Volume 10 - Issue 45
/ September 2021
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2021.45.09.3
How to Cite:
Sheremet, O. S., Voluiko, O. M., Posmitna, V. V., Poda, T., & Bidzilya, Y. M. (2021). Political and legal aspects of the information
warfare. Amazonia Investiga, 10(45), 31-41.
https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2021.45.09.3
Political and legal aspects of the information warfare
Політико-правові аспекти інформаційної війни
Received: July 20, 2021 Accepted: September 15, 2021
Written by:
Oleg S. Sheremet
7
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9512-991X
Oleksii M. Voluiko
8
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0894-5004
Victoriia V. Posmitna
9
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8719-1767
Tetiana Poda
10
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9662-1204
Yuriy M. Bidzilya
11
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5134-3239
Abstract
This article describes the technological features
of information warfare and possible lawful
mechanisms to counter information attacks. The
aim of the article is to analyse the political and
legal features of information warfare. The tactics
of the aggressor state’s behaviour in a hybrid war
was substantiated using the case of the
information war between Russia and Ukraine.
The channels of information dissemination,
which are most often used for disintegration and
disinformation purposes, were studied.
Problematic issues of the domestic public space
that most often appear in the perspective of
disinformation attacks on the Internet are
determined: the activities of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, cooperation between Ukraine and the
EU, reforms in Ukrainian society, temporarily
occupied territories and annexed Crimea,
corruption in Ukraine. The tactics of
confrontation between countries in the
information space was analysed — attempts to
establish their “security belt” from other actors in
international relations and to maintain their own
7
Doctor of Law, Associate Professor of the Department of Law, Philosophy and Political Science of O.M. Lazarevskyi Institute of
History and Socio-humanitarian Disciplines of Taras Shevchenko National University "Chernihiv Collegium", Ukraine.
8
PhD in Juridical Sciences, Head of the Department of Legal Support of Military-combat Activity of the Kyiv Faculty of the National
Academy of the National Guard of Ukraine, Ukraine.
9
PhD in Philological Science, Associate Professor of the Department of Legal Support of Military-combat Activity of the Kyiv Faculty
of the National Academy of the National Guard of Ukraine, Ukraine.
10
PhD in Philosophy, Associate Professor of the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Linguistics and Social Communications,
National Aviation University, Ukraine.
11
Doctor of Social Communications, Professor, Head of the Department of Journalism, Faculty of Philology, Uzhhorod National
University, Ukraine.
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dominant influence in certain regions by
spreading misinformation. Promising areas of
further research will be the analysis of the
peculiarities of the national legal systems’
development in order to counter misinformation
in the context of the continuous development of
democracy in the world.
Keywords: Information war, misinformation,
political and legal aspects, mental aggression,
media development, mass media, social
networks.
Introduction
Information war is the most common form of
modern confrontation, targeting human
consciousness (Easton & Almond, 2016; Batyuk,
2017). It is based on the ability to control and
manipulate public opinion, that is playing up to
the human will. People live in the information
space and receive information from the Internet,
press, radio and television programmes on a daily
basis. In a symbolic world that is separate from
reality, they may even conflict with their own
interests. Reality has receded into the
background. People are not free in this sense,
especially because there are many ways to
effectively influence information. There is the
term “brainwashing”, which can create a passive,
flexible person and turn his/her into a controlled
group. Overcoming the threats posed by
information wars is a factor in national security.
Information wars lead to the destruction of the
unified information space of the state,
manipulation of public consciousness, illegal use
of special means of influencing public
consciousness, as well as intensification of
international competition for the possession of
information technology and resources.
One of the factors contributing to the emergence
of information wars is the inadequate regulation
of relations in the information sphere, as well as
insufficient practice of law enforcement in
disinformation processes. This determines the
topicality of this research. The formation of
public consciousness with the help of the subjects
of information war using the methods of
psychological influence is becoming the most
effective way of control and manipulation both
within the state and abroad. It all depends on who
actually determines the information content.
