culture in the twenty-first century has acquired a new meaning. The information society and globalization have made it a kind of marker, as strong as ethnicity or political preferences. On this basis, engaging in cultural projects is a contribution to the development of a multicultural present. No nation or culture should be forgotten in such an information world as long as its culture is known in the world and as long as there is an opportunity to represent it. Russian aggression toward Ukraine back in 2014 (the seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in the Donbas) demonstrated a crushing significance. The “many nationalities” declared by the Russian authorities among the occupied territories led in practice to the elevation of all things Russian and an actual tacit ban on all things Ukrainian. The slogans of “denazification” promoted by Russia in 2022 were also intended to “abolish” everything Ukrainian (Aladekomo, 2022). However, the implementation of this “project” was only partially successful. The Ukrainian side, on the contrary, turned to supporting the local intellectual product and since 2014 has launched many initiatives to develop the cultural sphere. Not all of them have been implemented, but after 2022 they will definitely become relevant mechanisms for the restoration of the cultural sphere.

The article aims to analyze the transformation of the culture of the Ukrainian people in the context of military realities and based on philosophical comprehension of the dilemma. The task of the work is to study the possible institutional crisis of the development of the cultural sector, the problem of the destruction of cultural monuments. The relevance of this problem is extremely high because considering such problems will allow comprehending the Russian-Ukrainian war in another dimension – as a

vector de desarrollo de la cultura ucraniana en el siglo XXI, que sustituyó a los viejos paradigmas soviéticos que funcionaron durante la década de 1990. De un apego gradual a los hitos ruso-soviéticos, la cultura ucraniana moderna ha pasado a producir su propio producto cultural principalmente en ucraniano. Obsérvese que este movimiento no hará sino intensificarse en el futuro, y a partir de 2022 todos los intentos de imponer paradigmas rusos de desarrollo en el sector cultural sólo serán posibles en condiciones de capitulación de Ucrania, es decir, de su derrota en la guerra.

Palabras clave: cultura, Ucrania, sociedad, transformación, guerra ruso-ucraniana.

confrontation of two cultural matrices. The realization of the research objective involves the following research questions:

1. The problem of the existence of an institutional crisis in the development of Ukrainian culture.
2. The damage caused to Ukrainian culture in general as a result of Russian aggression.
3. Transformations of cultural values in the environment of modern Ukrainians.
4. Prospects for the development of Ukrainian culture in the postwar period.

Materials and methods

The work uses both general scientific and special historical methods of research. In particular, analysis, synthesis, induction, and deduction are used in the work. On the basis of the analysis, it was possible to realize the first stage - to divide the subject of research into smaller parts (development of Ukrainian culture, transformation of the attitude of the Ukrainian people to cultural values, the problem of destruction of cultural monuments of Ukraine during the Russian-Ukrainian war). At the same time, based on the synthesis it was possible to rethink the previously highlighted parts and form specific conclusions, which became the next part of the work. In the work, the historic-corporativistic method of research was also used. Based on this method, the problem of theft of the Ukrainian cultural values by Russians in the XX and XXI centuries was traced. The Russians have been systematically exporting Ukrainian historical values since the 1900s. They continue to do this in the modern Russian-Ukrainian war. Since 1917 the Russians regularly took Ukrainian valuables out of the museums or other valuable things. The article also uses the axiomatic method of research, which involves

ascending from the accepted theoretical statements (axioms) to the formation of their own specific conclusions. Consequently, the axiomatic method is a way of creating a scientific theory in which there are formed starting points from which one's own judgments are formed by logical paths. Using the hypothetico-deductive method it was possible to create orders of hypotheses, deductively connected with each other, from which their own statements about empirical facts are formed. The method of abstraction has also been applied, involving the transition from the abstract (general theory) to the formation of concrete judgments. Because of the method of concretization, it was possible to study the problem of the destruction of Ukrainian

cultural monuments. Because of the systematic method of research, it was possible to consider the phenomenon of Ukrainian culture as a complex system consisting of many interrelated elements. In addition, special cultural studies' methods were used in the study. In particular, the morphological methods of culture are used, based on which the structure and organizational structure of culture is investigated. In the organizational structure of the paradox of culture: public, collective, personal, informational, and the rest of the culture. The work divides culture into several levels: cumulative, every day, translational (described in Table 1).

