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“Russian World” as a political and cultural weapon of modern Russia

“Русский мир” як політико-культурна зброя сучасної Росії

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Abstract

This article raises the question of “Russian world” political and cultural concept that is the mobilizing and legitimating factor not only for citizens of Russia but also for Russian speaking people from other countries in the Russian-Ukrainian war. The author grounds the idea that the political concept of “Russian world” is conditioned by: the potential that is a pledge of power and survival keeping for the regime of post-communist Russia; the ability to create new solidarity beyond territory and history that will compensate psychological consequences of dramatic concatenation of political humiliation, economic decline, cultural nihilism and general chaos after the defeat in the Cold War and ruining of the USSR; striving for justification of military invasion into the territory of independent Ukraine and system terror against civilian population. The article answers the question why in the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation we can see the dehumanization of Ukrainians as an enemy and the increase in the infringement of all the rules of modern war (mass marauding, assaults and shootings, moving of civilian population to filtration camps and total destruction of social infrastructure in just those cities where the majority of population speak Russian and are well disposed to the concept of “Russian world”).

Keywords: “Russian world”, Russian-Ukrainian war, “ruscism” (Russian fascism).

Introduction

The Russian-Ukrainian war (begun in March 2014 and has been conducted up to the present

Анотація

У статті висвітлюється політико-культурна природа концепції “Русский мир”, що є мобілізуючим і легітимуючим фактором для російськомовних учасників російсько-української війни. Автор обґрунтовує думку про те, що привабливість концепції “Русский мир” зумовлена: потенціалом, який є запорукою могутності, збереження й виживання режиму посткомуністичної Росії на підставі здатності створити нову солідарність поза межами території й історії, що компенсує психологічні наслідки драматичного поєднання політичного приниження, економічного занепаду, культурного нігілізму і загального хаосу, які виникли після поразки у “Холодній війні” та розпаду СРСР; прагненням до виправдання військового вторгнення на територію незалежної України й системного терору проти мирного населення. Стаття відповідає на питання, чому в російсько-українському протистоянні: відбувається дегуманізація українців як ворога, порушуються правила ведення сучасної війни (масові мародерства, напади, розстріли, переселення мирного населення до фільтраційних таборів); знищується соціальна й культурна інфраструктура саме в тих містах, де більшість населення розмовляла російською мовою і поділяла цінності “Русского мира”.

Ключові слова: “Русский мир”, російсько-українська війна, “рашизм” (російський фашизм).

time) is one of the most actual questions of political science. It is connected with

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peculiarities of this military conflict which has two phases. The first one is the prolonged period (from February 2014 to February 2022), when military operations were concentrated in so-called Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics (further LPR and DPR) being under control of the RF. The second phase began on 24.02.22. Of that day V. Putin made the announcement: "I have approved the decision to conduct the special military operation. Its aim is to defend people who have been suffering from genocide of Kyiv regime for eight years. To stop this we will long for demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine" (Putin, 2022).

An actualizing factor is the character of Russian-Ukrainian confrontation that unites fierce fighting and massive information impact. These circumstances determine the arguments for the consequence of the ideas of "Russian World" that not only legitimate Russian policy, but also are the factor to mobilise the social thought of Russian society against Ukraine. In our opinion, the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation actualizes the consideration of the Russian world as a means of defeating this war. It is important that "Russian world" embraces both individual and social outlooks, taken together, motivate the justification of Russian-Ukrainian military confrontation. In other words, the course of Russian-Ukrainian war actualizes the study of "Russian world" as an ideological and world outlook means of its legitimization.

The hypothesis of our research was the assumption that "Russian world" turned into an informational weapon of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as it acted as a foundation: 1) for the solidarity of Russian society based on the picture of the world, which is common to the post-Soviet space; 2) universal meaningful life guidelines that replaced ideological schemes with a generalization of the common experience of survival in the USSR; 3) subjectivity of Russians, which allowed them to join world history and build their own identity.

