Volume 11 - Issue 55
/ July 2022
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2022.55.07.9
How to Cite:
Semenchuk, S., Levandovska, L., Polishchuk, O., Ostrovyi, V., & Kyryliuk, O. (2022). Geopolitical attitudes of the Ukrainians in
the realities of large-scale military aggression in 2014-2022: historical understanding of dilemmas. Amazonia Investiga, 11(55),
89-96. https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2022.55.07.9
Geopolitical attitudes of the Ukrainians in the realities of large-scale
military aggression in 2014-2022: historical understanding of dilemmas
Actitudes geopolíticas de los ucranianos en las realidades de la agresión militar a gran
escala en 2014-2022: comprensión histórica de los dilemas
Received: August 10, 2022 Accepted: September 5, 2022
Written by:
Semenchuk Serhii40
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4745-7468
Levandovska Liudmyla41
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7430-1971
Polishchuk Oleksandr42
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9838-7105
Ostrovyi Volodymyr43
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7998-7949
Kyryliuk Olena44
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9591-3539
Abstract
The work examines the problem of geopolitical
attitudes of Ukrainians in the realities of large-
scale military aggression. The article notes that
the number of supporters of democratic Western
values is growing in Ukraine. The research is
primarily based on the use of empirical research
methods: observation and survey. Sociological
surveys conducted by Ukrainian sociological
research groups: “Rating”, “Democratic
Initiatives named after I. Kucheriv” and “Kyiv
International Institute of Sociology” In the
results, it was noted that the geopolitical attitudes
of Ukrainians in the southeastern regions have
noticeably transformed. In particular, if in 2013
the idea of joining the Customs Union was
supported by the majority of residents (64%),
then in 2015 only 33% supported it. In general,
the number of Ukrainians who support Ukraine's
accession to the EU will continue to grow. The
conclusions summarize that the Russian-
Ukrainian war influenced a new understanding of
40
Candidate of Historical Skiences, Senior Lecturer of the Department of Social Disciplines Khmelnytsky Humanitarian-Pedagogical
Academy, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Social Disciplines, Ukraine.
41
Doctor of Philosophy, Lecturer of the Department of Social Disciplines Khmelnytsky Humanitarian-Pedagogical Academy, Faculty
of Humanities, Department of Social Disciplines, Ukraine.
42
Dr. of Philosophical Sciences, Professor Vice-Rector for Scientific and Pedagogical Work Department of Social Disciplines Faculty
of Humanities Khmelnytsky Humanitarian and Pedagogical Academy, Ukraine.
43
Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Social Disciplines, Assistant Professor of the
Department of Social Disciplines Khmelnytsky Humanitarian-Pedagogical Academy, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Social
Disciplines, Ukraine.
44
Senior Lecturer of the Department of Social Disciplines Khmelnytsky Humanitarian-Pedagogical Academy, Faculty of Humanities,
Department of Social Disciplines, Ukraine.
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Russian-Ukrainian relations in the post-Soviet
space. The level of Ukrainian support for the idea
of Ukraine's integration into the European Union
is particularly high.
Keywords: geopolitical attitudes, population of
Ukraine, transformation, Russian-Ukrainian war.
Introduction
The challenges of our time place new demands
on the formation of historical memory and the
revision of the past coexistence of peoples. In
2014. The Russian Federation (hereinafter
Russian Federation) launched a war against
Ukraine by occupying Ukrainian Crimea and
then supporting separatist sentiments in Donetsk
and Luhansk regions. At the same time, an
aggressive information campaign and the hybrid
war were launched to discredit Ukraine at every
possible level. Ukrainian society responded to
these challenges by uniting public and
government institutions, forming an active
volunteer movement, supporting the army,
forming additional volunteer formations, and by
informational resistance (Krasnozhon, 2021). At
the same time, the confrontation also took place
on a worldview level - a number of old
established myths, imposed since Soviet times,
collapsed in the minds of most Ukrainians.
Partial freezing of the conflict during 2016-2021,
its transfer from active combat to local
confrontation contributed to the preservation of
the level of trust in the Russians, but the open
attack on February 24, 2022 (using the
Belarusian territory) led to an openly negative
attitude towards the Russian Federation and
Russian ideologemes, a final break in the
Ukrainian consciousness of the concepts of
“good neighborliness” proposed in due time by
Russia, ideas about high Russian culture, the
presence and influence of which is not felt in the
actions of Russian military.
