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DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2022.56.08.26
How to Cite:
Bilgin, R., Ekici, S., & Sezgin, F. (2022). Turkey’s syrian policy under justice and development party rule after 2009. Amazonia
Investiga, 11(56), 264-277. https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2022.56.08.26
Turkey’s syrian policy under justice and development party rule after
2009
2009 YILI SONRASI ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ İKTİDARINDA
TÜRKİYE'NİN SURİYE POLİTİKASI
Received: September 2, 2022 Accepted: October 19, 2022
Written by:
Recep Bilgin108
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3760-218X
Seydali Ekici109
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8843-6092
Fatih Sezgin110
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4022-5813
Abstract
The Justice and Development Party's Syria
policy has followed a volatile and pragmatic line.
Prior to 2011, when the Arab Spring began in
Syria, strategic cooperation was established
within the framework of liberal and zero-
problem policies with neighbors. When Turkey's
democratic reform proposals against the
opposition movements that emerged in 2011 did
not realize, Turkey changed its position against
the Assad regime and started to support the
opposition. During this period, weapons aid was
also given to the dissidents. Later, with the
involvement of Russia and the USA, the balances
in Syria changed and Turkey turned to defensive
policies that would protect its internal and border
security. In this context, military operations were
carried out against Syria. However, these
operations were carried out with the consensus of
Russia and the USA. Although the JDP declared
the Assad regime to be an enemy after 2011, it
has come to the point where it is possible to
negotiate with the Assad regime in the later
period. This study makes a process analysis of
Turkey's changing Syria policy.
Key words: Turkey’s Syria Policy, Justice and
Development Party, Neo-Ottomanism, Islamism,
Security.
108
PhD Candidate, International Relations and Diplomacy Department, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Tishk
International University, Erbil, Iraq.
109
PhD Candidate, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences,
International Burch University, Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina.
110
PhD. Candidate, Campus Director, Glenbow College, Calgary, Canada.
Bilgin, R., Ekici, S., Sezgin, F. / Volume 11 - Issue 56: 264-277 / August, 2022
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Introduction
The foreign policy of Turkey in the first period
of the Justice and Development Party's (JDP) rule
developed as a reflection of the democratic
liberal understanding in domestic politics. In this
context, a zero-problem policy was developed,
and close relations were established with
neighboring countries. During this period, the
JDP was concerned about providing legitimacy
with liberal policies against the secular elite that
maintained the tutelage of the political system.
However, in the following period, the loss of
power of the circles that would make effective
opposition in the country brought the JDP back
to its old Islamist codes. The JDP's post-Arab
spring policy, which started in Syria in 2011,
shows the reflections of this Islamist line.
This study firstly reveals the story of the Islamic
thought that formed the origin of the JDP in the
Republic of Turkey, because this story is a
reflection of how they opposed the Kemalist state
and how they were oppressed. Therefore, the
JDP, which came to power under military
pressure, first embraced people from all over the
political spectrum and had a very democratic
period. However, they later gathered all the
power in their hands and adopted an authoritarian
approach after 2010. Having followed a very
liberal and democratic foreign policy before, the
JDP completely changed its practices after this
date. It was during this period that the Arab
Spring started and the JDP returned to its Islamist
codes and supported opposition religious
organizations in the civil war in Syria. In fact,
with Ahmet Davutoğlu's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 2009, the idea of neo-Ottomanism led
the government to proactive foreign policy. In
this context, they wanted to help the
establishment of regimes compatible with them
by supporting the opposition both in Egypt and
Syria. The change in the axis of the JDP's Syria
policy is remarkable in terms of showing the
Islamic expansionist policies in the period when
it was strong, while emphasizing the democratic
values when it was weak. As a matter of fact, this
study aims to explain these changes in the foreign
policy of the JDP through Syria.
Theoretical framework
Historical Background of Justice and
Development Party
The Justice and Development Party (JDP)
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-in Turkish), whose
founders have an Islamic background, is a
continuation of the “Nationalist View” that has
survived within Turkey's distinctive Islamist
traditions (Sambur, 2009). However, due to the
conjuncture that emerged at the time of its
establishment, this party as a conservative and
liberal democratic party with members from
almost all parts of the political spectrum
(Axiarlis, 2014).
The historical past of political Islam in Turkey
continued with a peculiar story in the Ottoman
period, and in the Republican Period, it contained
important signs pointing to the break from the
previous period. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in
1798 is shown as the period when Islamism first
emerged (Cesari, 2017). Later, Islamist thought
that spread from Egypt to the Islamic world, the
non-religious superstitions that Islamic societies
fell into and the false perception of religion, the
despotic governments that prevailed in the
Islamic world, and the Western colonialism,
which was perceived as an external threat in the
Islamic world, determined the three targets to be
overcome by Islamist intellectuals (Mohammadi,
2015).
However, with the establishment of the Republic
of Turkey, the western thought, determined by
the state, rejected everything that had a religious
reference and tried to establish a secular identity
and lifestyle. In this context, Islamic thought also
entered a very long period of slumber (White,
2013). With the military intervention in 1960,
Adnan Menderes government was overthrown,
and a new constitution was made in 1961 during
this period. The most important feature of this
new constitution was that it was a very liberal
constitution (Isiksel, 2013). The reason why this
constitution, which was made by the soldiers,
who were the founders of the new regime, was so
libertarian was thought to be because the
previous 1924 Constitution was very restrictive,
laying the groundwork for authoritarian
understandings and preparing a despotic leader
like Adnan Menderes (Dodd, 1992).