Russia’s political and information war against
Ukraine has become a long-term factor affecting
the country’s national security. It is necessary to
develop an effective concept of information
security to combat this impact.
Therefore, the aim of this work is to explore the
political and legal aspects of information warfare
and the mythologising of public consciousness
that accompanies this process. This aim involves
fulfilment of the following research objectives:
1) analysis of the features of information wars,
misinformation and mediatisation of political
consciousness to ensure the goals of individual
policy actors; 2) identification of problems of
active involvement of states in the processes of
counteracting threats in the information space.
Literature review
There are three main goals in the information
war: control over the information space and
ensuring the protection of one’s information
from hostile actions; use of control over the
information space for information attacks on the
enemy; increasing the overall efficiency of
information functions. According to a number of
theorists, continuing to stop broadcasting pro-
Russian TV and radio channels and
disseminating anti-Ukrainian information,
quickly refuting false information about Russia
in the Ukrainian media, reporting on government
agencies in the most transparent way and
improving media literacy of the Ukrainian people
are effective means of levelling threats to
Ukraine (Saakov, 2018; Bennett & Iyengar,
2010).
According to modern theorists, one of Russia’s
main tasks in the political, legal and information
war against Ukraine are the following (Blank,
2016; Dodonov, 2015):
−
creating an atmosphere with a negative
attitude to the cultural and historical heritage
of Ukrainian society;
−
manipulation of public opinion and political
orientation of the Ukrainian people to create
political tension and chaotic country;
Sheremet, O.S., Voluiko, O.M., Posmitna, V.V., Poda, T., Bidzilya, Y.M. / Volume 10 - Issue 45: 31-41 / September, 2021
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−
destabilization of political relations between
political parties, associations and
movements in order to incite conflicts,
arouse distrust, suspicion, aggravate
hostility and struggle for power;
−
discrediting the behaviour of top public
servants of Ukraine;
−
initiation of protests and disobedience;
−
undermining the country’s international
prestige and cooperation with other
countries;
−
creation or strengthening opposition
organisations or movements, especially the
extreme right or the extreme left;
−
discrediting the national history and national
identity of Ukrainians;
−
initiation of changes in worldviews and
value systems;
−
minimisation of information on
achievements recognised in science,
technology and other fields, focusing on
shortcomings, consequences of wrong
actions and unqualified government
decisions;
−
undermining the morale of the population
(fatigue from war, political scandals,
disbelief in victory) and, as a consequence,
the reduction of defence capabilities and
combat potential of the army;
−
damage to critical infrastructure (hardware,
software, protection tools and protection
regime against unauthorised leakage).
Other theorists include the formation of
preconditions for economic, mental or military
disruption, loss of readiness to fight and win,
destructive information-psychological,
information-technical and ideological influence
(Bukkvoll, 2016; Cassiday & Johnson, 2016).
The field of information warfare promotes the
free flow of information. All actions in
information conflicts are necessary to achieve the
intended political priorities over the enemy.
Information warfare implies the following
actions: gaining social control, manipulating
information, disinformation, propaganda
(Bielawski & Radomska, 2017). Such influences
can lead to political results, to a change in the
political views of the enemy in an information
war.
Regime change as an operational policy is
supported by the control of selective information
to create a comfortable perception of events and
create a sense of legitimacy. The modern
approach to political regime change and
information warfare is to unleash an all-out
attack through the information sphere
(dissemination of selective information), thereby
preventing politicians from adequately
responding to the impending threat (Simons,
2021). Information systems are used by actors
who want to undermine state institutions and
political systems and create political upheavals
by compromising public information systems
(Desouza et al., 2019).
Between 2018 and 2021, the EU recorded more
than 11,000 cases of misinformation, most of
which concerned Ukraine. According to the
representative of the European Commission, the
spread of false information is increasing, which
is a threat to democracy and damages the
reputation of the media. Therefore, appropriate
mechanisms should be developed to detect false
information. We can say that a full-scale war is
being waged against Ukraine: the form is
“political” and the content is “asymmetric”.