The problem of change of moods of the
Ukrainian population since February 2022, the
fall of pro-Russian political and social forces is a
relevant object of research on the political
situation in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the
purpose of the article is to analyze the
geopolitical moods of the Ukrainian population
in the realities of large-scale military aggression
in 2014-2022, in particular, through the prism of
historical comprehension of the dilemma of the
choice between European values. Thanks to the
realization of this task, it is possible to forecast
certain scenarios of the future neighborhood of
Ukraine and the Russian Federation in a time
perspective. Such research, therefore, will be
important for understanding the prospects and
consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war,
which will still be felt in the future in Europe and
all over the world (in view, for example, of
Ukraine's role in the world market of food
products).
The main sources for the study of this problem
are sociological surveys conducted by powerful
Ukrainian research centers. They make it
possible to assess transformations in the
consciousness of citizens in a temporal
perspective, i.e., to determine the real level of
support or decline of trust in a particular
phenomenon.
Theoretical Framework or Literature Review
Many Ukrainian scholars have studied the
peculiarities of the Russian-Ukrainian war since
2014. However, after the large-scale invasion by
the Russians (February 2022), there was a
qualitative reassessment of all long-standing
events. Scholars acknowledged that it was
impossible to foresee such a bloody and radical
continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian
confrontation. However, a few months after the
start of the Russian aggression, it is possible to
determine both the prerequisites for the war and
to outline indicative scenarios of its development
and consequences. For this reason, an important
task of modern political science remains the
analysis of the geopolitical attitude of Ukrainian
citizens. Note that since the Russian-Ukrainian
war, Ukrainian scientists began to actively study
it through a scientific prism.
For example, Kuzio (2021) investigated the
development of the Russian-Ukrainian war since
2014 and characterized its main causes and
preconditions. Parshyn & Mereniuk (2022)
investigated the peculiarities of the development
of Kyivan Rus’ through the prism of
multiculturalism. For this study, the works of
historians are valuable because they show the
duration of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. They
confirm the opinion that Ukraine takes its roots
Semenchuk, S., Levandovska, L., Polishchuk, O., Ostrovyi, V., Kyryliuk, O. / Volume 11 - Issue 55: 89-96 / July, 2022
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from Kievan Rus’, not Russia. In addition,
Ukrainian historians prove that Kievan Rus’
developed in a European direction during the
centuries.
Ishchuk (2022) characterized the main motives
of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The
researcher notes that although the official version
of the Russian government is to restore the
integrity of the divided “Russian world,” in fact
the motives of the attack on Ukraine are quite
different. Russia without Ukraine is no longer an
empire, and with its rich Ukrainian territories, it
automatically becomes an empire.
Ishchuk (2022) further cites a different motive.
Russia wants to take away from Ukraine the
primogeniture that Ukrainians rightly received
from medieval mighty Kievan Rus'. Therefore,
through this as well as through its aggressive
geopolitical desires, the aggressor state is trying
to absorb the economic, social, and cultural
potential of Ukraine.
The work of Kulyk (2019) is especially important
for our study. This specialist researched the
problem of the Russian-speaking population in
post-Soviet states while paying more attention to
the situation of the Russian-speaking population
in Ukraine. Kulyk (2019) analyzed the change of
the main identical Russian-speaking categories in
contemporary Ukraine. In his summary, he
believes that in contemporary Ukraine, Russian
speakers have become “fully Ukrainian,”
rejecting the Soviet philosophy. Note that many
foreign researchers have also taken part in the
study of this problem. Ghilès, (2022)
investigated the development of the Russian-
Ukrainian war and the transformation of Europe's
policy in this regard.
For example, Bînă & Dragomir (2020)
characterized the peculiarities of the Russian-
Ukrainian information war based on the analysis
of the main propaganda mechanisms used by the
Russian media. At the same time, Aladekomo
(2022) investigated the transformation of the
Russian-Ukrainian war through a legal prism.
Arel & Driscoll (2022) characterized the events
of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation to the
large-scale Russian invasion in February 2022.