Towards the end of the 1960s, it is seen that
especially socialist student movements started in
the whole world as well as in Turkey (Bal &
Laciner, 2001). Necmettin Erbakan, who was the
leader of the national view movement of that
period, who entered politics with his own identity
at this time, had brought political Islam out of the
slumber period it had been in for a long time
(Gulalp, 1999).
By 1971, the State, which had western and
secular codes, confronted with very different
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ideas, which were hostile to the Western world
and were heavily nationalistic. It should be stated
that the socialist youth movements represent an
extreme point in Turkey, while the national view
movement represents another extreme point.
However, the similarity between these two
movements was that they both had a nationalist
idea and were anti-Western. Although the
Republic of Turkey had a codification that
brought nationalism to the fore, its secular
western aspect was equally dominant, and at this
point it disagreed with the two extreme views
mentioned above. With the memorandum given
by the soldiers to the Süleyman Demirel
government on March 12, 1971, the government
resigned and Nihat Erim, who had a military
background, became the Prime Minister instead.
In the next period, an uncompromising struggle
of the soldiers, who were the owner of the state
and the most important political power at that
time, triggered a long-lasting struggle against
both the socialist thought and the Islamic national
view tradition represented by Erbakan. This
struggle continued in different ways with another
military coup in 1980 (Esen, 2021).
After the mid-1980s, there emerged a period in
which Islamist movements were on the rise in
Turkey. During this period, different political
murders were committed, and political Islam was
shown to be responsible for this. However,
despite all the propaganda activities, the rise of
political Islam continued. In 1994, the mayors of
Ankara and Istanbul passed into the hands of the
Welfare Party, the party of the national view of
that day. In the mayoral elections held that year,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan won the Istanbul
Municipality and made an important
breakthrough in his political life. In the general
elections held in December 1995, the Welfare
Party emerged as the first party with 21.4% of the
votes but could not form a coalition government.
An important reason for this was that the soldiers,
who were still the dominant figures of politics in
that day's Turkey, did not want other parties to
form a government with the Welfare Party.
However, the events that developed later
required Necmettin Erbakan to form a coalition
government with Tansu Çiller, the leader of the
True Path Party, in June 1996. After this point,
the February 28 process, in which important
ruptures would begin in Turkey, was entered
(Onis, 1997).
At the National Security Council meeting held on
February 28, 1997, crucially important decisions
were taken regarding the future of all groups with
Islamic tendencies and political Islam in Turkey.
These decisions included extending primary
education to 8 years and making it compulsory.
This resolution meant the closure of the middle
sections of Imam Hatip high schools, which are
institutions that political Islam attaches great
importance to in Turkey. At that time, Necmettin
Erbakan used the phrase "our backyard" for
Imam Hatip High Schools. In addition, attention
was drawn to the connections of political Islam
with the Iranian regime, and it was requested to
prevent such tendencies. These decisions, which
included many other measures like these, were
not initially approved by the then prime minister,
Necmettin Erbakan. However, later on, these
decisions were approved due to the pressure he
felt on himself. Subsequent developments
required Necmettin Erbakan to resign from being
the prime minister in June 1997, and the
governments established afterwards
implemented the decisions of the National
Security Council (Narli, 2000).
During this period, both the people with an
Islamic tendency and the people with this identity
in politics faced great pressure and forced
change. These oppressive attitudes of the soldiers
led to the establishment of very different
coalitions within the political spectrum in the
later period. So much so that Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, who founded the Justice and
Development Party in 2001, had friends from
political Islam as well as people from different
parts of the political spectrum. An important
reason why people of this different view united
under the roof of this party was that Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and his friends, who were called
innovators from the Islamic nationalist view, had
left the Nationalistic View. Abdullah Gül, who
was the representative of the innovators in the
congress held in the Fazilet Party, which was the
Party of National View of that time, made an
attempt to establish the Justice and Development
Party because he lost against Recai Kutan by a
very small margin (Eligür, 2010).
One of the biggest effects of February 28 on
Islamists is that it forced them to transform their
identity. In this respect, Tayyip Erdoğan and his
friends separated from the Islamist national view
and adopted the liberal conservative democrat
understanding. In fact, they received a great
support from the Western world with these
identities in the future. However, until that time,
the soldiers, who were constantly western and
advocating westernization, were perceived as a
natural ally by the westerners. Nevertheless, in
the ongoing process, especially anti-democratic
practices of the soldiers caused the westerners to
move away from them and the thought they
represented in Turkey. In the new conjuncture,
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Tayyip Erdogan and his friends, who came to the
fore with their conservative liberal democrat
identity, were supported by the westerners
represented by USA and EU (Yilmaz, 2013).
Establishment and Ideology of JDP
JDP was established on 14 August 2001 under
the chairmanship of Tayyip Erdogan. These
people, who represented the innovative
understanding of the national view, did not win
the congress in the Fazilet Party on 14 May,
2000, and they started new searches and
established this party with their new identities.