Theoretical Framework

Our article is based on the assumption that "Russian world" refers to ambiguous concepts that, without a final definition, have several general approaches to interpretation.

For example, collective article "Who identifies with the "Russian World"?..." believe that the term "Russian World" has ancient historical roots and a practical definition, however, the geopolitical design of this term was discussed

and refined in Russian political and cultural circles during Putin's presidency (O'Loughlina, Toalb & Kolosovc, 2016).

B. Özpek in his work "The Role of Democracy in the Recognition of De Facto States: An Empirical Assessment" interpreted "Russian World" as oblast or de facto state-like entities that are part of the influence of the RF (Özpek, 2014). De facto states are considered as political authorities operating in a certain territory without international legal recognition. However, de facto states strive to achieve the recognition of other states in order to be considered legitimate participants in the international system.

Some authors within the framework of the proposed approach Ukraine is classified as a "gray zone" country (Sergunin, 2004). Let's remind that Th. Carothers, outlining his vision of the gray area, warned this regime exists in two phases, the first phase being a flawed, unproductive pluralism, and the second phase being dominated by a single political force or central authority (Carothers, 2002).

Within these frameworks Ukraine is a typical example of a "gray zone" state because democratic institutions are present in the political system, but the actual rules by which this system functions are far from democratic standards. The reality of the functioning of various institutions introduced into the political system in the gray zone largely depends on local economic, cultural and historical conditions, as well as on the experience accumulated in the process of transformation.

"Russian world" as a rallying point for self-determination after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which simultaneously has and geopolitical context and plays the role of a substitute for the "national idea". Here, the "Russian world" is based on the following ideas:

- 1) the priority of Russia's national interests; the secondary role of "all-human" or cosmopolitan values;
- 2) Russia should remain a great power with a major voice in the international community;
- 3) Russia's main national interest consists of ensuring the country's security and territorial integrity.

Another interpretation of "Russian World" is based on the positioning RF of the as the antithesis of the modern West (Fedoseeva & Solomatin, 2015). The phenomenon of courage, its use as a resource in the global civilizational

competition is considered. The emasculation of masculinity is the reverse side of the development of Western civilization, which claims to have a global meaning. A number of factors with a historical dimension and a complex influence on the decline of manhood are proposed. Russia can and should take advantage of this de-passionization of the West in the course of civilizational competition, which is intensifying now.

The understanding of “Russian world” as a cultural and spiritual unity of “Orthodox peoples” is gaining popularity (Ksenofontov, 2018). In modern conditions both in Russia and abroad the church acted and acts as a support of the Russian culture, traditions and Russian identity. It should be noted that it is actively included in the general cultural processes of the global and regional levels.

So, in the Russian world, national holidays have become Days of Slavic writing and culture, Christmas, Easter, Epiphany celebrations. It is characteristic that such important Orthodox holidays that arose in the historical past are carefully preserved not only in neighboring countries, but also far. They are especially revered in countries where a fairly large population professing Orthodoxy lives. Among these countries, we note First of all, Serbia, where more than 6 million Orthodox; Bulgaria, where over 80% of the population is Orthodox; Greece, where 8 million residents adhere to Orthodoxy.

At present, within Russian society interaction between state and church in a number of areas, based on organizational bases of joint commissions and committees. Among them such as:

- 1) activities for the restoration and return to service of unique historical and cultural monuments;
- 2) regular holding of joint cultural, creative actions, competitions, festivals;
- 3) Church also actively manifests itself in the fight against alcoholism, neglect, crime;
- 4) promotes the formation, especially among young people, of a culture of interethnic and interfaith relations, fight against extremism and nationalism.

It must be stated that the “Russian world” as a component of the military confrontation between the RF and Ukraine receives a different definition depending on the definition of the essence of this war.

So, some representatives of scientific society (Datsyuk, 2014; Magda, 2015; Pocheptsov, 2018) regard this military conflict as a “hybrid war” dominating by such peculiarities of its conducting as: 1) asymmetry of actions that let grade enemy’s advantages in military conflict; 2) stake on information component that leads to factual conquest of one state by another with formal saving of sovereignty.