Thus, it is necessary to create special legislation
aimed at legal support of information security,
and the effective application of existing
legislation, the rules of which often make it
possible to effectively guarantee information
security (Kharytonov et al., 2019). Given that
information wars can lead to global threats and
security, the need to develop a convention in
accordance with international law to regulate the
arena of information warfare becomes an urgent
issue (Qureshi, 2019).
It is worth noting that according to the classical
approach expressed in the book of the ancient
Chinese strategist Sun Tzu — The Art of War —
the nature of any war is deceptive. Therefore,
most citizens of the country who have been
attacked by political information are usually
disoriented by large volumes of contradictory
information, and do not understand the
immediate scale and dangers for the whole
country.
The Internet has become a disseminator of false
information. The more people depend on social
networking sites, the more likely they are to
unknowingly come across information that could
change their point of view and influence political
behavior (Asri & Sualman, 2019). But it should
be noted that other (traditional) media have also
been involved in spreading misleading
information about a certain population in certain
countries and defending certain actions. First,
they are not very effective, and electronic media
can report fake news today. Second, publications
in print media are documents, so both the author
and the publication can be prosecuted. Due to its
nature, radio is not suitable for disseminating
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such information. Nowadays, television has
gained unprecedented power, but there are two
reasons why forgery may occur: negligence,
unconfirmed information, incompetence of
reporters and the decisive influence of the
government on the national information policy of
electronic media (Snegovaya, 2018; Gerbner,
2018).
For example, in Ukraine there are many
publications that actively disseminate
information of dubious quality, sometimes
misinformation. For example, publications such
as the false statement by Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (NATO), General
Breedlove about air strikes against Russian
troops in Ukraine (published on the National
Anti-Corruption Portal page) (Calha, 2015;
Galeotti, 2017; Kurian, 2011). However, the
number of fake news from Russian TV channels
and Internet sources is very large. With the help
of the Russian media, Vladimir Putin’s regime
has launched a real political war against Ukraine.
Political war usually targets young people.
Therefore, the emphasis on the spread of fake
messages is concentrated in social networks,
which are very popular among young people. To
this end, the Russian authorities have set up the
so-called “Internet troll factory” in St. Petersburg
— young people who pretend to be real members
of the Internet, widely concentrating and
disseminating provocative and outrageous
information. The purpose of this action is
psychological treatment of citizens of Ukraine
and other countries, including Internet users in
Russia. The principle of operation of the “Troll
Factory” is that “repeated lies become a fact”,
when users do not want to follow alternative
opinions on any issues. An example of this
activity is false information about the demolition
of a giant Mother Homeland Monument on
Pechersk Hill in Kyiv.
Methods and materials
Research design
The research procedure involved 2 stages:
1. The preparatory stage included content
analysis of scientific literature on the
selected topic, review of news headlines of
the largest news media, secondary analysis
of empirical data from analytical reports of
international organisations.
2. The field stage involved conducting
qualitative sociological research in the form
of focus groups.
Methods
Well-known methods were used at the
preparatory stage. Methods of qualitative data
processing were used, which include statistical
data of information sources on false media data,
classification of methods. Theoretical research
method allowed identifying the political and
legal characteristics of information war. To
strengthen it, empirical methods of scientific
research were used: observations and
generalisations, which involved obtaining facts
about the information war, forecasting trends in
the intervention of some states in the affairs of
other states.
Qualitative methods of focus group interviews
were used. This approach allowed getting a wide
range of opinions and creating group dynamics to
update and problematise issues related to
countering information threats from different
target groups.
Sample
Transcripts of 2 focus groups were obtained in
the course of the field stage. A total of 2 focus
group interviews were conducted: 1) with media
representatives (8 respondents); 2) with
representatives of public organisations and active
citizens (8 respondents).