Table 1.
Functional levels of culture

Functional levels of culture	
Cumulative level	The process of accumulation of all values and experience of the Ukrainian people
Household-level	The application by the society of the results of cultural thought
Broadcast level	There is a mutual penetration of the two previous levels.

Adapted from "The Culture and Development Manifesto" by Klitgaard (2020)

In addition, the work was built on the principles of consistency, scientificity, and objectivity.

Literature review

The work was based on the works of contemporary researchers. In particular, Klitgaard (2020) characterized the importance of culture for the development of society. He believes that culture is a particularly important variable to promote various forms of development (p. 123). In addition, he believes that culture is a key aspect in the politics of development and management (p. 124). Meade & Shaw (2021) characterized the contemporary challenges facing the development of culture and the arts. At the same time, these experts characterized the various ways in which societies manage to collectively make sense of, redefine, and transform the economic, cultural, personal, political, social, or territorial conditions of their lives by applying principles of culture and the arts. Schubert (2022) explored the role of culture in various management processes. From the Ukrainian specialists let us highlight the work of Sarnavska et al. (2021), where the problem of the influence of the Third Information Revolution on culture is considered through a philosophical prism. Also valuable for this article are works that examine the development of the Russian-Ukrainian war and its impact on various social

spheres. Kuzio (2021) explored the phenomenon of Russian nationalism and its impact on the development of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. Also, many foreign authors have studied the Russian-Ukrainian war through a social, economic, political, and historical prism. This is explained by the relevance of this topic. For example, Martz (2022) characterized the crimes of the Russian army against Ukraine. Ghilès (2022) investigated the war in Ukraine and its impact on international politics. Manolea (2021) characterized the conceptual bases for the study of modern hybrid warfare. So, the literary basis of this study is quite thorough, first, considering the relevance of this topic. The question of the development of Ukrainian culture against the background of military realities remains understudied. The topic of the destruction of Ukrainian cultural monuments, which was covered only in passing in the Ukrainian mass media, remains unexplored.

Results

The Development of Ukrainian Culture: A Modern Crisis of Institutions?

Culture includes not only the traditions of the people or historical and literary monuments but also the people who worked on the creation of a cultural product (Kuzio, 2021). Custody of such

people fell into the hands of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ukraine and other institutions (e.g., the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation). The latter organization launched an initiative in early April 2022 to support cultural workers, artists, and media workers. At the same time, the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation actively joined the creation of the “Map of Cultural Losses”. The purpose of this project is to record all, or part of the Ukrainian cultural monuments destroyed by the Russians. It is difficult to answer in what way the damage will be compensated because during military operations the priority in financing is given to the military sector (Kuzio, 2021; Filipova & Usheva, 2021). Note that before 2014 and the beginning of Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas, the institutional development of Ukrainian cultural projects was of secondary importance in the policy of Ukrainian authorities (Kuzio, 2021). In the field of culture, as a rule, budgetary funds were saved. The creative industry lacked funds and relevant institutions. The formation of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation began to play the role of a kind of mediator in contacts between artists of different levels and state funding. Thanks to this, it was possible to accumulate funds for relevant and important (including entertainment) projects. Thus, the number of Ukrainian films has increased several times. A successful pitching campaign by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation allowed some films to reach reasonable distribution results and even cover all expenses. As a result, a portion of the money spent on Ukrainian films was returned to the budget and could then be used in culture. Some productions also attracted extra-budgetary funds, which made the process much cheaper.

Collaboration with the Foundation was also organized by artists from other industries. We are talking primarily about broad grant projects that attracted talented creative young people to compete fairly and work accordingly. In fact, since 2018 there has been a fair distribution of funding and the use of state grants has become an effective element in the capitalization of culture along with its development.