The striking aspect of this party is that it was
founded at a time when the oppressive
environment of the February 28 process was
fading away. Likewise, the economic crisis that
broke out in Turkey in February 2001 facilitated
the performance of this party. As it can be
understood from the words "justice" and
"development", which are the words in the name
of the party, they used these two concepts
effectively, which were the two most basic needs
of the society at that time. This party, which came
to power about one year after its establishment,
achieved a great development momentum during
its first-period rule, approximately 2 years after
the economic crisis in 2001 and after the
devastating effects of the crisis began to improve.
In this period, the most important source of the
legitimacy of this party in the eyes of the society
was the continuous development of the economy.
It was an important step for Turkey's
democratization that they included people from
different spectrums in the same period (Özbudun,
2006).
In fact, the role that US President Bill Clinton had
assigned to Turkey during his 1999 visit to
Turkey was being implemented by this party
(Wing & Varol, 2006). Accordingly, Turkey,
with its secular democratic structure, had
achieved a position that would set an example for
all Muslim societies in the Middle East. In this
respect, the JDP, which applied liberal
democratic practices to both domestic and
foreign policy, gathered a significant number of
supporters both at home and abroad (Kesgin,
2020).
In this period, the soldiers who continued their
existence with their secular, nationalist and
western identity and the social layers they
represented entered into a great identity conflict.
On the one hand, these people, who represented
the westernization moves inherited from the
nineteenth century to the republic, on the other
hand, lost the support from the west due to their
anti-democratic practices. The secular society
and its representative soldiers, who could not
produce the necessary arguments against the
liberal-democratic and pro-Western domestic
and foreign policy that JDP constantly
emphasized, resorted to different propaganda
activities (Esposito et al., 2017). For example, in
the gatherings that started in 2007 and called the
Republic rallies, the slogan of "Are you aware of
the danger?" was set. In fact, at that time, it bore
the signs that the secular segments were breaking
away from the western understanding and
evolving towards a pro-Russian and pro-Chinese
Eurasian understanding. However, the western
identity, which had been defended for a long
time, hindered active opposition to the JDP. For
this reason, the political Islamist past of these
people was emphasized (Işik, 2012).
However, one of the most striking features of that
period was frequently expressed by Tayyip
Erdogan in the statement "I took off the national
view shirt." The expression is a phrase that was
used very effectively and turned into a slogan,
both to escape from that past of Tayyip Erdogan,
to emphasize his new identity and to block the
propaganda activities directed at him and his
party. He constantly felt the need to reject his past
with this sentence (Yılmaz, 2016) so that he
could move towards his political goals.
The peak point of all these struggles was the
Presidential elections held in 2007. According to
the 1982 constitution of the Republic of Turkey,
the president was elected by the Turkish Grand
National Assembly with a 2/3 majority vote.
However, as a result of the implementation of
this rule in the 1961 Constitution, the inability to
elect the president in very long sessions became
an important problem. Therefore, in the 1982
Constitution, the candidate who received the
absolute majority votes (at least one more than
the half) in the third round of the elections would
be elected President. The 2/3 majority
requirement was valid for the first two rounds
only. The candidate who received the absolute
majority in the third round would be elected
President. There were 550 deputies in the total
parliament of that day. A two-thirds majority of
these MPs amounted to 367. However, the
allegation of Sabih Kanadoğlu, who had
previously served as the Chief Public Prosecutor,
made Turkey very busy at that time. According
to this claim, at least 367 deputies had to be
present in the parliament for the election of the
president (Turhan, 2007). However, until that
day, the number of 367 was known as the number
of deputies to elect the president in the first
round. In this case, no one except the JDP
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deputies participated in the voting and the
number of participants remained at 361. In this
case, the Republican People's Party, which
applied to the Constitutional Court, canceled this
vote, and as a result, the JDP had to hold new
elections (Kahraman, 2007). In the general
elections held on July 22, 2007, JDP received
46.58% of the total votes in Turkey. Having
received only 34.4% of the total votes in the 2002
elections, the JDP increased its public support by
more than 10% in this election. Abdullah Gül
became President with the participation of the
Nationalist Movement Party, which entered the
parliament in subsequent Presidential elections.
These developments also represented the starting
point of major breaks in Turkey's political life
(Yılmaz, 2021).
The turning point in which the JDP gained
strength in such a way that no effective
opposition could be made within the system was
the referendum held in 2010. In this referendum,
the structure of the Constitutional Court, which
actively opposed the JDP, was changed, the
structure of the high council of judges and
prosecutors was changed, and military courts
were abolished. Thus, as a result of the elections
held in 2011 with the great success of the JDP,
Tayyip Erdogan declared that he entered a period
of mastery in politics.
JDP’s Foreign Policy until 2009
One of the clearest reflections of JDP's liberal-
democratic understanding emerged in its foreign
policy practices. Evaluating Turkey's chronic
problems up to that time with different foreign
policy approaches, JDP also gained the support
of some secular liberal sections in the country.
For example, the Cyprus issue, which has been
on Turkey's agenda since the 1950s, was handled
with a very different approach and a very liberal
and democratic line was followed. Accordingly,
the unification of the two communities in Cyprus
and their entry into the European Union with a
common constitution had previously been
revealed by the Annan Plan made by the United
Nations. Fully supporting this plan, JDP showed
that they were supporters of a liberal and
democratic solution, and they also received the
support of the Western world with these moves.