At the same time there is a scientific school which is built around works by Ch. Tilly, A. Toffler, M. vanCreveld; M. Kaldor and certifies the appearance of “new wars” (Van Creveld, 1991; Tilly, 1993; Toffler, 1993; Kaldor, 1999). The characteristic feature of such wars is the fact that they are conducted by means of “cleaning-up the territory” on the grounds of irredentism – ethnic mobilization by the reunification of areas, where ethnic minorities live, with the areas, where this ethnos is in majority.

To our mind, precisely such a combination of these two views understanding of wars of XX-XXI centuries let depict the peculiarities of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Namely, broad support for:

- 1) actions by Russian citizens in relation to Ukraine from the annexation of the Crimea to military support of LPR and DPR;
- 2) terror against the civilian population from persecution and criminal encroachment to looting committed by residents of the post-Soviet space, to which migrants of different generations – from both the USSR and the RF.

Methodology

The purpose of our work is to study the “Russian world” as a complex political and cultural concept, which has different definitions depending on: 1) memory, where of great importance are knowing of own history parental, realized assertion of strongholds in the formation of own independence history, achievement of social and science consensus concerning important events in the history of the country, detailed analysis of Russian history; 2) realities, where communications serve as channels complementing historical, philosophical and religious discourses in order to create cultural space; 3) creation of strategies for the future which takes place on the ontological grounds.

All this, in its turn, determines the methodological focus of the analysis that should

consider the impossibility to give “Russian world” just only one determination, such as 1) ethnographic definition of similarity between East Slavic peoples; 2) political and legitimate definition of genealogy definition of “Russian state” and “Russian church”; 3) ethno-nationalist definition of the “network of Russian speaking and Russian culture societies”.

So, can agree with Volkovskiy's thought, the analysis of “Russian world” as the legitimating accompaniment of Russian-Ukrainian military confrontation conditions the necessity to combine the analysis of ideas, systems of categories, outlook values, logic and argumentation with the study of alogisms and absurdity (Volkovskiy, 2021).

All these circumstances ground the methodological frames for scientific research of “Russian world” as a complicated cultural concept that combines general philosophic methods, phenomenology and hermeneutics with the analysis of the historical context of this doctrine creation taking into account the systemic grounds for spreading of individual and collective consciousness patterns.

Results and Discussion

All this determines the need to consider “Russian world” as a unique witnessing and socio-cultural experience that served as the basis for the legitimization of the war against Ukrainians. And this, in turn, leads to the definition of the essence of war, where the weapon is the assimilation and interpretation of collective ideas about modernity, which took place on the basis of stereotypes of thoughts and actions that are stable in public memory.

This is due to the fact that “Russian world” is positioned as a “reproduction of historical justice” – at the same time as an imperial irredenta in the borders of 1913, and as the Soviet irredenta in the borders of 1989. Really demonstrative is V. Putin's speech: “Russia would have won the war without Ukraine” from 16.12.2010, where he depreciated not only the contribution of Ukrainians into the Victory in the World War II but also the quantity of losses (when every ninth Ukrainian was lost) (Ligostova, 2010). It is important that as to the Russian official propaganda the main traitors/collaborators in this war are Ukrainian nationalists. But they suppress information about Russian Liberation Army (RLA) as a collaborative company formed of Soviet prisoners of war during World War II in

Germany headed by lieutenant-general A. Vlasov. In such disrespectful tone RF's official propaganda treats the creation of independent Ukraine in 1991 – as a result of the greatest geopolitical injustice – ruining of the USSR.

Such a fatal absence of critical perception of the Russian-Ukrainian war by “Russian world” supporters (both in the RF and Ukraine) is based on the manipulative interpretation of history and on the notions about Ukraine as a failed state and recognition of Ukrainians as secondary nation constantly dependant from Russian imperial projects.