Bertelsen (2017) in his monographic study
outlined the basic preconditions of the Russian-
Ukrainian war, the scholar paid special attention
to the coverage of events02 and 3-2. its impact on
the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Note that currently there are many works devoted
to terminological aspects of modern wars, in
particular, the study of the concept of hybrid
warfare. The latter is a manifestation of modern
wars, including the Russian-Ukrainian war. On
the other hand, Martz, 2022, highlighted in detail
the various crimes of the Russian state against
Ukraine.
At the same time, Claessen (2021) analyzed the
geopolitical realities of the Russian-Ukrainian
confrontation and its consequences in the future.
The work of O'Loughlin & Toal (2019) deserves
special attention. These experts have
characterized the problem of the transformation
of the geopolitical attitude based on the analysis
of the sentiments of Ukrainians in the
southeastern regions of Ukraine. They noted the
existence of tangible pro-Russian tendencies in
the region in question, which had a certain
influence on local political life and support for
predominantly pro-Russian politicians at the
level of the national parliament (Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine).
At the same time, they recorded that the level of
pro-Russian sympathies has decreased since the
events of 2014, but this has not fundamentally
changed the political balance of power in the
region. Consequently, there are not many
separate studies on the evolution of the
geopolitical attitudes of Ukrainians in Ukrainian
and global academic thought in general. For this
reason, the research on the influence of open
armed aggression in 2022 on the geopolitical
moods of Ukrainians in the future remains
relevant.
Methodology
The article is formed as a result of the use of
general scientific and empirical methods of
research. In particular, methods of analysis and
synthesis were used in the study of the theoretical
part of the problem. Using the method of
comparison, it was possible to trace the
peculiarities of the transformation of geopolitical
attitudes of Ukrainians in 2014 (the beginning of
Russian aggression against Ukraine) and 2022
(after the large-scale invasion of Russian troops
into Ukraine).
Based on the axiological method, it was possible
to pass from theoretical judgments to certain
conclusions regarding the geopolitical
orientations of Ukrainians. Possible potential
geopolitical attitudes of Ukrainians are reflected
as a result of using the prognostic method. The
historical method of research reflects the
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development of the geopolitical attitude of
Ukrainians through the historical prism.
At the same time, the study is based on the use of
empirical research methods: survey, observation,
analysis of statistical data. The main material for
the empirical research was sociological surveys
conducted by the “Rating” group and the
“Razumkov Center”, the Kyiv International
Institute of Sociology, and the “I. Kucheriv
Democratic Initiatives” group. The Kyiv
International Institute of Sociology conducted
research demonstrating the attitude of Ukrainians
to Russia, and their attitude towards Ukraine's
accession to the EU and NATO. At the same
time, the sociological group “I. Kucheriv
Democratic Initiatives” conducted research
primarily in Eastern Ukraine. The main focus of
their surveys was to analyze the attitudes of
Ukrainians in southeastern regions toward the
Russian military and Russian citizens and to
investigate the attitudes of residents of these
regions toward the idea of joining Russia.
“Razumkov Center” studied the sentiments of
Ukrainian refugees who returned to their
homeland (Centre, 2022). The research group
“Rating” conducted a sociological survey and
used it to form the results of the mood of
Ukrainians during the war (Visit Ukraine, 2022).
It should be noted that during the survey
Ukrainian sociological services use the term
Russia to define the aggressor state, so we leave
this approach unchanged.
Results
On February 20, 2014, the Russian Federation
began armed aggression against Ukraine. As a
result, Russian troops occupied the peninsula of
Crimea and part of Donbas. Since that time, a
confrontation between patriots and pro-Russian
people began in Ukrainian society, primarily in
the eastern regions of Ukraine. At the same time,
a study by the I. Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives
group, conducted from March 16-30, 2014,
confirms the opinion that in the Donbas, a
significantly larger number of people at this time
categorically did not support the idea of joining
Russia. In particular, only 26.8% of respondents
supported the separation of the Donbas from
Ukraine and its accession to Russia. However,
51.7% of respondents believed that the
southeastern regions of Ukraine should remain
part of Ukrainian lands. Since March 2014.
Donetsk Institute for Sociological Research
organized a survey among residents of Donetsk.