At the same time, after 2019 there was a certain scaling down of the Foundation's activities and its resources were redirected to other spheres of state administration. After the beginning of Russia's open military aggression in February 2022, all grant activities were curtailed and the work of cultural institutions was suspended (Ghilès, 2022). Undoubtedly, the invasion and the barbaric policies of the Russians were a test

for Ukraine's economy and society. Artists have been active on the pro-Ukrainian side, not so many have left the state (primarily for charity concerts, exhibitions, etc.). The lack of institutional organization indeed makes itself felt - ministerial workers cannot cope with this challenge (Sarnavska et al., 2021). We believe that the post-war resumption of the Ukrainian Cultural Fund will be an important tool for the restoration of cultural projects and the work of the relevant institutions. At the same time, extra-budgetary (patronage of arts) support for the restoration of cultural monuments will be an important element. Unfortunately, the budget of Ukraine will no longer be able to cover the costs of this article. Obviously, if the war becomes protracted, the military defense needs will require more and more expenses. Thus, the contemporary Ukrainian art scene has the institutional capacity to overcome the crisis, but the lack of funding will remain an important problem that will require additional discussion and solution.

Military Realities of the Russian-Ukrainian War: The Problem of Destruction of Ukrainian Cultural Monuments

The Russian-Ukrainian war has demonstrated that Ukraine's cultural-historical monuments are also experiencing great destruction (Ghilès, 2022). The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture estimates from February 2022 (the beginning of the full-scale invasion) that by early June 2022, Russian troops had committed over 400 war crimes against Ukrainian cultural heritage. Such crimes continue to be carried out by the Russians. Why are the Russians doing this? The main purpose of their crimes - no Ukrainian cultural monuments (indeed, no Ukrainian history) - no Ukrainian memory and national identity. Note that when a people's memory disappears, the results can be catastrophic for that people (Meade & Shaw, 2021). Russian troops have destroyed several types of Ukrainian heritage since the beginning of the large-scale invasion. The first type includes cultural sites that may not legally have monument status, but they are important historical buildings. The second directly includes monuments, which have the status of a monument. Also affected by the war are various kinds of cultural institutions, educational buildings it is said about art schools, buildings of universities. Note that the most ancient are the monuments of archaeology, and they are also very much affected by the war (Aladekomo, 2022). Indeed, during the war, archaeological monuments are destroyed not only as a result of shelling and bombing but also because military

units are engaged in creating trenches, arrangement of positions. For this reason, the archaeological layer can be destroyed, so the monuments will suffer. Unfortunately, this type of destruction is still difficult to see because it occurs purely on the front lines, that is, in hot spots, so it is almost impossible to conduct scientific surveys at such sites. Note that the website of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine posts up-to-date information about the affected monuments, which are easily identifiable. Archaeological monuments are almost not included here, but Ukrainian scientists together with the military begin to monitor and survey those monuments that are located in the de-occupied territories. Russian missiles destroyed the building of the museum of Ukrainian philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda, which was located in the Kharkiv region. This building was created in the 18th century, where the philosopher lived the last years of his life, and where he was buried nearby.

Experts note that as of the beginning of June, there were 407 cultural sites affected by the Russian troops (Aladekomo, 2022). First, we are talking about those objects that it was possible to document. Many such objects are not included because of the development of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The real figure is much larger, however, by how much is now unknown. In addition, Russia is exporting Ukrainian valuables, which is essentially a theft of Ukrainian cultural heritage. For example, many items of state museum funds from the museums of Melitopol and Mariupol were exported to the DNR (Donetsk People's Republic). At the same time, the occupation authorities in the DNR introduce their own approaches and procedures in the management of cultural values. Note that this practice (hijacking Ukrainian values) is not new to Russians (Klitgaard, 2020). It existed throughout the twentieth century. Since 1917, Russia systematically removed Ukrainian valuables from museums and precious metals from churches. At the present time, they can be found in Russian museums in the Hermitage. It should be noted that the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation organized a project called "Map of Cultural losses", where you can see where exactly Ukrainian historical monuments are taken out.