Cynicism of “Russian world” world outlook is demonstratively incarnated in Putin's statement that: 1) “the real sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in the partnership with Russia”; 2) relations between Russians and Ukrainians had been forming for centuries; 3) “Together we always were and will be much stronger and more successful, as we are one nation” (Putin, 2021).

The quintessence of “Russian world” is presented in Putin's words spoken on the 16.03.2022: “Appearance of Russian troops near Kyiv and other cities of Ukraine is not connected with the intention to occupy this country, we do not have such an aim” (Putin, 2022).

The real values of “Russian world” world outlook construction is testified by the events have been happening since the 24.02.2022, where the ambitions on great spirituality totally smashed onto the realities of bombing of residential areas and medical establishments, terror against civilian population, making of filtration camps for displaced people and mocking at prisoners of war. And all these against a background of full-scale ruining of cities and villages, residents of which were Russian speaking citizens of Ukraine.

It is important to understand the essence of the “Russian world”, this interpretation of it as a part of geopolitical reality. When in the frames of world-systematic approach by I. Wallerstein they assume the unique belonging of Russia to two world systems: Eurasian and Orthodox (Wallerstein, 1991, 1974).

This fact turns “Russian world” into social super system, reproduction of which is supplied by the interlacing of geopolitical interests, economies, social roles of cultural space, influence of spiritual system with personal vision of interpersonal relations, ideals and models of

behavior. As to the place in modern geopolitical environment, the role of second and third sort countries is connected only with countries' interests that make the nucleus in west-centric world system.

The mentioned above definition of "Russian world" is related to its understanding as the result of turning Russia from object into subject of world policy, that was certified firstly by occupation and further annexation of Crimean peninsula. Namely from this point of view "Russian world" was studied in the work by V. Katasonov "America vs Russia. Cold War 2.0." (Katasonov, 2014). Here "Russian world" is a product of world oligarchy's backdrop to the regeneration of Russia that was realized into the war with the USA under the banner of globalization and is conducted in Malorossiia as a part of "Russian world". Under such conditions military assistance to LPR-DPR is moral-humanitarian help of "Russian world" to its own parts, and in such a way it renovates political and economical power.

The aim of special military operation is not less demonstrative – "Our main point is to defend the RF from military threat that is made by western countries which make attempts to use Ukrainian people in the battle against our country" (Koval, 2022). The fact that followers of "Russian world" ideas live in countries with different political foundations and with striking differences in level and style of life and belong to different political realities brings into question the explanation of this concept's success only by the adequacy of propaganda attempts to basic national identification.

A. de Tangi in her book "The Great Migration: Russia and Russians after the Fall of the Iron Curtain" passes an opinion that irredentism of Russian- authorities of the RF sees the area of former USSR as the natural sphere of their influence (Tangi, 2012, p. 17). Distinctive feature of Russian migrants' behavior is in demonstration of general tendency of global world, where "migrants can be active actors of transnational policy", and "migrations can transform the system of international relations making new areas not coinciding with national borders" (Tangi, 2012, p. 18-19).

In this context, it is important that S. Pereslegin in his article "Self-instruction manual for playing on the "world chessboard". Classics of geopolitics, XIX century" introduced the notion "anthropoflows" which connects demographic migrations and "social processes that carry

identity". They at the same time form the geopolitical map of the world and are the source of ethno-cultural groups' movement (Pereslegin, 2003, p. 697).

Russian-Ukrainian confrontation demonstrates how "Russian world" is turning into the weapon on the grounds of the sacralization of Russia that causes identity changes not only in Russia but in Ukraine as well. It is popular to consider "Russian world" to be the unique moral oriented unit of world civilization that is opposed to western empires, directed on the exploitation of colonies by means of break and out-recoding of civilizational grounds and traditions of other peoples (Filimonov & Danyuk, 2016, p. 98). Here "Russian world" is a harmonious community that serves like a substratum for the development of peoples who voluntary joined the empire.