Both meetings took place online because of a
pandemic. The study also used the method of
secondary analysis of sociological data.
Sociological surveys were used, which claim to
be determined as mass and national. The
sampling method was used in the process. The
sample population was representative of the
whole of Ukraine. The stratification principle
was applied when building the sample. The strata
were the regions of Ukraine, there are
respondents from all regions of Ukraine.
Confidence probability (accuracy) — 95%, error
2-3%.
A secondary analysis of the results of
sociological survey was used to substantiate the
functional threats of disorientation policy. In the
course of the research, mass sociological surveys
(Social Communications Research Center, Socis
(https://socis.kiev.ua/ua), etc.) were analysed
with a representative sample by gender, age, and
territorial attributes. The general population in
such studies averaged more than 2,000 people,
with an error of no more than 2.5%.
Thus, the methodology of analysis of the subject
of research is used, aimed at reflecting the
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pluralistic positions of two important
stakeholders, participants in the political and
legal process. The behavioural approach, which
connects the active position of the media and
civil society in the context of information
confrontations, has proved fruitful for the
analysis of procedural aspects of information
warfare.
Results and discussion
A cross-cutting line among the factors of the
information war was the problem of
insufficiently high abilities of citizens to think
critically. Political, informational, media literacy
is an important factor in counteracting real and
potential information attacks (see Table 1).
Table 1.
Aspects of improving political and information literacy.
Item
No.
Aspects
Description
1.
Verification
To maintain trust in the official or recognised media, Internet users need to take
precautionary measures to avoid falling victim to misinformation. It is necessary
to check any content received online, especially if you are going to use it and
distribute it further. Verification technologies based on the help of volunteer
users are becoming increasingly popular. Communities such as Bellingcat and
#DigitalSherlocks, Stopfake view the verification and geolocation of volunteers
as important team activities.
2.
Exposure
One of the problems that users need to consider is “inflation” of false stories —
whether the misinformation is spreading further and even more as a result of the
exposure of facts and publication of results, whether it does not give them too
much publicity.
3.
Checking for
correspondence
to reality
Analyse the articles of journalists who study suspicious statements and verify
the facts, answering questions from the audience.
4.
Media literacy
One of the best ways to stop the spread of misinformation is to spread
information which helps the audience to critically evaluate the information they
read on social networks.
Source: compiled by the authors
An example of resistance in the information
confrontation was the new project Information as
a Weapon. Materials for the development of
media literacy are published daily on the official
website of the organization Svoboda. These
materials reveal the essence of information war,
principles of behaviour, tasks, classification of
information weapons, features and methods of its
use. Ukraine’s Strategic Plan brings together
politicians, experts, analysts, journalists and
public figures to improve Ukraine’s national
security. The purpose of its activities is to
participate in the formation and decision-making
on national security issues to improve Ukraine’s
defence capabilities, reform the national security
and defence sector in accordance with NATO
standards, promote Ukraine’s integration into the
Euro-Atlantic security framework.
At the same time, in countries with totalitarian
political regimes, television is the main focus of
the most powerful, impressive, accessible and
widely used media (Table 2).
Table 2.
Political and informational trust of citizens in the media.
Item No.
Type of information resource
Ration in %
1.
Television
82%
2.
Web-site news
55%
3.
Social networks
52%
4.
Radio
28%
5.
Print media
23%
6.
Television news
30%
Source: compiled by the authors
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The television, which will rank first for a long
time, was preferred by 82% of respondents
(Zozulia, 2020). In the course of the research, we
asked the same question in two focus groups —
with representatives of the media and
representatives of civil society institutions, active
citizens — “What should be the actions of
citizens in the information war”? We received the
same answers in both focus groups: check
information, reveal false stories, continuously
improve information literacy.
During the focus groups (see Table 3), media
representatives and active citizens strongly
argued that national information security should
now become a fundamental component of the
national security strategy.