Likewise, JDP improved its relations with the
European Union at an advanced level and carried
out the harmonization packages and
democratization moves required for
membership. In fact, Turkey had very close
relations with Greece, which had previously been
determined as an enemy in the public opinion
(Oran & Ünsal, 2013).
One of the points where liberal policies are most
clearly reflected in foreign policy is the "zero-
problems-with-neighbors policy" formulated by
the JDP itself. The slogans frequently voiced by
the soldiers and the institutions supporting them,
especially the secular elites in previous periods,
were losing their validity in this period. A slogan
inherited from the previous eras to the Turkey of
that day clearly revealed Turkey's relationship
with its neighbors: "A country surrounded by
seas on three sides and enemies on four sides."
According to this, Turkey was surrounded by
enemies and Turkey's neighbors were Turkey's
enemies. However, this concept changed to a
large extent and, as a requirement of liberal
policies, it reached the point of "zero problems
with neighbors" (Askerov, 2017).
In addition, Turkey's constant facing to the West
due to its secular identity had a significant impact
on its relations with the Middle East countries.
For this reason, there were very limited relations
with the Middle East countries in the previous
periods.
One of Turkey's most important foreign policy
problems from previous periods was its relations
with Syria. The Euphrates River, which
originates from Turkey and passes through Syria,
created important problems in foreign policy.
The construction of dams on this river caused the
problem of transboundary waters with Syria and
this problem remained on the agenda for a long
time. On the other hand, Syria's support of PKK
terror, which is a Kurdish separatist movement in
Turkey, exacerbated the problems (Sever, 2001).
However, JDP had very close relations with
Syria as a requirement of its "zero problems with
neighbors" policy and changed the direction of
the old policies of the state.
Methodology
This study was a qualitative survey and was a
comparison of two different periods. The data
required for the study were obtained by literature
review and these data were evaluated
comparatively. The conditions under which the
JDP's Syrian policy, which is the subject of this
article, changed and where it evolved as a result
are discussed in the study. In addition, case
studies were conducted to shed light on the
emerging transformations.
The article was formed with the analysis of the
policies of JDP in two different periods by
comparing and contrasting them. Moreover, the
reasons for the change in policies were analyzed,
and how these changes were put into effect in
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Syrian policy was demonstrated through
practices. While the paper reveals the historical
development of Islamist idea in Turkey, it gives
an account of the reasons for the change resulting
in the implementation of the ideology on Syria.
In order to give a clear picture, the paper used a
comparative method and indicated the policy
changes of JDP in different periods.
Results and discussion
Ahmet davutoglu and neo ottomanism
The last point the JDP was on the defensive in
Turkey's political structure was the closure case,
which was opened in Constitutional Court,
brought against it in March 2008. The positive
outcome of this case for JDP, amid pressure from
the environment towards secular elites, created a
great opportunity. The unchanging public
support to the JDP in all the developing processes
and the attitudes developed by the EU and the
USA towards the dissidents, who were believed
to hamper the democratization processes,
heralded positive developments for the JDP.
Both the high level of public support and the
support of the USA and the EU against the
secular elites strengthened the JDP's position
both at home and abroad. In fact, all these
developments were clearly shown in the
referendum in 2010, and 11 articles of the
constitution, which can be considered as
important steps towards democratization, were
amended.
The fact that the JDP did not have a competitor
to effectively oppose was an important reflection
of that Ahmet Davutoglu was made Minister of
Foreign Affairs in 2009, and JDP started to
produce new policies. At this point, the
appointment of Ahmet Davutoglu as Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the adoption of the idea of
neo-Ottomanism as a policy coincided with the
same time (Akca, 2019).
In Ahmet Davutoglu’s previous book, "Strategic
Depth", we see that he evaluates the power of the
state by taking into account different data.
Accordingly, the history, geography, culture and
population of a state are its fixed data. Likewise,
its economic, technological and military capacity
are also potential data. While these come
together to show the power of the state, there are
other factors that affect these data exponentially.
First of all, the strategic mentality of that state
and the existence of historical accumulation that
includes cultural, psychological, religious and
social values within this mentality can be used
effectively in policy making. All this will take
place within a strategic planning. This strategic
planning will be made by the political initiative
who is willing in this regard (Davutoğlu, 2001).
In this study, Davutoğlu also mentions some
elites who does not have a certain identity. He
stated that these people, who think that they do
not take initiative and take risks in making
decisions on important issues, withdraw in
occasions that require responsibility. Therefore,
these elites stand back at the point where they
need to take a step. They follow a passive policy.
However, he implied that people with the
understanding of strategic depth should take risks
and be active in important decisions (Davutoğlu,
2001).
In fact, we can say that Davutoglu brought such
a notion to power with the idea of neo-
Ottomanism together with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, which started in 2009. Although
it is perceived in a very different way in the
society, Davutoglu’s understanding of neo-
Ottomanism is to have very close relations with
the modern states that became a part of the
Ottoman Empire and to be a pioneer in many
issues.
It was thought that adopting this idea and acting
in this direction would bring Turkey to a central
position as in the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly,
Turkey would conduct active diplomacy in its
environment and use its soft power effectively. In
this way, it would strengthen the positive
perception towards itself in other societies. In
addition, in order for a country to internalize its
strategic depth, it had to accept its historical past
and plan accordingly. In this way, there was the
thought that the past inherited from the Ottoman
Empire would strengthen Turkey even more
(Tüysüzoğlu, 2013).