The imperative of the existence of "Russian world" is maxim – "Russians don't desert their own". The grounds for this are assertion about metaphysical and political unity of RF's image, general mythologization of everything, that is Russian a sign of special valour in opposition to evil as a whole (fascism in particular) and the fact of cultural opposition of RF to NATO countries (Poiarkova, 2022). For understanding of the essence of "Russian world" it is important to state that the rules of the existence of "Russian world" – unity and equality of different ethnic groups and cultures of empire under the leading role of Russian people – were formed by I. Stalin in 1945.

The definition of "Russian world" as the ideology of post-Soviet space was given by Patriarch Kyril at the opening ceremony of the 3-d Assembly of Russian world on 3.09.2009. He sees "Russian world" as a complicated phenomenon that, firstly, unites the flock of Russia Orthodox Church and takes Russian culture as the basis of national identity. Secondly, this is the answer to globalization questions as an attempt to make an independent subject of world formation on the basis of cultural and national identity (Patriarch Kyril, 2009).

To Patriarch Kyril's mind, the existence of "Russian world" as combined civilizational space is focused around the nucleus made of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (without common political institutions) and demands overcoming such tasks of different levels as: cooperation of civil societies and creation of strong relationship between elites of different countries which are parts of this civilizational space.

The opinion that “Russian world” is a system of shared values of traditional society that is opposed to individual liberal one is rather widespread. For instance, G. Zaporozhtseva (former citizen of Kyiv, now she is a political émigré) in the article “On the ways of returning Ukraine to the bosom of the Russian world” considers Maidan to be the event caused by mass hysteria premised by existential crisis of modern liberal society’s crisis (Zaporozhtseva, 2016, p.122). Maidan is an antithesis of “Russian world” as it made the atmosphere of unity by means of happy-enzyme, and this can explain the euphoria of tens of thousands of people which led to dreadful political consequences – falling out of the unified civilizational oikumena.

In the article written N.Ovchinnikova, Y.Kovalchuk (by the “citizens of LRR-DPR”) “On the cultural fronts of the Russian spring” – “Russian world” is treated as a changing factor of the conception of the world. The authors, who are contemporaries of the events an 2014, state that “Russian world” is a project that “changed the essence of life” for Russian speaking people in the east of Ukraine because “among members of people’s volunteer corps there were anarchists, communists, neopagans, monarchists, socialists, skinheads, “professional Russians” and others”, in the minds of which “there was real chaos. And even those, who were devoted to personal persuasions from now and then, lost his or her belief...” (Ovchinnikova, & Kovalchuk, 2016, p.49-50).

In our opinion, to understand the essence of the “Russian world” as a cultural project it is necessary to consider its role in gaining and keeping of Putin regime’s power. From this viewpoint the three-volume edition “Project Russia” by anonymous author is demonstrative (2008-2009). The edition was marked by extralarge number of printed copies and multiple reprints, that indicates he order from ruling stratum of the RF. In that anonymous work they proposed to unite elements of inheritance and appointment by election in order to unite “the best qualities of monarchy” and “the best qualities of Soviet system” (Anonymous, 2008, p. 344). The advantages of the mentioned above proposition were as follows: 1) to achieve the maximum authority of regime; 2) to liquidate the disadvantages of monarchy; 3) to form real elitism by means of participation of only privileged people in elections. The main pledge of success in advancement of RF’s project as a “New kingdom” was going to be the ability to orientate modern people to take decisions by “heart”, being supported by Orthodox tradition,

not by “stomach”, based on democratic postulates, because “the tsar authorities is the power of secular institution in the person of Tsar and spiritual institution in he person of Patriarch, and these two institutions balance each other” (Anonymous, 2008, p.346).

H. Pirchner in his work “Post Putin: Succession, Stability, and Russia’s Future” distinguished such stride that became the ground for Putin’s power and his supporters (Pirchner, 2019, p.90-99). First of all, this is the strengthening of KGB former structures letting them control private business (e.g. FSB (Federal Security Service).