Table 3.
Generalised results of the focus groups conducted by the author (survey of media and civil society
representatives on the topic of information war)
Question
Focus group with representatives
of civil society institutions
Focus group with media
representatives
In your opinion, what is
the role of the state in
counteracting
misinformation?
Determinant — the state is
responsible for the safety of
citizens, including in the
information sphere
The state’s role is important, but it can
weaken without the efforts of the
public sector and an active position in
the application of critical thinking by
citizens
In your opinion, what is
the participation of the
media in counteracting
information attacks?
Today’s media does not always
provide a fair and objective
coverage of events. Therefore, their
participation may entirely support
information attacks or resist them
Determinant — the media with
maximum responsibility are involved
in the process of countering
information attacks
In your opinion, what is
the significance of the
participatory role of civil
society in counteracting
information wars?
Civil society must be active and not
indifferent to national security
issues. But the state carries the
main load in counteracting
information threats. Citizens pay
taxes, the state guarantees
“information well-being”
Determinant — citizens set the pitch to
the entire public discourse. The
presence or absence of “information
noise” in public discourse largely
depends on their choice of which media
to prefer, which topic to cover in this
media, or to share certain information
on social networks.
Source: compiled by the authors
Given the rapid development of information
technology and the growing influence of the
media, social networks, and other Internet
monitoring resources, news agencies are used as
the most common means of information warfare
(information aggression).
International legal acts on information security
provide for restrictions on freedom of speech to
protect the rights and reputation of other person
and/or to protect national security and public
order, health and morals. On May 16, 2011, the
UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, Hoffman (2014), submitted a
report to the UN Human Rights Council on the
main trends and problems of people in finding
and transmitting information and ideas via the
Internet.
This report also sets out general methods for
restricting access to the Internet: 1) the law
should provide for clear restrictions; 2)
restrictions should be applied only to protect the
rights and reputation of other persons and/or to
protect national security and public order, health
and morals (Article 19, paragraph 3, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights); 3) the need to restrict freedom of speech
must be proven. The application of the provisions
requires prior confirmation of the facts of
information aggression of one state against
another, which can result in armed conflict,
terrorist acts, sabotage, thousands of wounded,
increased internal migration, number of refugees,
and so on.
Given the urgent need to protect the national
information space, the Parliament of Ukraine
adopted, revised and amended some regulations.
Thus, Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine “On
Ensuring Civil Rights and Freedoms, and the
Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied
Territory of Ukraine” recognizes the Russian
Federation as the occupying power. It should be
noted that although there is much evidence that
Ukraine still does not recognize Russia as an
aggressor, there is reason to talk about a hybrid
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nature of the confrontation (part of which is a
targeted misinformation campaign) (Law No.
1207-VII, 2014).
Laws and draft laws on the establishment of a
system for the protection of the national
information space complement national
legislation. In particular, it is the Decree of the
President of Ukraine on approval of the decision
of the National Security and Defenсe Council of
Ukraine “On National Cybersecurity Threats and
Emergency Measures to Eliminate Threats" and
“On the Doctrine of Information Security of
Ukraine” (February 2017) (Decree of the
President of Ukraine № 47/2017, 2017); “On the
Application of Personal Special Economic and
Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)” (April
2017) (Decree of the President of Ukraine
№133/2017, 2017); “On the Threat to National
Cyber Security and Emergency Measures to
Eliminate these Threats” (August 2017), the Law
of Ukraine “On Basic Principles of Cyber
Security of Ukraine” (October 2017) (Law No.
2163-VIІI, 2017).