Their results showed that 18.2% of respondents
wanted the region to be part of a union with
Russia, while 8.7% were in favor of joining
Russia. At the same time, only 4.7% supported
the idea of the proclamation of the so-called
DNR (Donetsk People's Republic). Note that
52.2% did not support Donetsk joining Russia
(Wood et al., 2015). Later, a sociological survey
by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology,
organized in April-May 2014, demonstrated that
25% of respondents still sought to leave Ukraine
and join Russia. However, only 5% supported the
idea of creating the “DPR”. Thus, as can be seen
from the sociological research, most of the
residents of Don did not strive to form a “people's
republic”. This idea was artificially imposed on
them with the help of Russian propaganda
(Bertelsen, 2017). At the same time, as the
military conflict escalated, the share of those who
wanted to join Russia noticeably increased. This
was caused by the opinion that a bloodless
Crimean scenario was better than a prolonged
brutal war. This idea was actively imposed on the
residents of the southeastern regions of Ukraine
(John, 2022). However, we emphasize that still
the majority of the population did not support
either joining Russia or the option of
“independence” in the manifestation of a
“people's republic” (Wood et al., 2015).
The total number of residents of Ukraine who
expressed a positive attitude to Russia from April
2014 to May 2015 decreased from 45% to 29%.
However, the percentage of those who began to
have openly negative attitudes toward Russian
citizens increased from 17% to 28% (Ukraine-
wide analysis). Most of those who had a negative
attitude toward Russians were in the Western and
Central regions. However, respondents in the
East (46%), South (43%), and Donbas (39%)
showed a tolerant and positive attitude towards
Russian citizens. Perhaps the reduction in the
power of hostilities in Donbas (since 2015)
influenced the decrease in the number of those
who experienced alienation between the societies
of Ukraine and Russia (O’Loughlin & Toal,
2019).
Since 2015, sociologists began to organize a
survey on the geopolitical interests of Ukrainian
citizens. For example, as of 2013, in eastern
Ukraine, 19 percent favored the idea of joining
the European Union, while 64 percent supported
the idea of joining the Customs Union. After the
Russian invasion, however, there was a
fundamental change in the geopolitical attitudes
of Ukrainians in the eastern regions (Arel &
Driscoll, 2022). For example, a study organized
in December 2015 found that in eastern Ukraine
(territories controlled by the Russian military
were also taken into account), 29% of
respondents supported Ukraine's accession to the
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EU. 35% did not support it, and 36% of
respondents noted that they had difficulty
answering. At the same time, the idea of joining
the Customs Union in the East of Ukraine was
not supported by 32%. However, 35% of
respondents refused to answer or found it
difficult to answer. Yet 33% supported Ukraine's
accession to the Customs Union. Note that in just
1 year of the war, the sentiment of the residents
of eastern Ukraine has changed dramatically
(O’Loughlin & Toal, 2019). Consequently, if in
2013 the idea of joining the Customs Union was
supported by the majority of residents (64%),
then as of 2015 only 33%. In general, the number
of Ukrainians supporting Ukraine's accession to
the EU is further increasing. This is evidenced by
the results of the 30th All-Ukrainian War Poll.
This poll was conducted by the research group
“Rating” in June 2022. The overwhelming
majority of the Ukrainian population supports
Ukraine's accession to the European Union
(87%). Only 3% are against it. Consequently, it
can be stated that the support for Ukraine's
accession to the EU is unanimous among
residents of all regions and ages (Ishchuk, 2022).
At the same time, 69% of respondents believe
that it will happen within 5 years. 14% believe
that it will happen between 5-10 years. Only 3%
believe that the accession to the EU will take
place in 10-20 years. Only 7% of respondents
believe that Ukraine will not integrate into EU
standards (Voytyuk, 2022). It should be noted
that as of 2022 the support of the Ukrainian
population for the idea of joining NATO has
noticeably increased (Voytyuk, 2022). In June
2022 it is supported by 76%, against - 10%,
undecided - 12%. It should be noted that only in
March 2022 68% of Ukrainians supported the
accession to NATO. In general, the idea of
Ukraine joining NATO is more cautiously
perceived by residents of the southeastern
regions (O’Loughlin & Toal, 2019). In particular,
55% of the residents of these territories perceive
this idea positively. At the same time, as 20% are
categorically against it, 22% would not come to
a referendum on Ukraine's accession to the
Alliance (Voytyuk, 2022).