Secondly, it is the centralization of power in the frames of FSB and FIS (Foreign Intelligence Service), power restrictions for regional governors, appointing of President representatives in regions. President representatives started to control patronage service in their regions – including the right to appoint the chiefs of militia in those regions. In the same way the consolidation of power is supplied by the Law “About Political Parties”, which restricts the number of parties recognized by the state. It is quite significant that in 2004 the elections of regional governors were abolished. Since 2000s, there have been taken some measures concerning the prohibition for civil servants to have assets abroad. Since 2018, they have made structures of prior collection of information about dissidence among military men.

Thirdly, political influence of oligarchs was restricted by criminal prosecutions and giving preference to those who supported the Kremlin. Fourthly, it is the suppression of mass media by means of intimidation, physical persecution and criminal homicides amid the creation of FSB structures that make federal supervision over radio and TV.

Fifthly, high emphasis was placed on the upbringing of young people that implies two directions. The first one is the system of measures pointed to form beliefs and ideas concerning history, where the role of I. Stalin is presented as an essential condition for the victory in the Second World War, but repressions (e.g. activity of GULAG (Directory-General for camps, the unified camp system of the USSR. The full name is the Directory-General of forced labour camp and correctional labour settlements) practically isn’t explained. And the network of nationwide organizations (similar to the Soviet Young Pioneers and Young Communist League) based on putinism have been made.

Sixthly, the campaign against religious organizations (except those which are loyal) and non-governmental organizations based on threats to national security (the closing of human rights activists' organization "Memorial" is very revealing. It was created by the Nobel laureate A. Sacharov).

Seventhly, this is the persecution of dissidents which is done in two ways: by means of control over electoral process and increase in imprisonments for unauthorized rallies, for information in social networks. Especially indicative is the creation of Investigation Committee of the RF in 2011, where ordinary citizens are encouraged to write dilations.

So, in the RF a vicious circle was formed – when the condition of regime survival is "Russian world" as nationalistic-imperialistic ideology which causes territorial expansion to demonstrate the viability of Putin regime to in-country population. To fulfil the regulation they linked bribery of elites and structures- successor of KGB, redistribution of money gained from oil and gas selling and removal of population from politics by means of intimidation.

All these circumstances together make multi-layered concept of Russian world that combines political powerlessness of Russian people and which T. Snyder in his work "The War in Ukraine Has Unleashed a New Word" called demonstrative messianic cynicism aimed to discredit common to mankind values, democratic procedures and standards, promotion RF's edge over the whole world (Snyder, 2022). Just this, as T. Snyder thinks, conditions the fact that "Putin's ethnic imperialism insists that Ukrainians must be Russians because they speak Russian. They do – and they speak Ukrainian. But Ukrainian identity has as much to do with an ability to live between languages than it does with the use of any one of them". In this context we can agree with the statement that "The War in Ukraine Is the True Culture War" because "Russians do not understand Ukrainian, because they have not learned it. Ukrainians do understand Russian, because they have learned it. This fact has battlefield implications. Ukrainian soldiers often speak Russian, though they are instructed to use Ukrainian to spot infiltrators and spies. This is a drastic example of a general practice of code-switching".

Neocolonial character of the Russian-Ukrainian war has one more symptom which isn't often noticed and consequently isn't taken into consideration. To T. Snyder's mind this is "the

imperial character of the Russian state, a very high proportion of the Russian soldiers in Ukraine belong to national minorities. This suggests a deeper problem, which is that even soldiers dying for a fascist cause need not be fascists themselves" (Snyder, 2022).

All mentioned above simulacra reveals the disrespect to Ukrainians because of their colonial secondariness and explains the animal behaviour of Russian invaders in Ukraine. So, it is not a contingency that the RF is systematically ruining culture infrastructure as the basis of collective memory, including museums, educational establishments, theatres, houses, parks, shopping centres. Very characteristic for "Russian world" is the promise to liberate "their own people" realised in the frames of the Russian-Ukrainian military confrontation and where the list of completely destroyed cities – Chernigiv, Mariupol, Irpin, Severodonetsk – fixes the crimes against mainly Russian speaking civilian population.