In fact, we can say that with this thought, Ahmet
Davutoğlu is trying to change the direction of
Turkey's traditional foreign policy. The western
and secular identity that Turkey had previously
adopted had weakened its relations, especially
with its southern and eastern neighbors. He
remained far from active politics in his relations
with the West. It was believed that Turkey's
effectiveness would increase with the new
concept determined (Tüysüzoğlu, 2013).
Turkey's traditional foreign policy was heavily
oriented towards the West and was shaped to
bring its western identity to the fore. Especially
the abandonment of the idea of irredentism with
the establishment of the republic caused Turkey
to take a passive stance towards the former
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Ottoman geographies, the Balkans and the
Middle East. After 2009, the JDP's lack of rivals
in domestic politics and elimination of secular
elites signaled its transition to a new and
proactive foreign policy. Although Davutoğlu
stated that he did not use terms such as neo-
Ottomanism, he criticized Turkey's passive
foreign policy on many issues in various ways
and signaled new directions (Cavlan, 2010). In
this context, Davutoğlu criticized Turkey's
failure to pursue active politics towards the states
that were historically and geopolitically within
the Ottoman Empire (Davutoğlu, 2001).
During this period, Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan explained Turkey's new foreign policy
as follows: He stated that Turkey is not a country
in the periphery of international actors in any
way, and that it is in a strategic position that will
affect three continents. He also stated that
Turkey's experience and historical mission
compelled Turkey to assume a role in line with
this rich background. Therefore, he stated that
Turkey should move towards becoming a global
power instead of being a regional power.
Likewise, he stated that this situation is not a
radical change from traditional politics, but a
revision in line with world realities (Tüysüzoğlu,
2013).
In fact, although Ahmet Davutoğlu does not
openly use the term Ottomanism, it is possible to
understand from his discourses that a new
Islamist identity is being formed and that Muslim
states from the old Ottoman legacy are being
called upon for cooperation under the leadership
of Turkey. He included the Muslims in the
Balkans, as well as the Middle East countries,
which were former Ottoman lands, in the Muslim
communities. The proactive foreign policy that
started with Davutoglu was not limited to the
modern states that were under the rule of the
Ottoman Empire. Foreign policy towards the
Muslim communities in Africa also started to
work actively. After becoming the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu announced in
his Sarajevo speech on 16 October 2009 that they
would strengthen their ties with these Muslim
countries and establish very close relations with
them. He also expressed the need of Muslim
communities for Turkey in different ways. He
even stated that a significant part of Turkey's own
population consisted of people whose origins
belonged to these countries. All these were
expressions that drew the profile of an idealist
Islamist (Oran & Ünsal, 2013).
Reflections of paradigm shift on syrian policy
In fact, the zero-problems-with-neighbors policy
that JDP had previously set had begun to bear
fruit since 2007. The rapprochement between the
two countries became more evident with the free
trade agreement on 1 January 2007. In the
following period, until 2010, the trade volume
between the two countries increased from 796
million dollars to 2.5 billion dollars
(Collinsworth, 2013).
Later, on September 16, 2009, with the visit of
Bashar Assad to Turkey, a strategic cooperation
council was established between the two
countries. There would be ministers of the two
countries in this council and it would consist of
16 people in total. In addition, other ministers
who were not members of this council would also
attend the meetings when necessary. It was
envisaged that this council would meet at least
twice a year. An important advantage of this
council was that it would enable the bureaucratic
problems to be overcome more quickly (Sinkaya,
2012). In addition, with the visa exemption
agreement signed in 2009, the citizens of the two
countries started to enter the other country
without obtaining a visa (Imai, 2016).
This agreement was followed by the ministerial
meetings of the two countries for high-level
strategic cooperation. The meetings held in
Aleppo and Gaziantep on 13 October 2009 with
the participation of council member ministers
were realized as a concrete step of cooperation
(Kibaroğlu, 2016). In addition, on 22 December
2009, the council attended by Prime Minister
Tayyip Erdogan on behalf of the Republic of
Turkey convened in Damascus and a total of 50
agreements, memorandums of understanding and
cooperation protocols were signed in various
fields (Scheumann et al., 2011).
Likewise, this council was held in Latakia, Syria
on October 3, 2010. The meeting with the
participation of the Prime Ministers was held on
21 December 2010 in Ankara. At this meeting,
the status of the previous agreement was
evaluated. In addition, 11 more agreements were
made. In these agreements, it was decided to
fight terrorism, to combine natural gas pipelines,
to facilitate customs procedures and to clear
mined lands and make them suitable for
agriculture.
− Arab Spring and Turkey’s Positioning
The Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia in
2010, spread to the countries in that region and
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reached Syria. At first, Turkey was in favor of
democratic solutions. For example, in the
uprisings against the Gaddafi regime in Libya,
Turkey sought a democratic solution that would
continue the regime and prevent international
intervention. However, these searches were
unsuccessful. Then, when the events broke out in
Syria, Turkey first thought of solving the
problems with democratic initiatives that the
Syrian regime would also consent to (Oran &
Ünsal, 2013).