Despite this, since February 24, Ukraine has still managed to secure a large number of valuables. The Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated how Ukrainians' attitudes toward their own historical cultural monuments have changed. Yes, since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion,

ordinary citizens of Ukraine have joined every resource to save cultural values. So, when people participate in the processes of saving culture, it means that for society cultural objects as carriers of history are important (Sarnavska et al., 2021). The Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated that for the Ukrainian people the social value began to manifest itself in a very different way, first, it is observed in the attitude of people to cultural values (Stryjek&Konieczna-Salamatin, 2021).

Transformation of cultural values of modern Ukrainians

New times have set new benchmarks in the cultural development of Ukrainians. The old Soviet heritage, associated with the dominance of the Russian language, since the beginning of the XXI century, began to lose old positions - the absolute dominance of the Russian-language product in the information and cultural spaces no longer existed. At the same time, the military actions that began in Ukraine after 2014 opened other role models. In particular, the volunteer movement became widespread - individual citizens or organizations, if they could not engage in free assistance to the army on their own, financially supported those who could provide such assistance. Even today, experts agree that without volunteer support, the Ukrainian armed forces could not withstand the onslaught of pro-Russian collaborators and Russian regular forces who unofficially participated in the conflict in 2014. Trust in volunteers and a general belief in the possibility of unselfish assistance has changed those around us. Old developmental paradigms associated with distrust of strangers took a hard hit (Danziger, 2012). Also, thanks to the volunteer movement many Ukrainians felt not as residents of individual cities or villages, or regions, but as citizens of one country. This powerful unification process, long hindered by pro-Russian politicians who speculated on linguistic, historical, and other issues, became an important element of cultural development (Schubert, 2022).

The outbreak of hostilities in 2014 led to an explosion of Ukrainian-language content. It was not only traditional media but also the Internet (Kuzio, 2021). A large part of the old "pro-Russian audience" was taken over by bloggers of the new Ukrainian format, who due to their own creativity were able to compete with promoted Russian columnists. However, in 2014, the main content remained Russian language.

It should be noted that an important role was played by the appeal of Ukrainians to their

history and the emergence of new information channels that focused on old Russian historical and cultural myths, debunked them, and presented the Ukrainian vision of events (Parshyn & Mereniuk, 2022). Such educational work was culturally useful because it pointed to the multidirectional development of Ukrainian culture, not just its Moscow-centricity (Mereniuk, 2021; Martyniuk et al., 2022).

At the same time, the military theme did not become dominant in the cultural field. Although support for the Ukrainian army was unconditional, since 2014, Ukraine continued to live its cultural life (Mereniuk, 2021). The same situation is repeated in 2022. There are few books, musical compositions, or other works of art devoted to militaristic culture. It should be noted, however, that the reference to military themes in 2022 is much more pronounced, which can be explained by the scale of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Prospects for the development of Ukrainian culture in the postwar period

Let us define the peculiarity of the development of Ukrainian culture since 1991. Forecasts of Russian and many other foreign experts about the explosion of “nationalism” in Ukraine immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union did not come true (Danziger, 2012). Tolerant attitudes toward the Russian language, literature, and, consequently, Russian and Russian-speaking culture in general, did not change throughout the 1990s. Since Soviet times, Russian, as the official language of “international” communication within the former communist state, has prevailed over all others. The free and democratic development of cultural processes during the first decade of Ukrainian independence did not break this trend: television, music, cinema, literature, and other spheres of intellectual life and entertainment were controlled either directly by Russians or Russian-speaking artists or performers. Note that this state of affairs did not reflect the ethnic composition of the population (Morska & Davydova, 2021). According to the only census conducted in 2001. Almost 48.5 million people lived in the country, of which 77.8% were Ukrainians, 17.3% - Russians, 4.9% - other nationalities. It should be noted that the number of Ukrainians in comparison to the last Soviet census of 1989 increased by 5%, while the number of Russians decreased by 4.8%. At the same time, 67.5% of citizens called Ukrainian their native language, and 29.6% called Russian their native language. A characteristic feature was the fact that in the

East of Ukraine and Crimea there were relatively fewer ethnic Ukrainians who spoke mostly Russian.