Such regressions of socio-political mind, which testify the breaking up of individual morality and intellectual self-control and make recall the nature of such phenomena as the manifestation of social traumas compensation by means of turning to the initial archetypes: cruelty and violence. In this context, it is to the point to appeal to the opinion of W. Reich, who was a contemporary and researcher of the nature of fascism and thought that fascism substituted grounds for social solidarity (Reich, 1980). The reasons for such a situation were, first of all, in chaos of political and economic life that facilitated the formation of "childish necessity in defense" and focus transmission from personal life to "Führer". The other reason was in the specific structure of German society, where the First World War ruined the considerable part of middle class, and minor bourgeois, bureaucrats and employees became dependant from state power (Reich, 1980, p. 117, 95).

The attractiveness of such a situation is in simple explanations that might be given to drawbacks of the world. So, reasons of social failures are in actions of enemies, driving force of which is the envy to wealth, special history and extraordinary spirituality of Russia as the successor of the USSR. In its turn, giving simple explanations to complicated problems of the present time gives a chance to an average person to answer for nothing.

In this context the pantheon of heroes and glorious victories of "Russian world" are rather

demonstrative and embrace not only different layers of history but also reconcile irreconcilable antipodes. All these features are transformed into traits of real heroes who came to Ukraine as marginal people and quickly transformed into transmitters of special spirituality of fighters with fascism and gain the indulgence concerning criminal assaults and proper material supply in the form of stolen belongings having belonged to supporters of Ukrainian junta.

To our mind, mentioned above let suppose that the attractiveness of “Russian world” may be based on new, implemented by globalization, social processes which help make a new type of solidarity beyond the territory and time (by means of concentration on the past). This confirms A. Toffler’s remark that technological achievements desynchronize time and space characteristics and on this basis they form new types of relations, overcoming any space and time restrictions (Toffler & Toffler, 2006, 51).

Indeed, new means of communication (instruments of which are social networks) transform into adaptive means of adaptation to the present time, that is chaotically changing and makes it easier to appeal to something which is taken as an unbreakable rule and turn into the guaranty of survival. On the other hand, an attempt to find the support in the past stipulates for general loss the meaning of life as the imitation of the USSR experience in rearmament, army and interminable trainings of military men, unification of population against inner and outer enemies – are the actions which hide the lack of desired image of the future.

This explains the amorphism of “Russian world” ideology, where the aspiration for having a powerful state by any means and for any price is the means to reach the ideals. Under the circumstances of diffusiveness of ideological guiding, compensatory process conditions on the search of such world outlook constructions, which would be able to be “supplemented reality” (a border between reality and virtuality), as it will give the sense of existence in permanently traumatizing reality.

To our mind, to properly understand the cultural concept of “Russian world” it is necessary to pay attention on the fact that unprecedented losses of the RF in the Russian-Ukrainian war cause consolidation of Russians against Ukrainians, who are seen as an existential threat demanding the only scenario of war “to the victory”.

In this context, it is also indicative that among those Russians who quickly fled abroad from the “partial mobilization” (announced) – the motives were not so much protest against the war with Ukraine itself, but rather disagreement to directly take part in it. A similar motivation is inherent in Russian mothers, who are outraged not by the war with Ukraine itself, but by the violation of promises not to attract conscripts to participate in hostilities in Ukraine.

As we can see, dehumanisation of the enemy leads to stopping of critical thinking, when instead of focusing the efforts against Putinism Russian society shows the behaviour of “social animals”. This collective move resembles the animal behavior and is distinguished by the unity of direction, solidarity and follow the patterns and regurgitate the arguments given by Russian mass media propaganda as to the demarcation into “their own and others”.

Most tellingly, this inclination to mass and copied behaviour in Russian society manifests itself in hatred against the dissidents and making of detachments to harass Russians who speak out against the war with Ukraine. Thus, activity of so called “Putin’s troops” made of aged supporters is very demonstrative.