When demonstrations began in Syria in March
2011, regimes in other Arab countries had
already been overthrown. However, there was
the potential for a much longer war in Syria. The
policy that Turkey had wanted to implement in
Libya previously did not work. In this case, the
need to follow different policies regarding Syria
stood in front of Turkish policy makers. In Syria,
the demonstrations first turned into a civil war,
then into proxy wars and became a cause for
conflict between sects. In addition, in the same
period, organizations with religious references
started to become more active in Syria, and
minorities of different nationalities such as the
Kurds began to seek new solutions of being
independent.
The rapprochement with Syria until that day had
caused Turkey to remain silent in response to the
regime's reaction to the events taking place in
Syria. After the protests started on March 18,
2011, Turkey was in favor of solving problems
through dialogue. At first, Turkey saw this issue
as Syria's own internal issue and was worried that
the problems that would arise would affect it
negatively (Altunışık, 2016). Later, Turkey
wanted the Syrian regime to make some reforms.
Among these demands of Turkey were general
amnesty, change in the electoral system and the
abolition of the state of emergency that had been
going on since 1963. The Assad regime in Syria
lifted the state of emergency on April 21.
However, when other reforms and democratic
initiatives were not realized, Turkey changed its
policy towards Syria. At that time, Ahmet
Davutoglu’s intense efforts were inconclusive
(Mohammed, 2011). Later, Prime Minister
Erdogan decided to impose economic sanctions
against the Syrian regime after his visit to the
USA.
− Pressure on Syria by the JDP
The JDP government's policy towards Syria,
starting from March 2011, turned into forcing
this country into democratic reforms. However,
at the same time, these calls for reform did not
yield results and the refugee migration to Turkey
started. While rumors were spreading that they
would create a buffer zone in Syria to stop the
refugees from crossing into Turkey, the Syrian
army was sending soldiers to the Turkish border.
During this process, allowing the Syrian
opposition to gather in Turkey in May and July
indicated that the crisis between Turkey and
Syria would deepen. On July 9, 2011, Davutoglu
went for the last time and demanded that the war
be stopped. When these demands were not
accepted, Turkey started to follow a similar
policy against Syria together with the western
states. In September, Turkey allowed the
dissidents to form the Syrian National Council in
Istanbul. In this way, Turkish government
thought that they could have more control over
the political equilibrium that might emerge after
Assad in Syria. Likewise, the Assad regime
accused Turkey of inciting, arming and training
the rebels (Oran & Ünsal, 2013).
− Support to Opposition
After September 2011, Turkey changed its policy
towards Syria once again and started to support
the opposition. In this new period, Davutoglu
first announced a package of sanctions against
Syria on October 30, 2011. Accordingly, high-
level strategic cooperation was suspended until
the establishment of the legitimate government in
Syria, senior officials who used violence against
civilians within the country were banned from
traveling to Turkey, and their assets in Turkey
were frozen. Similarly, arms sales to Syria were
stopped, and all arms shipments to this country
were blocked. In addition, financial relations
with the Central Bank of Syria were suspended
(Ağır & Atılgan, 2017).
− JDP’s Similar Policies Towards Other
Arab Countries
In fact, during the period when Turkey changed
its policy towards Syria, there were also power
changes in countries that had previously
experienced the Arab Spring and gained new
administrations. For example, in the elections
held on October 23, 2011, in Tunisia, where the
Arab Spring began, the Ennahda party, which
was described as a moderate Islamist, received
41% of the votes and won 89 seats in the 218-
member constituent assembly. Likewise, it
became the largest political party in the
parliament (Saleh, 2015).
Likewise, in the election process that started on
November 28, 2011, and ended on January 11,
2012, in Egypt, as an Islamist organization, the
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Muslim brothers' party “Freedom and Justice
Party”, won 127 out of 332 seats and achieved
great success in the election together with the
other parties it formed a coalition with.
Mohammed Morsi, the representative of the
Muslim brothers, won the presidential elections
held in May-June 2012 (Kazamias, 2015). Morsi
pursued policies aimed at weakening the military
tutelage, as the JDP had done in Turkey. During
this period, Morsi dismissed some military
commanders. However, he was removed from
power with the military coup on 3 July 2013
(Kurun, 2015).
It should be stated that Morsi's domestic policy
moves in this period were similar to the JDP's
policies in Turkey. However, what the JDP did in
Turkey, Morsi could not do in Egypt. Along with
the military coup, the government and pro-
government press in Turkey reacted very harshly
to the military coup (Türkeş, 2016).
− Islamist Ideals as Driving Force
All these show that the changes made in the
Syrian policy in this period and the policy
towards other Arab countries show similarities.
Although JDP's discourses focused on
democracy at that time, it is possible to say that
Islamist ideals came to the fore. Already in this
period, we see that with the change made in
Syrian policy, they started to support the
opposition in this country. The opposition
supported by the JDP emerged as belonging to
the Islamist background (Başkan & Taşpınar,
2021).
Islamic organizations similar to the Muslim
brothers in Egypt were also present in Syria.
Behind the JDP's support to these Islamic groups
was its enthusiasm to bring organizations that
would have close relations with it to power.
While doing this, the western states, especially
the USA, reacted strongly to Bashar Assad's use
of chemical weapons against his own people at
that time (Scheller, 2014). In this case, the JDP
calculated that the groups it supported would be
accepted by the westerners and move to power.
However, the fact that the US wanted Assad, who
had secular tendencies, to stay in power rather
than an Islamic government, had failed Turkey's
calculations. Likewise, Turkey could not
calculate the existence of forces such as Saudi
Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates that
would give serious reactions to any formation of
the Muslim brothers (Erhan et al., 2015).