These provisions have provoked a negative
reaction of not only the media, but also
practitioners and scholars in the legal field and
other areas related to the provision of
information. International Security Experts
Pazyuk and Mitsik (2019) conducted a detailed
legal analysis of the Decree of the President of
Ukraine based on the decision of the National
Security and Defence Council “On the
Implementation of Certain Special Economic
Measures and Other Restrictive Measures
(Sanctions)”. Experts concluded that some of the
above provisions and other provisions of
information laws and regulations do not take into
account the technical components of the
country’s information security system. This
directly affects the level of effectiveness of
measures to ensure the national information field
security, their implementation and management.
The complexity of this situation increases the
urgency of developing the legal aspects of
modern information wars.
The actual situation of legal liability for violation
of freedom of speech always has certain socio-
economic consequences. Therefore, the
Presidential Decree “On the Application of
Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive
Measures (Sanctions)”, which prohibits Internet
service providers from providing resources to
Internet users, does not comply with the
principles of legality and legal grounds of such
restriction. From a legal point of view, blocking
Russian Internet resources is also a somewhat
controversial step. Joining the “club” of countries
that block Internet resources (Russia, North
Korea and China) is a very controversial
decision.
Prohibition is always the simplest and most
unpleasant choice. This is not the right strategy
for a country that seeks to implement European
integration intentions. The view of the
international community on this issue is
undoubtedly negative. Blocking information
resources can help rather than hinder
propaganda. As a rule, it is difficult to provide a
good confrontation without falling to the
aggressor’s level. In order to protect their
democratic values, centuries-old traditions and
achievements in the field of human rights,
European countries are forced to find ways to
restrict freedom of speech in order to protect this
type of democracy. In fact, the effects of
information aggression far outweigh the
capabilities of conventional means, and it
encourages temporary restrictions on democracy
in order to uphold democratic values in the
future. According to the focus groups, the
opinion of representatives and active citizens was
divided by about 50% to 50%: one half of the
respondents were in favour of blocking Russian
information resources in Ukraine, the other half
were strongly against such radical steps at the
state level.
Usually, measures in the field of information
security include: formulation and
implementation of information security strategy
of Ukraine; introduction of a public register of
owners/managers of Internet resources; creation
of special state institutions to respond to
information aggression; implementation of
educational programmes of media literacy;
creating favourable conditions for the promotion,
development and accessibility of domestic book
publishing, television and film production,
education and culture; forced use of antivirus
software; strengthening responsibility for the use
of unlicensed software.
Analysis of the experience of the United States
and European countries on legislation and
regulations on information war shows that the
main tools to combat the information
disorientation campaign are the following: 1) the
development of social information culture;
2) development of social information culture,
introduction of specialised state and interstate
institutions to combat and prevent cyberattacks;
3) creation of cyberpolice; 4) introduction of
state registrars of Internet resources for
dissemination of unreliable information
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(misinformation, hostile propaganda, etc.);
5) development of national media education
programmes; 6) introduction of economic
sanctions on relevant entities in the information
market; 7) a ban on the use of simulation tools
and other information technology tools designed
to manipulate public awareness in elections;
8) the obligation to disclose sources of funds for
political advertising/advocacy in the media and
social networks; 9) creation of software based on
artificial intelligence technology for detection,
identification and marking of false information;
10) creation of databases of information
resources, analytical centers, tools for verifying
information and messages, etc.
There were 90% of the respondents in the focus
groups of media representatives and civil society
institutions who agreed with the urgency and
importance of such a step to ensure that
information challenges in modern Ukraine are
addressed within the legal field. The need to
adopt the Information Code of Ukraine should be
noted. This idea is enshrined in the Basic
Principles for the Development of Information-
Oriented Society in Ukraine for 2007-2015
(Zozulia, 2020; Stadnyk, 2017).
The study found that 90% of journalists and civic
activists surveyed in the focus group considered
the issue of consistent legal regulation to ensure
the country’s information security to be No. 1
problem. For a democracy, it is the most
important tool for countering disinformation
attacks by other countries. However, civil society
is showing a tendency towards a somewhat
paternalistic position of the state in ensuring
information security. Media representatives have
demonstrated a more proactive stance on their
own responsibility to counter misinformation
campaigns.