Conclusions

So, Russian world is a synonym of Russian fascism the essence of which is noteworthy implemented into the practice of Dehumanization of everything that is Ukrainian. That's why the heated phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war (from 24.02.2022 to nowadays) is under the slogans of endless lies that includes such narratives as “everything is Ukrainians’ fault” and bombing and shootings of civilian population are theatrical productions, where Armed Forces of Ukraine are shelling their countrymen and then place corpses stealthily in order to accuse the liberating mission of the RF of everything.

All mentioned above indicate that “Russian world” is noted for different interpretations made on common principles, such as: Orthodox faith, Russian culture and language, common historical memory and views on social development.

In our opinion, interpretations of “Russian world” – common political environment, part of geopolitical reality, reproduction of historical truth, world outlook surrogate – all these together let the fragment of different periods’ essences coexist without conflicts – an original “symbiosis

of incompatible” made of mixture of symbols, persuasions and ideas.

In other words, Multilayer interpretation of “Russian world” includes: 1) unified church which formed civilizational unity; 2) territory of common language; 3) unity on the basis of common history, where the best way of existence was empire.

As we can see, undeniable advantage of “Russian world” construct is the ability to adapt to the traumatizing reality by means of concealing the responsibilities for the present time. Thus, the conception of “strong power” is the main factor organizing the being, where person’s role is reduced to a small screw.

It is not an element of chance that “Russian world” is based on the transformation of conception about the past. The reason of this is in search for solving of present time problems in the past – in the space of familiar images and readymade excuses. The result of such an approach is losing the grip of present time reality. Undoubtedly, “Russian world” bears the imprint of nostalgia for idealized life in the USSR, where the total irresponsibility was compensated by social guarantees, and right eclipsed responsibility. This is an unwillingness to grow up, public permission to be social teenager and believe that rules can be broken for the sake of “our own people”.

Different interpretations of “Russian world” let abstract this concept in understanding of common political environment which appeared on the basis of residual unity of civilizing, cultural, social, family, production, infrastructural and economic relations, existing in spite of borders that appeared after the dissolution of the USSR. In these frames there is the inner circle of “Russian world” in the form of the RF and the outer one which include Russian speaking people abroad.

Russian peace is a worldview concept that acts as a substitute stability of the existence of the statehood of the RF and is determined by fixations in concrete-historical ideology and with the help of traditions preserved in public consciousness.

Russian peace is a means of objectifying social consciousness as a result of the cognitive activity of a certain set of individuals united by cultural heritage, language, mentality, time and space. The Russian world is an interrelationship of social consciousness and worldview traditions

that are fixed historically, where worldview traditions are always concrete and belong to the historical time of the post-Soviet society of the modern RF.

It is important that the subjects who fall into the sphere of political and cultural influence of “Russian World” have the opportunity to continue the socio-cognitive creative process of assimilation of the post-Soviet space and time by their own or joint efforts, creating a real relationship between human thoughts, words and deeds. “Russian world is a proposition of feeling of unity for former citizens of the USSR based on struggle for justice for “their own people”, that justify law-breakings as it turns marginal person into hero, and Internet spreads popularity, and stolen belongings make the illusion of successful life.

If we consider mentality not only as an image and a way of thinking, but also an image and a way of acting – “thought” (and such a combination is legitimate, since mental stereotypes are perceived unconsciously, where they assume critical discursive thinking, but give rise to only spontaneous, unconscious actions of the individual), then the “Russian world” can be considered as a substitute for historical heredity, which allows the traumatized post-Soviet society of Russia to preserve its integrity in the process of socio-historical development, which is impossible without the transmission provided by the traditions from generation to generation of axiological, semantic and teleological worldview elements. It is this continuity that makes representatives of the “Russian world” subjects of world history, determining their historicity. Heredity in social consciousness ensures the connection of eras, moreover, the historical past can act as a real factor in the formation and development of the social system only because such continuity exists.

Thus, world outlook construct of “Russian world” changed into weapon against Ukraine through the potential of its own – ability to form new solidarity beyond territory and time, which can compensate dramatic coincidence of military defeat, political humiliation, economic fall, cultural nihilism and general chaos.

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