A noticeable tendency was when the number of Russian-speaking cultural product was noticeably greater than its demand in Ukrainian society. The beginning of the 21st century was marked by a gradual change of trends, the introduction of administrative decisions on obligatory dubbing of films in Ukrainian (and not in Russian), a celebration of national Ukrainian heroes, rehabilitation of victims of totalitarian regimes, etc. However, there were no cardinal changes in the cultural sense - the privileged attitude towards everything Russian continued to exist. A certain revision of this paradigm took place in 2014 when after the revolution of dignity Russian troops occupied Crimea and began to support the collaborators in Donbas. Scaring the local population with the specter of “Ukrainian nationalism” and even “Nazism,” the Kremlin authoritarian regime used propaganda to impose its view of events not only on Ukrainians but also on democratic observers in the West.

After 2014, it became clear that culture could be used as a weapon in a hybrid confrontation. The formation of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation and increased attention to the Ukrainianization of culture led to positive developments. The emergence of a large number of Ukrainian films, literary works, music, etc. entailed that Ukrainian culture was becoming Ukrainian language. The markers regarding the independent development of Ukraine since at least the times of Kievan Rus' (Middle Ages) were clearly defined (Parshyn & Mereniuk, 2022). Obviously, the mentioned events of 2014 accelerated an already obvious tendency - the gradual “Ukrainianization” of Ukrainian culture. Despite considerable Russian influence, the modern generation of artists belonged to the modern cultural circle, so they were not going to recognize the old authorities, especially since Russian media and cultural policy was aimed at reviving and honoring the old Soviet (imperial), rather than at forming something new. Not surprisingly, after February 2022, many Russian cultural and educational figures publicly supported it. Ukrainian cultural figures came out on the pro-Ukrainian side. Only a small fraction on both sides used the slogan “culture outside politics” (above all, quite a few Russians appealed to it). For this reason, we believe that the beginning of open armed aggression of Russia against Ukraine will be of fateful importance for the further development of Ukrainian culture. The gradual turning to own history and own roots, specific Ukrainian cultural

circle, and modern markers of the development of democratic societies will give new guidelines for the development of Ukrainian-language culture (Dahalan & Ahmad, 2018). It has become evident that belonging to the old paradigms of post-Soviet and pro-Russian development is outmoded. We also predict similar development trends for the entire post-Soviet region, which the Russian leadership for a long time considered its own. This opinion is confirmed by the

transformation of the Ukrainian people's attitude towards the Ukrainian language. Based on the analysis of sociological research it was found out that the level of support for the Ukrainian language as a single state language after the large-scale Russian invasion reached the maximum level for all time of Independence of Ukraine - 83% of Ukrainians believe that the only state language should be Ukrainian (Figure. 1).




Figure 1. The level of support by Ukrainians for the Ukrainian language as a single state language Adaptive from Rating. “The sixth national poll: the language issue in Ukraine” (March 19th, 2022). (Group rating, 2022)

At the same time, over the past decade, there has been a steady increase in the number of those who consider Ukrainian their native language. For example, in 2012 - 57%, respectively in 2022 - 76%. We believe that vivid changes in language self-identification took place between 2013-2016. One of the main reasons were such events as the reaction of society to the language experiments of the authorities in 2013, the events

of the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014), and Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Later, positive dynamics in the process of self-identification took place based on the transformation of attitudes towards the Ukrainian language in the center, east, and south of Ukraine. These transformations are reflected in Table 2.

Table 2.