These views of the respondents are fully
summarised with the positions of modern
theorists. According to Barabash and Kotelenets
(2016), the ability to influence public
communication channels currently has a decisive
impact on the level of legitimacy of government.
Kalpokas (2017) extends this opinion. In his
works, he analyses the phenomenon of Internet
branding and its importance in increasing threats
to national security and political instability.
According to the author, the state, which is
considered as a brand, should project its image to
both domestic and foreign audiences. However,
when building a brand, states are vulnerable to
“sofa warriors” — ordinary people who are
involuntarily “recruited” by hostile actors to
spread (through social media or other platforms)
a counter-brand that is harmful to the state.
According to Akimenko, and Giles (2020), with
the growing level of digitalisation in the modern
world, the challenges of information wars will
become more pronounced, political elites will
identify them in the list of the most pressing
threats to national unity.
Bilan (2016) considers it necessary to introduce
Ukrainian information law. Today, the issue of
improving Ukrainian information legislation in
the creation, dissemination and use of
information is very important in accordance with
modern needs and challenges. According to
domestic lawyers, this improvement should be
done through codification, formulation and
adoption of the Information Code of Ukraine. In
particular, the famous Ukrainian scientist and
politician Gorbulin supports this idea. This code
would be especially important for the regulation
of socio-political processes both for the
population suffering from information
confrontation and for the regulation of the state’s
position in the international community (Zozulia,
2020; Karber, 2015). In the case of Ukraine, we
are dealing not only with hostile propaganda, but
also with a “semantic (value-based, meaningful)
war” correctly described by intelligence experts.
The whole set of information communication is
used to retransmit these values. The main
structural element of this war is imitation images,
which do not really exist. Examples of such
imitations are “fascists in Kyiv”, “cruelty of
punitive forces”, “punished guys” and the use of
prohibited weapons in Ukraine. The strategic
goals of the operation of these simulators are to
replace the objective ideas of the target groups
about the nature of the conflict with the
“information phantoms” that the aggressor
needs.
The introduction of alternative concepts,
meanings and imitations has led to the fact that
this hybrid method of war has divided public
opinion in Ukraine into more pro-Russian or
more anti-Russian. The decree on blocking
Russian Internet resources theoretically confirms
that war is a war in the media. If the media
usually cover military operations, the battle of
values will have the opposite picture. The armed
forces complete an operations launched by the
media. As a result, the citizens of Ukraine
postponed the actions of the armed forces in the
conflict zone in protest against their participation
in hostilities.
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The description of the famous Russian political
scientist Yakovlev is also interesting. Reading
Russian scientific articles for five years,
Yakovlev noted with interest that the people who
coordinate the introduction and interpretation of
Russian news studied the same textbook
(Zozulia, 2020; Kriesi, 2013). The human psyche
is arranged as follows: as soon as the accusation
becomes the subject of public discussion, its
“supporters” and “opponents”, “experts” and
“sofa experts” inevitably appear. A “big lie” can
cause deep emotional trauma for the listener or
viewer, which will determine their point of view
over a long period of time, which contradicts any
arguments of logic and reason.
The “40 by 60” method was invented by
Goebbels. It is to create media that cover 60% of
their information in the enemy’s interests.
Having thus earned his trust, the remaining 40%
they use for extremely effective, thanks to this
trust, misinformation (Lilleker, 2006; Snyder,
2010). Instead of proving something, the
information is presented as something obvious,
self-evident, and therefore unquestionably
supported by the majority of the population.
Despite its apparent simplicity, this method is
incredibly effective, because the human psyche
automatically responds to the opinion of the
majority, seeking to join it. However, it is
important to remember that the majority must be
overwhelming, and its support must be absolute
and unconditional. If these conditions are met,
the number of supporters of the “majority
position” begins to grow gradually, but steadily
and increases exponentially over time (mainly
due to members of the lower social strata, who
are most vulnerable to “joining influence”
effect).