Sociological surveys conducted by the group
“Rating” in 2022 point to the evolution of public
attitudes of Ukrainians, which occurred as a
result of Russian aggression. In particular, after
the initial shock, panic moods have subsided
(Visit Ukraine, 2022). Over 92% of respondents
are confident that the Ukrainian armed forces
will be able to defend the country from the
Russian army. Only about 6% of the respondents
are not sure about the possibility of repulsing
Russia. It should be noted that the conviction of
achieving victory is absolutely dominant in all
regions of Ukraine. For comparison, in January
2022 a poll was conducted, where it was asked to
determine the chances of success of Ukraine in
the conflict with Russia - then only 56% of
Ukrainians, who believed in victory if the
military clash acquired an aggressive dimension,
assessed them positively.
In March 2022, about 57% of respondents
believed that the Ukrainian army was capable of
defeating the Russian army within a few weeks.
Specifically, 18% thought victory would come in
a week, while 39% thought it would take several
weeks. 18% of respondents assumed that the
military actions would last for several months,
and only 9% of Ukrainians assumed that no
radical military success is to be expected in the
nearest future (Ukrinform, 2022). To speed up
the victory, respondents are ready to resort to
active actions. First of all, we should note that
almost 97% of respondents determined that they
would not leave the country in the near future.
4/5 Ukrainians also indicated that they support
the Ukrainian military in the confrontation with
Russia, and identified themselves as military,
volunteers, or persons providing financial or
informational support.
The image of the Russians contains negative
public connotations. As the research of the
“Rating” group showed, 40% of Ukrainians say
without hesitation that the vast majority of
Russians have a positive attitude to waging war
against Ukraine. A quarter of respondents believe
that half of the supporters of the war in Russia,
while about the same number of respondents are
convinced that only a quarter of the population
actually supports the war in Russia (Visit
Ukraine, 2022). Of this complex question, the
dilemma is extremely important: What will the
next Ukrainian-Russian relations be like? 42% of
respondents are in favor of never establishing
friendly relations with Russia again - in their
opinion, it is impossible to restore friendly
relations, a little less than a quarter of the
population is convinced that it will take 20-30
years after the war to establish peaceful relations
between the peoples, 18% think that a term of the
next 10-15 years will be enough. Only 12% of
those surveyed say that only a few years will be
enough to restore “pre-war” friendly contacts
(Visit Ukraine, 2022). If we analyze the
geography of such a survey, we can see a certain
“disposition” towards Russia on the part of
residents of the East and South of Ukraine,
especially among people who have relatives in
the Russian Federation. On the other hand, more
than 30% of respondents have relatives in Russia,
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and they are in no mood to seek ways of
reconciliation with official Moscow.
Refugees returning to Ukraine, according to
research by the Razumkov Center, in February
2022 rated their condition on average 7.9 out of
10 (Centre, 2022). In the proposed scale, 0 meant
“the maximum level of peace and confidence,”
while 10 corresponded to an incredible level of
panic and uncertainty about the future. In total,
more than 57% of respondents indicated numbers
between 8 and 10, i.e., they defined their state as
extremely panicky (Centre, 2022). By mid-May,
however, the situation had already changed. The
psychological state of refugees who return to
Ukraine is assessed by an average of 5.5. Only
15% of respondents evaluated their inner state by
the score from 8 to 10. This indicates a significant
improvement of the well-being of people and
muted panic moods. In addition, 94% of the
Ukrainians, who returned home, admitted that
Ukraine will come out of the war victorious.
Characteristically, no one gave a negative answer
- the remaining 6% of respondents noted that it
was difficult for them to answer such a question
(Centre, 2022). Consequently, sociological
surveys indicate the beginning of the solution to
certain historical problems. In particular, there is
a noticeable trend towards the final rejection of
good-neighborly relations with Russia in the
future, transforming them into the status of
maximum neutral (but not friendly).