Self-identification of Ukrainians based on the analysis of attitudes towards the Ukrainian language from 2013 – 2022

The process of self-identification of Ukrainians based on changes in attitudes toward the Ukrainian language	
2013	Society's reaction to the language experiments of the then pro-Russian authorities
2013-2014	The Revolution of Dignity, which popularized the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian folklore (as well as modern), dragged the Ukrainian cultural product on a peculiar trend
2014	Russia's aggression against Ukraine and occupation of Crimea and certain regions of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Introduction of quotas on the use of the Russian language in broadcast television, radio stations, the press, etc. In some places, particularly in western Ukraine, condemnation of the Russian-speaking population.
2022	February 24 - full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Transformation of attitudes toward the Ukrainian language in the center, east, and south of Ukraine. Mass support for the idea of a single state language - Ukrainian.

Compiled based on the author's analysis

We believe that a return to the old state of cultural development is possible only in the event of a military defeat for Ukraine or a diplomatic defeat for the Ukrainian government, which may lead to a change in the status of Russian culture in

Ukraine. However, even this possibility would be only a temporary prerequisite on the way to a new military conflict.

Discussion

For further discussion we offer the thesis: the Russian language is a hybrid weapon of the Russian Federation. The vast majority of Ukrainians who used the Russian language in their everyday lives did not want a war to break out and did not want the Kremlin regime to resort to protecting their “interests”. However, their conservatism and unwillingness to step out of their own “comfort zone” still gave a formal reason for such a “burnout” by the Russians. In fact, there are no Russian-speaking Ukrainians, but Russians are Russified. Russian is not a native language for Ukrainians, and all attempts to create a “Ukrainian Russian language” (like there is Australian English, American English, etc.) have failed. After 2022 the imitation of Russian samples and the use of the achievements of Russian culture of the Soviet variety will have no moral justification. Already now, many Ukrainian scholars consciously refuse to cooperate with the Russians and, if possible, try not to cite them in their publications. A similar “oblivion” will surely await other spheres. It is difficult to determine the consequences of these processes, but they will become an indispensable part of the next policy.

We believe that the conducted research has demonstrated the main direction of the development of Ukrainian culture for the coming years. Undoubtedly, the specified problems remain debatable, because it is impossible to take into account the influence of many factors on the course of the war and its consequences.

Conclusions

Thus, Ukrainian culture during the independent development of Ukraine has undergone profound transformations:

1. From the privileged importance of the Russian language and culture, Ukrainians in the beginning of the XXI century began to move to the creation of their own Ukrainian-language cultural product.
2. The attitude of Ukrainians to their own national values has changed, and the Ukrainian language has begun to assume a leading role. There have been changes in the Internet environment, Ukrainian music, cinema, literature, etc. According to Ukrainian officials, Russian culture in Ukraine has become an element of hybrid warfare, so the introduction of quotas on the use of the Russian language has accelerated the transition of quite a few artists to the

Ukrainian-language medium. Gradually, the situation when the ethnic majority of Ukrainians in Ukraine were adherents of Russian or Russian-speaking culture began to change more actively. Note that in 2022 and beyond, this movement will only intensify and embrace the majority of artists and cultural figures who will finally turn their backs on Russian culture (as a tool used by the official Kremlin).

3. The attitude of Ukrainians to their own history and culture has changed: The Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated how the attitude of Ukrainians to their own historical and cultural monuments has changed. Thus, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia, ordinary citizens of Ukraine have been using all their resources to save cultural values.
4. There are tangible changes in the scientific environment. Even now, many Ukrainian scientists deliberately refuse to cooperate with the Russians and, if possible, try not to cite them in their publications. We believe that this process will have positive consequences, especially for the development of Ukrainian humanitarian science, since the old concepts of understanding Ukrainian culture developed in a pro-Russian direction. Liberation from the “old authorities” will make it possible to rethink the scientific and cultural tradition of Ukraine.

We also predict similar development trends for the entire post-Soviet region, which the Russian leadership considered “its” for a long time.

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