Although the JDP did not openly expressed its
Islamic ideals on Syria and other Arab countries,
different reflections of this have emerged. In
particular, a phrase that Tayyip Erdogan used in
his speech on September 5, 2012, has been
constantly reminded as a slogan that most clearly
shows the Islamic ideals in Turkey after that day.
His sentence is as follows: "God willing, we will
recite Fatiha [First Quranic verse that is cited in
prayers in Islam] at the tomb of Saladin, and we
will also perform our prayers in the Umayyad
Mosque... We will freely pray for our
brotherhood (Hurriyet Newspaper, 2012)."
− Developments at Home
In the following period, Turkey's interest in the
opposition in Syria continued to increase. In
January 2014, 2 trucks claimed by government
officials to belong to the National Intelligence
Organization were stopped by the Gendarmerie
on the order of the prosecutor (Armstrong, 2014).
It was claimed that these trucks initially
contained weapons that went to the Syrian
opposition. When these allegations were
repeated in the press for a long time, government
officials began to repeat that there was
humanitarian aid going to Syria in the trucks
(Stanley-Adamson, 2016).
In the news published in May 2015, signed by
journalist Can Dündar, the weapons hidden under
the drugs in these trucks were shown. Thereupon,
Turkey's agenda focused on this issue again
(Dündar, 2015), and at this point Ahmet
Davutoglu emphasized that state institutions
should work in coordination and stated that it was
wrong to reflect a decision of the political will as
if it were a crime by another state institution. In
addition, he said, unlike his previous statements,
what happens inside the trucks is nobody's
business (Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 2015).
− Russian Intervention and Defensive
Period
During this period, clashes continued between
the Syrian army and the opposition, and the
progress of the opposition could not be stopped.
At the beginning of 2014, the opposition in Syria
lost foreign support to a large extent, and during
this period, ISIS began to be effective in the north
and east of Syria. By 2015, Russia was also
included in the equation in Syria on September
30, 2015. Russia, which stated that it entered the
region in order to stop the advance of the terrorist
organization ISIS, organized an aerial
bombardment against ISIS, thus weakening the
strength of the organization. In addition, during
this period, the Syrian government gained the
support of Iran (Karnazov, 2015).
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The downing of the Russian plane, which
violated Turkish airspace on November 24, 2015,
started a new era for Turkey. Turkey, which had
been actively involved in the crisis in Syria until
that day, then changed its priority and returned to
its national security policies. In this period, the
protection of the borders and the organization of
the Kurdish minority in northern Syria were
highlighted as the main problems. This period
also led to a temporary Cold War between
Turkey and Russia, and the Syrian airspace was
closed to Turkish planes in the same period. After
this, the Assad regime in Syria entered the
recovery process (Kökçam, 2018).
− Turkish Military Operations to Maintain
its Security
It is possible to say that Russia's intervention in
the region changed the conditions dramatically.
In fact, as a result of the influence of Russia,
Astana talks were held, and a ceasefire was
declared between the Assad regime and the
opposition on 30 December 2016. Turkey and
Iran were also included in these talks. In fact,
these three countries became the guarantor states.
As a result of the Astana agreement signed on
May 4, 2017, it was decided to establish de-
escalation zones. Later, with the 2 agreements
dated 15 September 2017, the framework
determining the duties and responsibilities of the
soldiers of the guarantor countries was drawn. 12
observation points were established around Idlib,
and the observation points where Turkish
soldiers were placed were located in the areas
under the control of the opposition. Russia and
Iran had observation points in the areas under the
control of the Assad regime. However, the
advance of the regime soldiers towards Idlib
continued and this situation led to an increase in
the wave of migration towards Turkey. In this
case, Turkey placed more soldiers at the
observation posts, but could not prevent the
attacks (Demir, 2021).
After the start of the period of Turkey's
withdrawal to the defense in Syria, its policy
focused on border security and internal security
issues. In this context, there were different cross-
border movements of the Turkish Armed Forces
towards Syria. The first of these is the operation
launched against the ISIS on August 24, 2016. As
a result of this operation, ISIS withdrew inside
Syria. The reason that compelled Turkey in this
operation was the killing of soldiers and civilians
on its own borders and within the country by this
organization (Yeltin, 2018).
On January 30, 2018, there was a second
operation launched by Turkey against the Kurds'
attempts to establish a new state in Syria. There
were important reasons for this operation from
Turkey’s point of view. First of all, this operation
was launched with the aim of creating safe zones
for the Syrian refugees, whose numbers are
increasing day by day in Turkey. In addition, the
activity of the separatist Kurdish movement PKK
in Turkey, its attack on Turkey's military posts
and attempts to establish a new state have made
the operation necessary for Turkey. As a result of
this operation, Afrin city center was taken under
control on 18 March 2018. Thus, the Kurdish
canton that was planned to be established in the
region was prevented (Köylü, 2018).
On October 30, 2019, another Turkish operation
against the Kurdish region in Syria began. The
activities of the separatist Kurdish movement in
this region were perceived as a threat by Turkey.