One of the classic ways to support the “absolute
obviousness” approach is to publish the results of
various surveys that demonstrate absolute social
consensus on specific issues. “Black”
propaganda technology does not require that
these reports be in any way related to reality. A
lot can be said about all these methods, because
their list is huge. However, there are other
important things. The method of “black”
propaganda influences the audience through a
deep psychological mechanism, so that the
consequences of this influence cannot be
eliminated by ordinary logical arguments.
Usually, this is impossible for the joining effect
not to occur. However, if these conditions are
met, the number of supporters of the “majority
position” begins to grow gradually but steadily,
and increases exponentially over time (mainly
due to members of the lower social strata, who
are most prone to the “joining effect”) (Lilleker,
2006; Popescu, 2015).
However, the information war, in which Ukraine
is significantly weaker than Russia, is also
important. Therefore, the following objectives
are important: building the political culture of
Ukrainians, influencing the public consciousness
of the population by creating effective counter-
myths, demythologising consciousness,
including the population of Eastern and Southern
Ukraine, systemic rational explanations,
counterarguments, even humour, and, of course,
building a single state positive myth.
Demythologisation of mass consciousness is
possible on the basis of the evolutionary
development of national and civic worldview,
strengthening critical attitudes in society,
development of independent media, raising the
level of education of the population, changing the
philosophy of life of the average Ukrainian and
state elite.
All methods of special propaganda are united by
a single goal. It is to weaken the enemy’s army
by introducing internal enmity, mutual hatred
and distrust to each other. The result they lead to
is the one they were created to achieve. However,
mutual hatred and internal enmity do not arise in
the enemy’s army, but in the homes and families
of citizens. It seems that special propaganda
works against its own population even more
effectively than against enemy soldiers. Probably
because the civilian population, unlike the enemy
soldiers, cannot defend themselves.
Over the last ten years, there have been countless
discussions on the need to adopt the Information
Code of Ukraine and determine its importance
for lawful settlement of problematic aspects of
information security. This code should be based
on the concept of national information policy.
Conclusions
Modern democratic society is forced to find a
balance between certain extremes. In order to
protect their democratic values, centuries-old
traditions and achievements in the field of human
rights, European countries have to find ways to
restrict freedom of speech in order to protect the
foundations of a democratic political regime. In
fact, the effects of information aggression far
outweigh the capabilities of conventional
weapons, and it encourages temporary
restrictions on democracy in order to maintain
democratic values in the future.
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In this case, temporary restrictions on democracy
should be seen as a way to preserve democratic
traditions in the future. Democracy can be
limited only to the period of eradication of threats
to its further existence. At the same time, these
measures can be applied only in countries with a
stable democratic system that are able to resist
the abuse of power by the ruling elite. On the one
hand, there is no democracy without freedom of
speech, while on the other hand, there is a danger
of using freedom of speech to manipulate public
consciousness.
Prospects for further research involve scientific
substantiation of the creation of an effective
mechanism for confronting information threats in
different national contexts. It is important to
analyse the needs of citizens, what information
they choose, from what sources, standards of
their reliability, which will affect the
consciousness, emotional expression, the
relationship between citizens and the media. In
order to withstand misinformation and
manipulation spread through social networks and
other communication channels in such
conditions, each state needs consolidation and
trust in the government. On the other hand, a
large-scale rapid-response information policy
with the use of modern technologies is important.
At the same time, citizens must properly filter
information, think critically, analyse, pay
attention to sources of information, media
owners, because as awareness increases,
manipulation decreases.
In addition, the possibility of imposing
international sanctions in the field of information
should be considered separately, namely: 1) the
requirement for media companies to geocode
their Internet content and encode Russian
satellite TV channels; 2) a ban on European
satellite/cable TV providers to provide services
to media companies in countries that have not yet
introduced geocoding of web content and
encoding of satellite TV signals.
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