Discussion
The historical roots of the misunderstanding
between present-day Ukraine and Russia lie in
the history of development (Ostrovyi, 2022). As
early as the ninth century, the state-centered in
Kyiv was called Rus, a name that later spread to
all the lands that recognized the power of the
princes of Kyiv. At the same time, the narrow
meaning of the term was preserved for quite a
long time: the territories around Kyiv were
considered Rus' (Mereniuk & Parshyn, 2021).
While the lands in the northeast, which became a
stronghold of the Moscow princedom, were
considered by the Slavs to be Zalessia, although
the culture there also had Byzantine-Russian
roots (Parfinenko et al., 2019). Any imperial
ambitions of the Russians toward Ukraine came
later, only in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, when the Russian Empire was actually
created. True, the transformation of Russia and
its transformation into the Soviet Union proved
to be more devastating for Ukraine: while Tsarist
Russia sought to “denazify” primarily the
Ukrainian elite, the Soviets Russified everyone.
The consequences of this process became evident
in 1991 when a significant part of Ukrainian
citizens inherited the Soviet mentality:
everything Russian was recognized as privileged,
everything Ukrainian as primitive (Kuzio, 2021).
This paradigm, therefore, underwent gradual
changes - new generations of Ukrainians
perceived their country differently. Although
sociological surveys indicated that Russia was
considered a friendly country, the number of
supporters of democratic Western values was
growing. At the same time, the regime and.
Putin's regime was acquiring striking
authoritarian traits (Galeotti, 2019). Control of
the Russian media, the formation of biased public
opinion, and militarism led to the annexation of
Crimea in 2014 and the deployment of the war in
Donbas. February 2022 was a new test for
Ukraine, resulting in a significant change in
attitudes toward Russia.
One should trust sociological surveys that
indicate a decrease in supporters of Russia and an
increase in the popularity of NATO and the
European Union. The methods of barbaric
warfare imposed by the Russians have been
permanently imprinted in the minds of
Ukrainians, and there will be no quick
reconciliation with the opponents. This indicates,
in particular, the elimination of the old
mythologem of “fraternal nations,” which was
once actively propagated. Also, a considerable
fascination with Russian cultural achievements
will become a thing of the past, since, given all
the atrocities of the Russians, they have nothing
to do with the modern aggressor country. An
important dilemma is also the appeal to NATO
and the European Union. Previously, there was
an uncertain attitude toward these structures.
Now, given the help and support of Western
allies, Ukrainians will definitely relate better to
representatives of the Alliance in the future.
Conclusions
The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in
2014 and especially its escalation since February
2022 brought a new understanding of Russian-
Ukrainian relations in the post-Soviet space.
According to sociological surveys, attitudes in
Ukraine toward Russians have long been
predominantly positive. Joint history, economic
relations, and achievements in science and
culture deepened this cooperation. At the same
time, the gradual formation of I. Putin's
authoritarian and propaganda-blinded society has
exposed old imperial stereotypes of Russian
thinking. As proven, the majority of Ukrainians
believe that the restoration of pre-war Russian-
Ukrainian relations is impossible, the current
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level of support for Ukraine's integration into the
EU is high. According to the analyzed data, 69%
of the respondents believe that this accession to
the EU will take place within 5 years. Ukrainians
are also confident in their own armed forces,
which, in their opinion, are capable of protecting
them from aggression. At the same time, to be
fair, we should note Ukrainians' understanding of
the true essence of the war: according to
sociological surveys, Ukrainians extend
responsibility for aggression and waging a
destructive war to all Russians, not only to the
Russian authorities headed by I. Putin. This
correlates with obtaining truthful information
about the Russian speeches in favor of the war,
support for the main conventional signs of this
conflict, etc. In this, we see a skillful
confrontation in the information war, which was
not the case, for example, in 2014. - The Russian
side failed to show and impose on Ukrainians and
the whole world its vision of the development of
events, the voluntary annexation of territories,
and the fictitious “atrocities” of the Ukrainian
military. In reality, Donetsk, occupied by pro-
Russian collaborators, has not been turned into a
“sacrificial stone” - the city does not look
destroyed even after the start of hostilities in
February 2022. Obviously, Russian propaganda
has failed and cannot shape Ukrainian public
opinion. New times dictate new trends in public
opinion. Obviously, they have no place for old
dilemmas like the mythologem of “brotherly
peoples” (to be or not to be together with russia?).
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