Although military success was achieved as a
result of this operation, some results changed
with the intervention of the USA and Russia later
on. In the Ankara agreement dated October 17,
2019, Turkey and the United States reached an
agreement, and the Kurdish militias began to
withdraw to the south. In addition, the Sochi
agreement was signed with Russia on October
22, 2019, and as a result, it was decided that the
separatist militias would withdraw 30 kilometers
to the south. In addition, it was planned to
conduct patrols of Turkish and Russian soldiers
at a depth of 10 kilometers in this region. Thus,
actors with diplomatic activity such as Russia
and the USA came before Turkey and limited
Turkey's range of action (Demir, 2021).
Then, on February 20, 2020, another operation
against Syria was launched. Neighboring the
Turkish city of Hatay, Idlib had become a
gathering place for opponents of the regime.
Therefore, the attacks of both the Assad regime
and the Russian forces continued. This situation,
which threatens Turkey's borders, could also lead
to a refugee influx of three million people living
in the region towards Turkey. Due to these
security problems, Turkey launched a cross-
border operation. As a result of this operation,
which took place with an air attack, the Sochi
agreement was signed between Russia and
Turkey on March 5, 2002, and the operation was
terminated. Thus, Turkey's control was
established around Idlib. As a result of this
operation, Turkey eliminated a security problem
against itself (Demir, 2021).
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− New Pursuits in Syrian Policy
At the last point, the realization by Turkey that
the Bashar Assad regime could not be
overthrown especially because of the support of
Russia and the USA brought new pursuits.
Tayyip Erdogan, who said that it was not possible
to meet with Bashar Assad before (Cumhuriyet
Newspaper, 2017), has recently changed his
mind. Holding a press conference for the
European political community while he was in
Prague, Erdogan said on relations with Syria,
"When the time comes, we can go to meet with
the president of Syria. As of now, there are
already low-level talks (Euronews, 2022)."
Discussion
After the military memorandum in 2007, JDP's
ability to overcome the closure case in 2008
without any problems caused it to become almost
the only actor in political life in the following
period. The JDP, which largely eliminated the
opposition forces within the state with the
constitutional amendment referendum in 2010,
gave the signal that it would embark on new
initiatives when Ahmet Davutoglu was appointed
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2009. After
this period, the idea of following a proactive
policy under the name of neo-Ottomanism was
attempted and new initiatives were tried to be
realized for all nations that were under the rule of
the Ottoman Empire. Although an Islamic
understanding was not expressed openly at the
level of discourse, the actions of the later period
showed that the government was chasing Islamic
dreams. In particular, the collapse of the regimes
after the Arab Spring and the coming to power of
parties with Islamist ideas in countries such as
Egypt and Tunisia gave hope that the dreams of
the JDP would come true.
However, the intervention of other political
forces in the following process brought about
radical changes. The removal of the Muslim
brothers from power in Egypt and the
intervention of Russia in Syria to support the
Assad regime also heralded that Islamist dreams
would not come true. As a matter of fact, the
USA's support of the Assad regime against
radical Islamist opponents had results far beyond
the expectations of the JDP.
With Russia's intervention in the region, it is
possible to say that Turkey's Syria policy was
drawn to a defensive line. After that period, some
military operations were carried out to prevent
formations that would threaten Turkey's security
in the authority vacuum that emerged in Syria. As
a matter of fact, these operations were carried out
under the control of Russia and the USA.
Tayyip Erdogan's Syria policy has significant
changes in attitude. While he was close enough
to say, "my brother Esad" before the Arab Spring,
it came to the point of saying enemy "Eset" after
the events started in Syria (Demirtaş, 2013). He
stated that it was not possible to meet with Bashar
Assad during this period. He even stated that
Assad was a murderer who killed his own people.
However, at the last point, he stated that he could
negotiate with the regime in Syria.
Finally, after the Turkish Foreign Minister
Mevlut Cavusoglu’s statement, "We have to
somehow agree with the opposition and the
regime in Syria, we have to take it", anti-Turkey
protests were held in many cities under the
control of the Free Syrian Army supported by
Turkey. Meanwhile, there were those who
burned the Turkish flag among the protesters
(Euronews, 2022).
Conclusion
After coming to power in Turkey, the JDP, which
was quite weak against the secular soldiers,
received great support both inside and outside of
Turkey with its liberal and democratic line.
Thanks to this support, he was able to stand
against the soldiers, who were the most effective
political power in Turkey at that time. Even
liberal policies showed themselves in foreign
relations and a policy of zero problems with all
neighboring countries was adopted. In this
context, very close strategic cooperation was
entered into with Syria. However, the fact that
the JDP became very powerful and remained
unrivaled in the political arena caused it to return
to its own Islamist identity. Supporting the
opposition in Syria for these purposes and
providing them with weapons, JDP was eager to
bring Islamist groups to power. Other
developments that fed these dreams also emerged
in Egypt and Tunisia, which experienced the
Arab Spring. While all these brought about
foreign policy initiatives that fed Islamic
idealism, with the intervention of Russia, Iran
and the USA in Syria, all these idealist policies
were replaced by realist and defensive policies.
After a while, Turkey's own security was
endangered, and foreign policy moves to protect
this security were realized. Turkey's Syrian
foreign policy evolved from democratic liberal
policies to idealist Islamist policies, and then it
has been drawn to a realistic line in the face of
the emerging realities. In fact, at this point, a
situation has emerged that even the opponents,
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who were supported before by Turkey, are not
satisfied.
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